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Abstract 
This study seeks both to describe and account for the patterns of industrial relations 
which have emerged in the UK coal industry since privatisation in 1994. In doing so, 
it also aims to address some of the wider questions concerning the relationship 
between ownership and industrial relations. 
A series of hypotheses are advanced concerning how changes in ownership 
might affect industrial relations within the industry, and whether such changes would 
have positive or negative implications for organised labour. 
A case study approach is utilised to analyse labour relations developments at a 
number of collieries, and it is shown that the industrial relations strategies adopted by 
management within the new coal enterprises have had a determining effect upon the 
patterns of labour relations within the privati sed industry. 
This study also demonstrates that the emergent pattern of labour relations in 
the privatised industry is characterised by both continuity and change. However, 
whilst continuity with the patterns of labour relations established during the final 
decade of public ownership is shown to have had negative implications for organised 
labour within the industry, the changes associated with privatisation are demonstrated 
to have been a more ambivalent force. 
Change has, in different contexts, had some positive implications for 
organised labour, but in the majority of cases, the implications for labour have been 
negative. Overall, therefore, this study concludes that privatisation has had a 
significant influence upon industrial relations within the coal industry, and that 
organised labour has been detrimentally affected by these developments. 
-------------- -----
For Billy, who worked in the mines for twenty seven years, and whose experience, 
like that of countless others, negates the old 
lie that hard work never hurt anyone. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Because coal is the most abundant indigenous energy source in the UK, and was the 
engine ofthe first industrial revolution, the mining industry has been of tremendous 
strategic and symbolic importance. Numerous literary works have drawn upon the 
powerful imagery associated with coal mining (e.g. Lawrence, 1994, Zola, 1954), 
and as mining has always involved arduous physical work in dangerous conditions, 
the coal miner has been viewed as the 'archetypal proletarian' (Harrison, 1978). 
Because of this, the industry, which has been characterised by periodic crises and 
conflicts (Raynes, 1928), has often been regarded as a 'special case' (Samuel, 1925 ; 
Hughes and Moore, 1972). 
When the coal industry was taken into public ownership in 1947, the 
National Coal Board (NCB) became the focus of study as the epitome of the post 
war nationalisation programme (Haynes, 1953 ; Baldwin, 1955). Industrial relations 
within the industry prior to nationalisation had been characterised by bitter conflict, 
and because of this, much of the academic interest in the public sector coal industry 
was concerned with the labour relations implications of public ownership. 
The end of the nationalised era is of equal significance however, this being 
illustrated by the description of the proposed de-nationalisation of coal as the 
'ultimate privatisation.' Resistance to the restructuring programme which preceded 
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privatisation led to the 1984-85 strike. This was the last major industrial dispute to 
take place in the industry before it was returned to the private sector, which 
generated a vast literature, comprising analyses of the dispute (e.g. Beynon, 1985 ; 
Winterton and Winterton, 1989), explorations of the role of coalfield women in the 
strike (e.g. Miller, 1986 ; Seddon, 1986; Stead, 1987), and examinations of the civil 
liberties issues arising from the policing of the dispute (e.g. Fine and Millar, 1985). 
Journalistic accounts of the dispute were also produced (e.g. Wilsher, Macintyre and 
Jones, 1985 ; Adeney and Lloyd, 1986), as were personal accounts of the sttike by 
key participants (e.g. Ottey, 1985 ; Macgregor, 1986 ; Smith, 1997). Literature of 
equal importance also emerged from within the mining communities themselves 
(e.g. Barnsley Women Against Pit Closures, 1984; 1985 ; Worsborough 
Community Group, 1985 ; People of Thurcroft, 1986; Douglass, 1986; Dolby, 
1987 ; Sheffield Women Against Pit Closures, 1987), which encompassed poetry 
(e.g. Gittins, 1986), and photographic art (e.g. Pattison and Beynon, 1984). 
Following the defeat of the 1984-85 strike, this attention was redirected 
towards the transition of the coal industry from public corporation to private 
enterprise (Gibbon and Bromley, 1990; Pendleton and Winterton, 1993), the social 
consequences of the associated restructuring (e.g. Wright, 1985 ; Wade, 1985 ; 
Beynon, Hudson and Sadler, 1986; Edwards, 1993), and the implications for the 
coal industry of privatising the electricity supply industry (e.g. Gladstone and 
Dewhirst, 1988 ; Fothergill and Guy, 1993 ; Green, 1994). More recently, however, 
academics have begun to explore the changes apparent within the coal industry since 
privatisation, and as was the case when the industry was nationalised, attention has 
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focused on the industrial relations implications of ownership change (Croney, 1996 ; 
Parry, Waddington and Critcher, 1997). 
This study can be viewed as a contribution to the debate on the patterns of 
industrial relations which have emerged in the coal industry since privatisation, and 
therefore to the wider questions concerning the relationship between ownership and 
labour relations. As such, it is likely to be of interest to management, who may have 
anticipated the opportunities presented by the new commercial environment 
engendered by privatisation ; to the trade unions, which were concerned that 
privatisation might undermine their bargaining position; and to individual workers, 
many of whom feared that privatisation might have a detrimental impact upon their 
terms and conditions of employment. 
This study is concerned with the extent to which the emergent patterns of 
industrial relations in the privati sed industry represent continuity or change with the 
past. Because the years of public ownership were characterised by having two 
distinct phases of labour relations, however, it also has a significant comparative 
dimension, since labour relations developments following privatisation are 
compared with both the earlier periods which are identified. 
In Chapter Two, the patterns of industrial relations which have prevailed 
within the coal industry since nationalisation in 1947 are considered, and the 1984-
85 strike is identified as a watershed. This chapter then explains how the 
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restructuring of industrial relations which followed the 1984-85 strike was 
inextricably linked to the restructuring of both operations and ownership. 
Chapter Three places the restructuring of the coal industry within the context 
of global capitalist restructuring. The privatisation programme instituted by the 
Conservatives during the 1980s and early 1990s is regarded as a manifestation of 
economic restructuring within the UK, and following an examination of the 
theoretical debate concerning the likely influence of privatisation upon industrial 
relations, labour relations developments in a number of privati sed industries are 
considered. Two alternative hypotheses are then outlined which relate to the 
possible influence of privati sat ion upon industrial relations in the coal industry, and 
the implications of this for organised labour. A model is also presented which 
illustrates how patterns of labour relations in the privati sed industry might be 
characterised by continuity or change, as a result of the interaction of management 
industrial relations strategies, and the responses of the mining unions to those 
strategies. 
In Chapter Four, consideration is given to the methodology to be employed 
in order to test the hypotheses presented within Chapter Three. The merits of a case 
study approach are considered, after which the research design is outlined, and the 
operationalisation of the research is explained. This chapter also details how 
problems relating to access necessitated a review of methodology, which led to the 
adoption of a somewhat unorthodox case study approach, in which three of the four 
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cases selected for study are holistic, whilst the final case is characterised by an 
embedded design. 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven are concerned with the empirical findings 
from three holistic case studies conducted at Cwmpridd colliery, Abergoed colliery 
and Workham colliery respectively. The structure of these chapters is identical, and 
reflects the analytical framework which was utilised when the case reports were 
being prepared. Each of these chapters therefore begins with an introduction to the 
case which is being considered, before developments in management industrial 
relations strategies are examined. The role of the trade unions is then analysed, 
followed by a consideration of the institutions of collective bargaining. 
Developments within the labour process are then assessed, and finally, some 
conclusions are offered as to whether the emergent patterns of labour relations are 
characterised by continuity or change. 
The structure of Chapter Eight is slightly different from that of chapters Five, 
Six and Seven, since it is concerned with empirical evidence drawn from the final 
case study which has an embedded, rather than holistic design. This chapter 
therefore begins with an introduction to Coal UK, the company which forms the 
initial unit of analysis. Following this, the four subsections, are each concerned with 
a different colliery owned by the company. The structure of these subsections is 
identical to that of chapters Five, Six and Seven, in that a brief introduction to each 
case is presented, before developments in management industrial relations strategies, 
the role of the trade unions, the institutions of collective bargaining and the labour 
Chapter 1 
6 
process are analysed. The conclusions presented at the end of this chapter consider 
whether the patterns of industrial relations which are evident at both corporate and 
colliery level represent continuity or change. 
In Chapter Nine the empirical findings detailed in the previous four chapters 
are compared, and some explanations are given for the emergent patterns of labour 
relations within the privatised coal industry. Finally, in Chapter Ten, the hypotheses 
and model presented at the end of chapter three are reconsidered, and their validity is 
assessed. 
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Chapter Two 
Background to contemporary change in coal mining 
On 1 January 1947, the UK coal industry was taken into public ownership by the 
Labour government returned by the first post war election. Collective bargaining 
had been in evidence within the industry long before the advent of public ownership, 
with negotiations being largely conducted on a district basis, since the miners' union 
was then comprised of a number of autonomous local organisations, loosely 
combined within the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (Ashworth, 1986). 
However, industrial relations took on a more formal and institutionalised character 
in the era of nationalisation. 
The Miners' Federation of Great Britain was replaced by the National Union 
of Mine workers (NUM), on 1 January 1945, although the federal structure was 
retained, and local areas continued to exercise considerable autonomy (Page Arnot, 
1979). Furthermore, local traditions remained pertinent and indeed, divisions 
between the politically militant coalfields of Scotland, South Wales, Kent, and later 
Yorkshire and the more moderate districts of Nottingham shire and the Midlands 
were to have a significant impact on industrial relations in the industry in later years. 
Collective bargaining nevertheless gradually became the prerogative of the national 
union under nationalisation. 
The terms and conditions of nationalisation reflected the corporatism of the 
post war consensus. The Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 (section 46) 
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obliged the newly created National Coal Board (NCB) to negotiate and consult with 
trade unions representing large sections of the workforce in order to establish joint 
structures for the negotiation of employment terms and conditions (Winterton and 
Winterton, 1993a: 71), and following nationalisation, joint consultative machinery 
was introduced at national, district, area and colliery levels in accordance with the 
Act (McCormick, 1979: 58). 
Formal conciliation machinery had already been established under wartime 
control. This had resulted in the creation of a National Board which consisted of a 
Joint National Negotiating Committee (JNNC), which provided for union 
representation, and a National Reference Tribunal which was composed of 
independent people, and which made binding awards when the JNNC failed to reach 
agreement. After nationalisation, conciliation machinery was also introduced at 
colliery level (McCormick, 1979: 45). 
Industrial relations then, were both highly regulated and pluralistic 
(Goodman, 1984: 65-68) in character during the early decades ofnationalisation. 
The institutional framework which was developed to support collective bargaining 
was based on an acceptance that capital and labour within the industry had 
competing interests that required accommodation, and indeed, the conciliation 
procedures were highly effective in relation to the resolution of disputes throughout 
the period of nationalisation (Winterton, 1981: 16). Furthermore, the existence of 
tripartite arrangements for strategic planning within the industry, involving the 
government, NCB management and the mining unions, arguably enabled the 
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contraction of the industry during the 1960s to be managed more sensitively than 
were the closures of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
In 1985, the defeat of the year long strike by NUM members opposed to pit 
closures facilitated sweeping changes in patterns of industrial relations within the 
industry, and the reassertion of managerial power. The 1984-85 strike was a 
watershed in terms of industrial relations in coal, although the origins of the changes 
which occurred can be traced back to the early 1970s. 
Following the first oil shock of 1973, when oil prices trebled, global demand 
for coal began to rise, and throughout the 1970s global supply was increased in order 
to meet this, with new reserves in Colombia, South Africa and Australia being 
exploited (Rutledge and Wright, 1985: 307). 
In the UK the implementation of the 1974 Plan for Coal, a tripartite 
agreement negotiated by the Labour government, the NCB and the NUM, following 
the union's victory in the 1974 wage dispute, resulted in the development of new 
capacity to replace collieries lost through exhaustion. Plan for Coal also committed 
the industry to "operate at optimum efficiency," (NCB, 1974), and as a result new 
technologies and operational techniques were adopted at both new and existing 
collieries, which served to increase both output and productivity (Winterton and 
Winterton, 1995), although the ambitious projected output targets outlined in Plan 
for Coal were not met in full, and were revised downwards by the 1977 tripartite 
agreement Coal for the Future (Edwards and Reery, 1989: 199). As a result of the 
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long development times inherent to coal extraction, many of the expansionist 
projects designed to increase coal production in both the UK and the world were 
only just beginning to come on stream when the recession of 1981 depressed global 
demand for coal. 
By the beginning of the 1980s demand and supply side changes had resulted 
in international coal markets facing a crisis of over supply, which necessitated major 
restructuring in the global coal industry. In the UK industry this entailed the closure 
of uneconomic, i.e. surplus, capacity, which implied the closure of collieries on 
grounds other than exhaustion (Winterton and Winterton, 1989). This was not a 
situation envisaged by Plan for Coal, and was diametrically opposed to NUM policy 
which committed the union to resisting closures on grounds other than exhaustion. 
By the early 1980s however, there were also a number of political factors 
which pointed towards major restructuring in the UK coal industry, some of which, 
like their economic counterparts, had their origins in events which transpired a 
decade earlier. 
During the early decades of the nationalised era, the coal industry was noted 
for being relatively strike prone, and various theories have been advanced in order to 
explain this (Clegg, 1979; Lynch, 1978; Winterton, 1981). Somewhat 
paradoxically however, the industrial relations strategies adopted by the NUM at 
national level following nationalisation, focused on co-operation rather than 
confrontation with NCB management. In part this was because the NUM saw co-
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operation with the NCB as the most appropriate strategy for ensuring the success of 
coal nationalisation, although it was also a consequence of the miners being divided, 
because pay was determined at area rather than national level (Allen, 1981), until the 
implementation of a series of wage structure agreements, comprising the 1955 
Revision of Wages Structure Agreement, the 1966 National Power Loading 
Agreement (NPLA) and the 1971 Third Day Wage Structure Agreement, which 
created centralised pay bargaining in the industry (Winterton, 1981: 13-14). 
The increased demand for coal generated by the 1973 oil shock however, 
served greatly to increase the bargaining power of the NUM at a time when there 
was a resurgence of militancy within the coalfields. This had been demonstrated in 
1969, when unofficial strike action took place in several coalfields following a claim 
for a reduction in the hours worked by surface employees (McCormick, 1979). 
Moreover in 1971, the NUM national conference supported a rule change which 
reduced the majority necessary for strike action to be called from 66 per cent to 55 
per cent, which paved the way for the first national stoppage for over forty years in 
1972 in support of a pay claim. 
The increasing militancy of the miners during the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
was in part a consequence of the establishment of centralised pay bargaining which 
enabled the NUM to unite over this issue. It was also a reflection of the rising power 
of the political left within the NUM, most crucially within the Yorkshire Area. 
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In 1967, the Barnsley Miners' Forum had been established to campaign for 
the election of left wing candidates to posts within the NOM (Winterton and 
Winterton, 1989), and indeed in 1973, the election of Arthur Scargill and Owen 
Briscoe as President and Secretary respectively of the Yorkshire Area NUM, 
affirmed the ascendancy of the political left within the UK's largest and therefore 
most strategically important coalfield. Left wingers such as Mick McGahey were 
also elected to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the NUM during the 
early 1970s, and by the end of 1973, the left was within a handful of votes of ending 
the traditional right wing dominance of that body (Allen, 1981), although the 
Presidency of the national union did not fall to the left until the election of Scargill 
in 1982. 
In November 1973, the NUM implemented a national overtime ban in pursuit 
of a pay claim, which was escalated into an all out stoppage in February 1974. The 
national strike of 1974 precipitated the downfall of the Conservative government led 
by Edward Heath. However, the overtime ban which preceded it also prompted a 
review of industrial relations policies within the upper echelons of NCB 
management, and a secret report prepared by Wilfred Miron, former Chairman of the 
NCB East Midlands Division, for Sir Derek Ezra, then NCB Chairman, in December 
1973 outlined a strategy to reduce the influence of the political left within the NUM. 
Miron's scheme rested firstly on a return to local wage bargaining, in order 
that moderate areas could be divided from more militant ones, as had been the case 
prior to the implementation of the 1966 NPLA, and secondly, on the adoption of 
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new technologies, which would reduce the staffing levels required within the 
industry, and reduce the miners' control of the labour process at the point of 
production (Winterton and Winterton, 1989: 9-12). The Miron Report then, 
advocated a radical restructuring of both the labour process within coal mining, and 
of the industrial relations policies which had prevailed within the industry since 
nationalisation. 
The analysis and objectives of the Miron Report were arguably reflected in a 
number of NCB policies which emerged during the 1970s and 1980s. By 1978, area 
incentive schemes were in operation in every UK coalfield, (Ashworth, 1986: 674-
675), despite mineworkers having twice rejected the introduction of such schemes in 
national ballots (Richards, 1996: 51). Furthermore, between 1973 / 74 and 1981 / 
82, average staffing levels at UK collieries fell by almost 20 per cent (Ashworth, 
1986: 674-675). The NCB's goal of restructuring, and the reassessment of industrial 
relations policies in the public sector however, were given added impetus by the 
election of a Conservative government in 1979. 
The Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher rejected the 
corporatism of the post war consensus (Beynon and McMylor, 1985), and instead 
was committed to the neo-liberal values of free market economics. Organised labour 
was seen by the Conservatives as a barrier to the operation of the free market, and as 
a consequence, a series of legislative measures beginning with the 1980 
Employment Act were introduced, which restricted the powers of trade unions, by 
removing legal immunities and protection against unfair dismissal, restricting the 
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right to picket and the operation of the closed shop, and by introducing pre-strike 
ballots. Furthermore, social security legislation introduced in 1980, reduced the 
level of welfare benefits paid to strikers (Jones and Novak, 1985). 
The Conservative government, however, was also committed to returning 
many of the nationalised industries to the private sector, and to ensuring that those 
industries which remained within the public domain operated within a "clearer 
financial discipline," (Conservative Party, 1979: 15). Indeed, the 1980 Coal 
Industry Act required the NCB to break even without government support by 1983 / 
84, although government policy was revised in 1981, following threatened strike 
action by the NUM over pit closures (Robinson, 1985). 
The coal industry had been identified as a key battleground for the 
implementation of government policy by Nicholas Ridley, in a report of the 
Conservative Party's policy group on the nationalised industries, which was leaked 
to the Economist in 1978. The report predicted that as a result of government 
policy, a major conflict with a public sector trade union was inevitable, and that the 
coal industry was the most likely arena for this to take place (Economist, 27 May 
1978). The report, however, also outlined a number of measures for combating 
industrial action in the industry, which included building up coal stocks at power 
stations, making contingency plans for the importation of coal, utilising non union 
lorry drivers for the transportation of coal, ensuring that dual coal/oil bum 
facilities were available at all power stations, and deploying well equipped mobile 
police units against pickets. 
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Crucially, the report suggested that the confrontation, when it occurred, 
should be on favourable ground chosen by the government, and indeed the reversal 
of government policy following threatened industrial action by the NUM in 1981, 
was later attributed by David Howell, Energy Secretary at the time, to inadequate 
preparation (Crick, 1985: 88). In 1984 however, following the appointment ofIan 
McGregor, a man with a reputation for union busting as a result of his activities 
within the AMAX corporation (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986: 55), to the position of 
NCB Chairman, further reductions in capacity were announced by the NCB which 
included the closure of Cortonwood Colliery in South Yorkshire. This precipitated 
the year long strike by NUM members opposed to pit closures, in which the union 
was decisively beaten. 
Operational Restructuring 
Government energy policy after 1979 was driven by a commitment to increase 
competition in this sector, in order to improve efficiency, and oil and gas were 
privatised in the early 1980s as a consequence. Plans to privatise the coal industry 
however, though tacitly acknowledged within both the government and the NCB 
(Moore, 1983 ; Rost and Pargeter, 1985: 39), were not made public unti11988. 
Nevertheless, government preparations for privatisation centred on facilitating 
increased efficiency within the industry by increasing competition, initially by way 
of relaxing restrictions on the importation of coal, and the deregulation of opencast 
and licensed mining operations (Robinson and Marshall, 1985). 
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Government policy gave added impulse to increasing efficiency within the 
industry, to which the NCB had been effectively committed since 1974, under Plan 
for Coal. New technology was to playa key role in NCB strategy for both 
increasing efficiency and restructuring, in preparation for privatisation. 
Microelectronic technology developed during the 1970s, had enabled coal 
mining, which was already extensively mechanised, to be automated. The 
application of systems engineering led to the development of MINOS, and its 
associated sub-systems, MIDAS, IMP ACT and FIDO, which enabled both new and 
existing capacity to be increasingly organised around huge, highly productive, multi-
colliery complexes (Bums et aI, 1983). 
The application of new technology during the 1970s and early 1980s was 
uneven, and appeared piecemeal, although the strategy concentrated operations in 
the central coalfields of Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and the Midlands, 
because MINOS had been designed around the favourable geological conditions 
which prevailed in these districts. The peripheral coalfields of Scotland, South 
Wales, Kent and the North East, by comparison received little technological 
investment, as MINOS was not suited to the heavily faulted and steeply inclined 
seams which characterised these coalfields (Bums et aI, 1983). The development of 
superpits, such as the Selby Complex in North Yorkshire however, ensured that 
other mines operating without systems control, were, because of their higher costs 
and lower productivity, classed as uneconomic capacity, and eannarked for closure. 
Indeed by the mid 1980s, as a result of the application of new technology, entire 
Chapter 2 
17 
coalfields in the periphery were threatened with closure on economic grounds 
(Bums, Newby and Winterton, 1985). 
At colliery level, the application of systems control technology, and the 
resultant changes in work organisation, served firstly, to increase management 
control over the labour process, and secondly, greatly to intensify work at the point 
of production by increasing machine running time. The implications for 
employment at colliery level then, were no less serious, and indeed the Selby 
Complex, which was developed as a highly automated mine, required 75 per cent 
less labour than a colliery with comparable output operating with conventional 
longwall mining (Bums et aI, 1983). 
Prior to the 1984-85 strike, the NUM, though opposed to the closure of 
capacity on economic grounds, had no co-ordinated policy in relation to the 
introduction of the technology which would facilitate this process. This was in part 
because attitudinal differences towards new technology existed between the central 
and peripheral coalfields, as the application of new technology impacted in different 
ways in these areas, and because the federal structure of the NUM exacerbated these 
divisions. The gradual introduction of new technology however, also enabled the 
role of this within the NCB's overall restructuring programme to be disguised 
(Bums, Newby and Winterton, 1985). 
The defeat of the NUM in the 1984-85 strike, demonstrated that the balance 
of power within the industry had tilted decisively in favour of management, and with 
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worker resistance to restructuring effectively crushed, the pace of this dramatically 
increased. Indeed the defeat of the NUM was crucial in order that the full potential 
of new technology could be realised, since this facilitated the intensification of work, 
which in turn resulted in greatly increased productivity. Between 1984/85 and 
1991 /92, 70 per cent of UK collieries were closed, and the workforce was reduced 
by 74 per cent, whilst in the same period overall productivity rose by 97 per cent 
(Table 2.1.). Further colliery closures occurred before the industry was offered for 
sale, and in December 1994, when the industry was returned to the private sector, 
only four collieries were operated by British Coal outside the central coalfield. 
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Table 2.1: British Coal deep-mine operating statistics 1983-98 
year collieries employment output total OMS face OMS 
(OOOs) (MT) (tonnes) (tonnes) 
83/84 170 19l.7 90.1 2.43 10.32 
84/85 169 171.4 27.6 2.08 10.54 
85/86 133 138.5 88.4 2.72 12.03 
86/87 110 107.7 88.0 3.29 14.40 
87/88 94 89.0 82.4 3.62 16.20 
88/89 86 80.1 85.0 4.14 19.05 
89/90 73 65.4 75.6 4.32 20.52 
90/91 65 57.3 72.3 4.70 22.62 
91/92 51 43.8 7l.0 5.36 25.28 
92/93 50 3l.7 6l.8 7.20 34.00 
93/94a 18 10.6 43.l 9.00 45.00 
Sources: NCB, BC Report and Accounts, and operating statistics (various). 
Note: (a) calculated from BC operating results for week 40. 
Restructuring Industrial Relations 
Changes to the established patterns of industrial relations in the coal industry 
following the 1984-85 strike, in many respects reflected more general changes which 
had occurred in UK industrial relations over the decade. 
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During the 1980s there was a steady decline in trade union membership, 
which fell from a peak of 13.3 million members in 1979, to 9.9 million members in 
1990 (Employment Gazette, June 1994). This was largely a result of the contraction 
of heavy industry and manufacturing, sectors traditionally associated with high 
levels of unionisation (Purcell, 1993: 9), although it was to some extent a 
consequence of the growing rejection of collective ideals. In addition however, 
management in many sectors adopted a more unitary approach to industrial relations. 
Incidences of trade union de-recognition and exclusion became more commonplace 
(Claydon, 1989; Smith and Morton, 1993 ; 1994; Gall and McKay, 1994), and 
trade unions experienced increasing difficulty in gaining recognition in newly 
established businesses (Disney, Gosling and Machin, 1995 ; Millward, 1994: 120). 
As a result of these developments, the proportion of workers covered by 
collective bargaining fell during the decade, with lower levels of coverage being 
reported in both the manufacturing and service sectors, and amongst both manual 
and non-manual grades (Purcell, 1993: 14). 
Where trade unions continued to operate, single union deals, which often 
incorporated no strike agreements increased in significance. In such deals, 
pioneered by the electricians' union (EETPU), and the engineering workers union 
(AUEW), which subsequently merged to form the Amalgamated Electrical and 
Engineering Union (AEEU), sole recognition was accorded to one union in 
exchange for compliance with management objectives (Millward, 1994: 35, 121-
122). 
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Decentralised bargaining, became an emergent feature of UK industrial 
relations during the 1980s, particularly in the private sector (IRRR, 1989b), and 
similarly greater emphasis was placed on flexible working, as management sought to 
cut costs with the removal of job demarcation, and with changes to the established 
patterns of work (IRRR, 1987). The utilisation of temporary and subcontract labour 
also grew during the decade (IRRR, 1986b), reflecting the growing division of the 
workforce into core and peripheral sectors. 
The changes which occurred in UK industrial relations during the 1980s, 
were to some extent prompted by increasingly intense international competition, 
which necessitated changes in work organisation (Edwards et aI, 1992). However, 
they were also greatly facilitated by the creation of a legal framework and political 
climate which supported the re-assertion of managerial prerogatives, by a 
Conservative government hostile towards organised labour, and indeed Claydon 
suggests that union de-recognition represented an "opportunist response" to these 
developments, rather than a coherent change in managerial industrial relations 
strategy (Claydon, 1989: 222). 
Within the coal industry during the 1980s however, managerial approaches 
to industrial relations were both opportunistic and strategic, reflecting the long term 
objective of operational restructuring, and the restructuring of industrial relations in 
preparation for privatisation. The political and legal climate created by the 
Conservative government nevertheless facilitated the defeat of the NUM in 1984-85 
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which presented NCB management with an opportunity to operationalise this 
strategy. 
In the aftermath of the strike the NCB objective of achieving financial break 
even resulted in the formulation of a production cost ceiling of £1.50/ Gigajoule 
(Winterton and Winterton, 1993a: 82-83). This policy was developed unilaterally by 
NCB management, and represented an abandonment of the corporatism which had 
characterised the industry since nationalisation. It was however, also indicative of 
the intention of the NCB to remove the influence of the NUM from questions of 
long term industrial strategy (Edwards and Reery, 1989: 225). 
The NCB unilaterally adopted a unitary approach (Goodman, 1984: 61-65) to 
industrial relations at all levels of the industry following the 1984-85 strike. This 
was illustrated within days of the return to work, by Ian McGregor's statement that, 
"people are now discovering the price of insubordination and insurrection. And boy 
are we going to make it stick." (Sunday Telegraph, 10 March 1985). At national 
level however, management strategies centred on the continued promotion of the 
collaborationist Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM), and the 
institutionalisation of dual unionism within the industry. The UDM had been 
formed in October 1985, by former Nottinghamshire Area NUM delegates who had 
supported strike breaking in the Nottinghamshire coalfield in 1984-85 in defiance of 
the policy of the national union. The organisers of the breakaway were opposed to a 
proposed revision ofNUM rules which was designed to make the Nottinghamshire 
Area more accountable to the national union, and which provided for disciplinary 
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action to be taken against them for their actions in 1984-85. The breakaway was 
later joined by former NUM members in other small coalfields such as South 
Derbyshire and Leicestershire who had also worked dUling the strike (Winterton and 
Winterton, 1989: 226-230). Moreover, NCB policy received government support, 
since the Coal Industry Act 1987 ended the exclusive right of the NUM to represent 
and negotiate on behalf of mineworkers by permitting the UDM to act as workforce 
representatives (Winterton and Winterton, 1993a: 88). 
The UDM was recognised by the NCB as soon as it was formed, and in 
December 1985, the NCB notified the NUM of its intention to replace the 
conciliation machinery established by the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 
(Section 46), with a new scheme which recognised that the UDM then represented a 
substantial proportion of the workforce. The new conciliation arrangements were 
based on the majority / minority principal (Clapham, 1990), whereby the union with 
the majority of members within a particular area would be granted sole bargaining 
rights for the entire workforce in that area, with management being the arbiter of 
which union represented the majority of the workforce (Taylor, 1988). 
The NUM rejected these arrangements because it objected to NUM members 
in areas such as Nottinghamshire, where the majority of the workforce belonged to 
the UDM, being denied the right to be "represented by a trade union of their choice." 
(NUM, 1987a: 40). The involvement of the NUM in national negotiations was made 
conditional by the NCB on its acceptance of the new conciliation arrangements, 
however, and the union was therefore excluded from national negotiations from 
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September 1986, when the UDM accepted the new scheme (Leman and Winterton, 
1991: 57). Some commentators however, suggested that although the stance of 
NUM national officials was understandable, particularly in the immediate aftermath 
of the strike, such intransigence was untenable in the long term, and indeed has led 
to the continued exclusion of the NUM, which has not now negotiated a pay 
settlement since 1983. 
In addition to utilising strategies which aimed to institutionalise dual 
unionism at national level, NCB management also sought to exploit the internal 
divisions within the NUM in order to fragment collective bargaining. NCB policy 
regarding the proposed development of new capacity at Margam in South Wales 
exemplified this, since the NCB stated that this was conditional upon the South 
Wales NUM accepting six day working and greater labour flexibility. This both 
highlighted and exacerbated the policy differences of the national and South Wales 
NUM, since the national NUM was opposed to such developments, whilst the South 
Wales NUM was willing to negotiate, and indeed in February 1987, the South Wales 
Area Delegate Conference voted to accept six day working in defiance of the 
national union (Taylor, 1988: 228-229). 
At local level the reassertion of management prerogatives, and moves by 
NCB management to marginalise the NUM took a variety of different forms. The 
existing local conciliation machinery was unilaterally withdrawn after the 1984-85 
strike by NCB management, who proposed a replacement which incorporated both 
the dual union structure and the majority / minority principal of the new national 
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arrangements. This scheme was accepted by the UDM in February 1987, but the 
NUM opposed the new arrangements, and as a consequence was excluded from 
formal conciliation procedures at local level (Leman and Winterton, 1991: 58). 
The four months immediately following the strike were regarded as a 
"punishment period" by many NUM branch officials, because they were required to 
resume three shift working, and were denied time off for union duties, whilst at 
many collieries, management refused to talk to branch officials (Winterton and 
Winterton, 1989: 222-223). In addition union officials were disproportionately 
represented amongst over seven hundred employees dismissed by the NCB for strike 
activities. Indeed in the Scottish area, 43 per cent of the sacked employees were 
elected union officials, and 71 per cent had been leaders of official strike committees 
(Rose, 1985). 
Management's unitary approach at local level was also evident in unilateral 
changes made to working arrangements at individual collieries. Such changes 
usually involved the removal of long standing locally negotiated concessions, and at 
a number of pits this provoked unofficial strike action by NUM members. A new 
Disciplinary Code of Conduct was similarly imposed by NCB management in 1987. 
This applied to mineworker grades represented by the NUM or UDM, but not to 
supervisory staff who were represented by the National Association of Colliery 
Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS) or the British Association of Colliery 
Management (BACM) (NUM, 1987b: 522 and 524). The code extended the 
definition of gross industrial misconduct to activities occurring away from NCB 
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premises, and provided for the summary dismissal of offenders. In addition it also 
gave management the power to veto the presence of union representatives at 
disciplinary hearings (Winterton and Winterton, 1989; 1993a). Whilst the UDM 
"took note" of the new code, its application in NUM strongholds resulted in a series 
of unofficial strikes (Taylor, 1988: 228 ; Richards, 1996: 216). 
Management tactics which aimed to marginalise the influence of the NUM at 
local level included the extension of pit based incentive schemes, like the Doncaster 
Option, which served to fragment collective bargaining in the industry (Leman and 
Winterton, 1991: 61-62). In addition, NCB management adopted a variety of 
Human Resource Management techniques designed to undermine the NUM at 
individual collieries. Direct communication with the workforce, established during 
the 1984-85 strike was continued, with letters, and colliery / company news sheets 
which were sent to the homes of employees, and with videos and teletext messages 
on NCB premises (Richardson and Wood, 1989: 42), whilst team briefings were also 
introduced in some coalfields (IRRR, 1986a). 
NCB management additionally made increasing use of subcontract labour 
which was employed initially on ad hoc contracts for specific tasks (Leman and 
Winterton, 1991: 61). Such contracts were frequently negotiated directly with the 
workers involved, and were intended to enable the NCB to circumvent the unions, 
although the use of subcontractors also enabled the NCB to introduce non union 
labour, the objective of which was to dilute NUM membership and further fragment 
the workforce (NUM, 1989a). 
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Despite the intensity of the managerial assault on union organisation at local 
level, the success of these initiatives was somewhat limited. This was partially a 
consequence of the relative autonomy afforded to individual colliery managers, since 
this enabled them to determine how zealously they pursued the unitary approach to 
industrial relations adopted centrally by the NCB, although the need for workforce 
co-operation to achieve productivity targets also acted as a counterbalance to the 
objective of restoring managerial prerogatives. In addition, however, NUM 
branches remained intact and the union was thus able to mount some resistance to 
the managerial offensive at colliery level (Clapham, 1991). Indeed, as Richards 
(1996), has pointed out, during 1986 only 15 of the 125 collieries owned by British 
Coal remained unaffected by industrial action (Richards, 1996: 215). Furthermore, 
the NUM also had some success in organising sub contract labour (Prowse and 
Turner, 1996). 
Since the new pattern of industrial relations established in the wake of the 
1984-85 strike was designed to promote the UDM, whilst weakening the NUM, it is 
unsurprising that the two organisations responded differently to these developments. 
After the strike, the UDM confirmed its collaborationist credentials by its 
acceptance of the NCB's revised national and local conciliation schemes, and by its 
acquiescence to the Disciplinary Code. The willingness of the UDM to comply with 
managerial objectives however, was further underlined by its endeavours to gain 
sole recognition at the new developments of Margam and Asfordby in return for 
negotiations over flexible working (Taylor, 1988: 229). 
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The UDM leadership remained hostile towards the NUM, and indeed at the 
1987 UDM Conference, the UDM President Roy Lynk insisted that the UDM would 
dictate the terms of any future reconciliation (Taylor, ibid). Lynk was ousted as 
UDM President in November 1992, although the attitude of his successor, Neil 
Greatrex was equally uncompromising towards the NUM, as he suggested shortly 
after his election, that there was "no chance whatsoever" of reconciliation 
(Guardian, 1 December 1992). A more conciliatory approach to rapprochement 
with the NUM was favoured within some quarters of the UDM however, and indeed 
Horace Sankey, who adopted such a platform when he opposed Lynk in the UDM 
Presidential election of 1988, received the support of 37 per cent ofUDM members 
(Waddington and Wykes, 1989: 26). 
NUM responses to the post strike industrial relations were more complex, 
largely because the union was divided over how best to respond to the NCB's 
unitary approach, and to the emergence of the UDM. The national union was 
opposed to the new conciliation scheme, the Disciplinary Code, flexible working 
and the use of subcontractors (NUM, 1987b). A number of influential left wingers, 
notably Mick McGahey of Scotland and Des Dutfield from South Wales however, 
argued that such an uncompromising position was untenable, given that the balance 
of power within the industry had tilted away from the union as a result of their defeat 
in 1984-85, and believed that a reassessment ofNUM strategy was therefore 
necessary (Edwards and Heery, 1989: 234). 
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At a Special National Delegate Conference in January 1988, the Derbyshire 
and South Wales areas unsuccessfully called for the union to accept the new 
conciliation arrangements in order to end its effective derecognition (South Wales 
Miner, June 1988). Similarly the North Western area called equally unsuccessfully 
at the 1989 Annual Conference, for a membership ballot, to determine whether 
opposition to consultation with British Coal should be continued (NUM, 1989b: 
442-448). Indeed between the introduction of the new conciliation scheme and the 
1989 Annual Conference, no fewer than twenty one unsuccessful attempts were 
made to change union policy on this issue (NUM ibid). 
The South Wales NUM also opposed national policy on flexible working, 
partly in recognition that the new commercial objectives of the NCB made this 
necessary, if older mines with workings far from the shaft were to remain viable. 
Acceptance of flexible working at Margam and Asfordby, however, was also 
advocated in order to prevent the UDM expanding from its Nottinghamshire base 
(South Wales Miner, March 1987), and indeed the South Wales and Leicestershire 
areas ultimately agreed to negotiate over flexible working (Taylor, 1988). 
Though the divisions within the NUM were primarily over policy questions, 
they were also a reflection of growing criticism of the leadership of Arthur Scargill. 
Scargill was an uncompromising advocate of national policy, and was both hostile 
towards, and contemptuous of, the UDM. Moreover, he unjustly accused those 
endeavouring to re-evaluate NUM strategy of collaboration with NCB objectives. 
(South Wales Miner, April 1987). Like his UDM counterpart, Scargill was opposed 
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in the 1988 NUM Presidential election by a candidate who advocated rapprochement 
between the two organisations. John Walsh, Scargill's opponent also called for the 
NUM to adopt more moderate policies to facilitate this goal, and suggested that it 
was Scargill's intransigence which was the major barrier to re-unification 
(Independent, 20 January 1988). Scargill was re-elected to the NUM Presidency, 
polling 53.8 per cent of the votes cast. The narrow margin of his victory however, 
indicated that ordinary NUM members were, like their officials, divided over the 
direction of the union's post strike strategy. 
Privatising Coal 
In May 1992, the Queen's Speech signalled the intention of the newly re-elected 
Conservative government to return the coal industry to the private sector. This 
followed Cecil Parkinson's pledge to the Conservative Party Conference in 1988, 
that this, the "ultimate privatisation," would take place if the Conservatives won the 
next election. 
Preparatory legislation for coal privatisation had included measures to 
remove the constraints on the small private sector which had continued to exist after 
most of the industry was nationalised in 1947 (Robinson and Sykes, 1987). The 
British Coal and British Rail (Transfer Proposals) Act 1993, enabled British Coal to 
participate in the privatisation process (DT!, 1993), and additional legislation 
established a new public sector body, the Coal Authority, with responsibility for 
licensing all mining operations (Robinson and Sykes, 1987). The Coal Authority 
also took over some of British Coal's liabilities in relation to subsidence when it 
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came into being in October 1994, although British Coal itself was set to remain in 
existence until all its liabilities were settled (Financial Times, 26 October 1994). 
This was largely because the question of liabilities had threatened to undennine the 
sell off by deterring potential buyers (Times, 26 April 1994). The process of coal 
privatisation however, was most profoundly influenced by the earlier privatisation of 
the electricity supply industry CESI). 
By the early 1990s the UK coal industry was heavily dependent upon the 
market provided by the electricity generators. Coal had been largely eclipsed as a 
domestic fuel following the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea, and the use of 
diesel on the railways had removed another important market. In addition, industrial 
markets had diminished as a result of the contraction of heavy industry, particularly 
within the iron and steel sector, and indeed by the early 1990s, almost 80 per cent of 
UK coal sales were to the electricity generators (DTI, 1993: 18-19). 
The privatisation of electricity in 1990 created two major generating 
companies, National Power and PowerGen, in addition to a number of regional 
electricity companies (RECs) whose business was electricity supply (Green, 1994). 
The market for coal was at first protected, as National Power and PowerGen were 
obliged by initial three year subsidised contracts to purchase 65 to 70 million tonnes 
of coal each year from British Coal, despite their requirements for indigenous coal 
being much lower than this (Robinson, 1992). The RECs also signed back to back 
contracts to buy the power produced by the generators (Guardian, 10 October 1992). 
Ultimately privatisation also enabled the industry to seek the most economically 
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competitive fuel sources, which precipitated a scramble by both generators and 
RECs alike to diversify into other fuels, at a time when demand for power was 
falling due to the recession. As a result, stockpiles of coal increased, and by the time 
of the 1992 coal crisis more than eighteen months supply was held at power stations 
and pitheads (Sunday Times, 18 October 1992). 
Following electricity privatisation, the generating companies invested in 
import terminals capable of handling increased quantities of foreign coal. This was 
cheaper than UK coal because it was extracted from opencast rather than deep mines 
in countries where labour costs were low, and where pricing policies were 
influenced by the need for hard currency. Imported coal had the additional 
advantage of having a lower sulphur content then coal mined in the UK. Coal 
imports did increase marginally after electricity privatisation, from 1.5 million 
tonnes in 1990, to 1.8 million tonnes in 1993, and in 1993,2 per cent of electricity 
was generated from imported coal, a rise of 1 per cent on the corresponding figure 
for 1989 (DT!, 1994). 
Nuclear power also assumed an increasing significance following the 
privatisation of electricity, since Nuclear Electric, the privatised nuclear generator, 
was protected from market competition by government subsidies which amounted to 
£1.2 billion per year, the equivalent of £50 per tonne of coal, whilst subsidies for the 
coal industry had been gradually withdrawn (Guardian, 9 and 14 October 1992). 
Indeed largely because of the subsidies granted to the nuclear industry, it was able to 
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increase its share of the electricity generation market from 22 per cent in 1989 to 28 
per cent in 1993 at the expense of UK coal (DTI, 1994). 
The biggest threat to the market for UK coal however, came neither from 
coal imports, nor from nuclear power, but from the umegulated investment in gas 
burning generating facilities. 
The "dash for gas," was to some extent caused by the impact of EC 
environmental regulations. In 1988, the Large Combustion Plant Directive required 
governments of member states to outline plans for the reduction of sulphur dioxide 
and nitrogen dioxide emissions. As a consequence the UK agreed to reduce sulphur 
dioxide from existing plant to 20 per cent below the 1980 level by 1993, to 40 per 
cent below by 1998, and to 60 per cent below by 2003. Nitrogen Dioxide emissions 
were to be reduced by 15 per cent by 1993 and by 30 per cent by 1998, on the same 
basis (Newbery, 1993). 
Flue gas desulphurisation equipment could have been installed at existing 
plant in order to reduce emissions, however this was seen as a more expensive 
option than the importation of low sulphur foreign coal, or than the constmction of 
highly efficient Combined Cycle Gas Turbine generating facilities (Newbery, ibid). 
The use of gas as a generating fuel was prohibited by the EC, as it was deemed that 
this should be conserved due to it being a finite resource. When the ban was lifted in 
the late 1980s however, the "dash for gas" began in earnest (Sunday Times, 18 
October 1992). 
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The nature ofthe privatisation ofthe EST itself, however, was also in part 
responsible for the "dash for gas," since this created an effective duopoly in 
generation. The RECs desired to break the market dominance of National Power 
and PowerGen, because they saw that they were in a position to inflate prices. As a 
consequence the RECs were willing to enter into agreements with the smaller 
independent generators whose existence was permitted under the terms of 
privatisation, and to co-finance the construction of gas fired capacity. The 
independent generators in return, were then able to offer the RECs fifteen year 
contracts. Furthermore, as the RECs were permitted to pass on the extra costs 
resulting from their investment in gas fired capacity to their customers under the 
post privatisation pricing regime, the attractions of gas were great indeed (Guardian, 
10 and 14 October 1992). 
By the time of the coal crisis in October 1992, sixteen gas fired power 
stations had been built or were under construction, and a further twenty were 
planned (Financial Times, 15 October 1992). As a result, by 1993, 10 per cent of 
electricity generated in the UK was provided by gas fired capacity, whereas in 1989, 
the corresponding figure was just 1 per cent (DTI, 1994). 
The privatisation of the ESI then, distorted the energy markets and allowed 
gas, and to a lesser extent imported coal and nuclear power to encroach into the 
electricity generation market formerly dominated by UK coal. Indeed between 1989 
and 1993, the share of the market belonging to UK coal fell from 64 per cent to 51 
per cent, representing a reduction of20 per cent (DTI, 1994). These developments 
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threatened the very existence of the UK coal industry and attracted widespread 
criticism from British Coal, the mining unions and opposition politicians as a result. 
Furthermore, because the privatisation of the electricity supply industry was also 
able to contaminate the privatisation of coal, even advocates of privatisation in the 
energy sector suggested that the process had been badly mishandled (Robinson, 
1992). 
The privatisation of the electricity supply industry set the parameters for the 
privatisation of coal, as the size and shape of the industry offered for sale was 
largely determined by the shrinking electricity market, which necessitated further 
restructuring in the coal industry. 
The initial subsidised contracts between the power generators and British 
Coal expired in March 1993. During the summer and Autumn of 1992 however, 
negotiations over new contracts stalled because the generators wanted to reduce the 
amount of UK coal they purchased. This was a consequence of their inability to 
agree back to back contracts with the RECs, who were concerned that the higher 
price of electricity generated from UK coal would attract penalties from the 
electricity regulator OffER (Times, 30 September 1992 and Daily Telegraph, 19 
October 1992). The delay over the signing of new contracts between British Coal 
and the generators precipitated the coal crisis of October 1992, when Michael 
Heseltine announced the closure of thirty one collieries, because the government was 
unwilling to intervene and increase the demand for coal with the extension of 
subsidies (Financial Times 14 October 1992). Heseltine did, however, instigate a 
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review of energy policy in order to quell backbench rebellion and placate public 
outrage. 
The delay influenced the timing of coal privatisation, and indeed in the wake 
of the October announcements some commentators suggested this could be 
abandoned altogether (Independent, 30 October 1992). Coal privatisation was 
delayed in the first instance, because the government had to ensure that contracts 
with the generators were in place in order that the market for coal was large enough 
to attract potential buyers. The government also decided to postpone coal 
privatisation until the review of energy policy was complete (Times, 30 October 
1992). 
In December 1992, Eastern Electric signed a five year electricity supply 
contract with PowerGen paving the way for a series of back to back agreements 
between the RECs, the generators and British Coal. The new contracts however, 
reduced the amount of coal supplied to the generators from 65 million tonnes in 
1992 to 40 million tonnes in 1993 and 30 million tonnes in each of the following 
years. The market for coal therefore was to be effectively halved within two years, 
and as a result restructuring in the coal industry continued, albeit at a slower pace 
than that anticipated by the October announcements. Nevertheless, by April 1994 
when the industry was offered for sale, some 34 collieries had closed, vindicating 
critics of the government's energy review, who argued that this was little more than 
a cynical exercise designed to circumvent public opinion whilst providing only a 
stay of execution for the threatened collieries. 
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In advance of privatisation proper, British Coal offered all the collieries it 
had closed following the coal crisis of 1992 for sale on lease or license as individual 
units. A small number of mines were also placed on a care and maintenance basis 
subject to market testing (DTI, 1993). Private sector buyers had acquired 11 of these 
mines by the time the core collieries were returned to the private sector. Coal 
Investments, a company headed by Malcolm Edwards the former Commercial 
Director of British Coal, bought 5, RJB Mining purchased 3 collieries, 2 mines were 
acquired by management buyout teams whilst a further 1 was the subject of an 
employee buyout (Table 2.2.). 
In April 1994, the 16 remaining core collieries were offered for sale in five 
regional packages which also included opencast sites, stockpiles and existing 
contracts with the electricity generating companies. British Coal had opposed the 
break up of the industry, arguing that it would be weakened as a result. The 
government however, favoured this option because retaining the coal industry intact 
would have replaced a public monopoly with a private one, without introducing 
competition to the industry (Robinson and Sykes, 1987). Therefore, though the 
government stated its willingness to consider selling all five regions to a single 
bidder, this was not a likely prospect. 
The lack of interest displayed by international mining companies in the 
privatisation also influenced the decision to break up the industry, since few UK 
companies had the resources either to purchase or manage the entire industry, small 
though it was (Financial Times, 14 April 1994). 
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Table 2.2: Collieries transferred to the private sector 1992-94 
Leased/licensed as individual units before privatisation proper 
Colliery Area 
Rossington Central North 
Clipstone Central South 
Calverton Central South 
Hem Heath Central South 
Silverdale Central South 
Markham Main Central North 
Coventry Central South 
Trentham Central South 
Betws South Wales 
Hatfield Central North 
Monktonhall Scotland 
Transferred to private sector in regional packages 
Colliery Area 
Kellingley Central North 
Prince of Wales Central North 
North Selby Central North 
Ricall Central North 
Stillingfleet Central North 
Wistow Central North 
Whitemoor Central North 
Maltby Central North 
Point of Ayr Central North 
Asfordby Central South 
Daw Mill Central South 
Bilsthorpe Central South 
Harworth Central South 
Thoresby Central South 
Welbeck Central South 
Longannet Scotland 
Transferred to the private sector as "stand alone" units 
Colliery 
AnnesleylBentinck 
Thome 
Ellington 
Tower 
Area 
Central South 
Central North 
North East 
South Wales 
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Purchaser 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
Coal Investments 
Coal Investments 
Coal Investments 
Coal Investments 
Coal Investments 
BAL 
HCC 
MM 
Purchaser 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
Mining Scotland 
Purchaser 
Coal Investments 
RJB Mining 
RJB Mining 
GTA 
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A number of collieries closed or mothballed in the months immediately 
preceding privatisation were also offered for sale in parallel as individual stand alone 
units. This element of privati sat ion was intended to be an entirely separate sale from 
that of the regional packages, however the sales occurred simultaneously, because 
the timetable for coal privatisation had been affected by the ramifications of the 
privatisation of electricity. This situation was further confused because bidders for 
certain regions were only allowed to purchase stand alone collieries within those 
regions under certain conditions, and because British Coal's non mining interests 
were the subject of a further separate sale (Financial Times, 12 September 1994). 
Some twenty five companies pre-qualified in May 1994 to enter the bidding 
proper in September, although not all were expected to do so (Times, 13 September 
1994). RJB Mining and Coal Investments had emerged in the preceding months as 
the_companies most likely to emerge as the government's preferred bidders. RJB 
Mining was selected by the government as the preferred bidder for three regions, 
Central North, Central South and the North East. Mining (Scotland) a company part 
owned by Coal Investments was chosen for the Scottish region, and Celtic Energy 
was named as the preferred bidder for the South Wales region. RJB Mining also 
purchased two of the collieries offered for sale on a stand alone basis, whilst Coal 
Investments purchased one, with a further one being the subject of an employee 
buyout (Financial Times, 13 October 1994). 
The privatisation of coal then was characterised by confusion, but the process 
was finally completed in December 1994, with RJB Mining becoming the owner of 
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around 65 per cent of the collieries that survived the restructuring, which had 
preceded the sale. 
NUM and UDM members were likely to be affected in similar ways by 
privatisation, as a result of the restructuring associated with this process, and 
because of the anticipated reassertion of the profit motive under private ownership. 
The traditions of the two organisations however, detelmined that they responded 
somewhat differently to the prospect of the industry being returned to the private 
sector. 
The position ofthe UDM was that privatisation was undesirable, but 
inevitable, and that it would therefore seek to gain influence with those parties likely 
to acquire a stake in the industry (Financial Times, 4 September 1992). In practice, 
the UDM position amounted to little more than tacit collusion with British Coal and 
government objectives. This was demonstrated by the UDM's engagement of 
consultants in October 1991, who advised the organisation on its own role in the 
privatisation process (Times, 5 October 1992). Characteristically, Roy Lynk 
recommended to the government that the industry be privatised as two regions, in 
order to reduce the effectiveness of any industrial action which might be taken by 
the unions (Independent, 14 December 1992). 
Lynk's enthusiasm for privatisation was not shared by all his members, and 
in November 1992, he was replaced as UDM President by Neil Greatrex, who was 
more sceptical on this issue (Financial Times, 1 December 1992). Following 
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Greatrex's election however, there were no significant changes to UDM policy in 
relation to privatisation and the UDM continued to explore the possibility of 
mounting a bid to take over the industry. During 1991 and 1992, the organisation 
had been linked with a number of commercial interests, including East Midlands 
Electricity, opencast companies and financial institutions (Guardian, 18 August 
1992). A joint bid with BACM was also mooted, although BACM, unlike the UDM 
argued for the industry to be privatised as a single unit in order that a viable structure 
could be maintained (Financial Times, 8 October 1992). The UDM however, 
eventually joined forces with Coal Investments. The company submitted bids for 
several of the regional packages when the industry was offered for sale, although all 
were unsuccessful (Financial Times, 13 October 1994). 
Official NUM policy regarding privatisation contrasted sharply with that of 
the UDM. The NUM opposed privatisation on ideological grounds, and at the 1992 
Annual Conference, an Emergency Resolution submitted by the NEC, calling for the 
union to take "any action necessary" to prevent privatisation, gained unanimous 
support (NUM, 1992: 109). The NUM however, also opposed privatisation because 
of fears that safety standards and working conditions would deteriorate under private 
ownership, when profitability was likely to assume an increasing significance 
(NUM, ibid). Such concerns were also voiced by NACODS (Independent, 15 
February 1993), particularly as the government had signalled that it intended to relax 
mines safety legislation as part of the Coal Privatisation Bill (Times, 4 May 1993). 
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The NUM was also concerned that trade union rights would be eroded under 
private ownership, especially as many subcontractors employed by BC were making 
increasing use of non-union labour (NUM, 1991: 65). Indeed, the use of 
subcontractors was viewed by the NUM as back door privatisation, and in April 
1992, NUM members in Yorkshire supported calls for industrial action over their 
employment at Markham Main colliery (Times, 18 April 1992). 
In the coalfields, responses to privatisation proper were characterised by a 
pragmatism born of an increasingly desperate struggle to prevent further colliery 
closures in areas already devastated by restructuring. As a result, a number ofNUM 
branches at collieries threatened with closure, including Thurcroft in South 
Yorkshire, Monktonhall in Scotland and Tower in South Wales considered mounting 
employee buyouts (Guardian, 30 May 1992 and Financial Times, 1 December 
1992), and the Scottish NUM similarly signalled its interest in an employee buyout 
scheme for the Longannet Complex. In addition, the Cokemen's and white collar 
sections of the NUMjoined forces with BACM, two other trade unions and Unity 
Bank, to investigate the possibility of an employee buyout for the Coal Products 
Division (Financial Times, 4 September 1992). 
At the 1992 NUM Annual Conference, two Emergency Resolutions 
condemning employee buyouts were unanimously supported. The privatisation 
debate however, served only to highlight the ambiguity of the NUM's position. 
Indeed some of the delegates supporting the resolutions were involved in buyout 
proposals themselves, not because they supported privatisation, but rather because 
Chapter 2 
43 
they recognised that privately owned collieries were a preferable alternative to 
colliery closures. (NUM, 1992: 109-137). Two collieries, Monktonhall (Guardian, 
10 June 1992), and Tower (Times, 3 January 1995) were ultimately acquired by 
employee buyout teams. The majority of the bids submitted by employee buyout 
teams were however, unsuccessful. 
* Parts of this chapter formed the basis for a paper entitled 'The new coal kings: 
enterprise in the British mining industry after privatisation.' This paper was 
presented at the Fourth International Conference on Public and Private Sector 
Partnerships: Fostering Enterprise, LjUbljana University, 20-23 May 1998. This 
paper is reproduced in Appendix D. 
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Chapter Three 
Towards a theory of restructuring and industrial relations 
Capitalist restructuring 
The contemporary changes which have affected the UK coal industry, and which 
have been manifest in the restructuring of operations, industrial relations and 
ownership are inextricably intertwined with the process of capitalist restructuring. 
Restructuring is an inherent feature of capitalist development, since it is this 
which facilitates the continual expansion of profit accumulation, which is required 
by capital (Bradbury, 1985: 39). Restructuring may involve the regeneration ofthe 
prevailing regime of accumulation, by way of the modernisation of capacity 
designed to increase the efficiency of both capital and labour, by the closure of 
unprofitable capacity (Bradbury, ibid), and by the development of new capacity in 
growth sectors (Tailby and Whitston, 1989: 1). However, as any regime of 
accumulation will eventually exhaust the potential for expansion and the generation 
of surplus value, periodic crises occur, which necessitate more fundamental 
structural change (Grahl, 1983: 118), designed not only to regenerate the existing 
regime of accumulation, but also to create a new regime, and thus a new source of 
surplus value. 
For much of the twentieth century, the dominant regime of accumulation in 
the developed capitalist nations has been Fordism. Fordism is based on an 
equilibrium between the mass production of standardised goods manufactured using 
Chapter 3 
45 
assembly line techniques, and the mass consumption of those goods. Levels of 
consumption, and therefore markets were supported by Keynesian policies, which 
were adopted by individual governments in order to maintain aggregate demand 
(Martin, 1988: 210), and by wage regulation, which linked pay to productivity and 
prices (De Vroey, 1984; Lipietz, 1982). In addition, the position of the unemployed 
as consumers was maintained by social security systems (Aglietta, 1979: 382-383). 
Small scale production however continued, and indeed continues, to operate in 
tandem with Fordist mass production, reflecting the fact that capitalist development 
has been both complex and uneven. 
Due to the interaction of a number of factors, the prevailing regime of 
capitalist accumulation entered a period of crisis in the 1960s. At this time 
stagnating productivity served to undermine the Fordist mode of production (Lipietz, 
1984: 99). Moreover, the systems of wage regulation which had been established to 
sustain this, were increasingly called into question because organised labour was 
willing to disrupt production, and therefore the process of accumulation in pursuit of 
its demands (Martin, 1988: 216). In addition, the profits of many companies 
operating in the capitalist heartlands of North America, Europe and Japan began to 
fall (Lipietz, 1982 ; 1984). 
Though the crisis of capitalist accumulation was essentially multi 
dimensional in character, the crisis of profitability in particular necessitated that new 
sources of surplus value be developed (Lipietz, 1984: 100). This provided an 
impulse for restructuring, and the development of a new regime of accumulation. 
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The need for restructuring moreover, received added impetus from the economic 
crises of the 1970s, the most notable of these being the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 
(Thrift, 1988: 8). 
Restructuring: the global dimension 
The restructuring undertaken by capital in response to the crises of the 1960s and 
1970s impacted globally, but had differing implications for different parts of the 
globe. 
As Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye have pointed out, global economic 
divisions which concentrated the production of manufactured goods in the first 
world, and the production of raw materials in the third world, were apparent from 
the sixteenth century, and were consolidated during the era of capitalist production 
(Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980: 10-12). The restructuring which commenced 
in the 1960s however, resulted in the emergence of a new regime of accumulation 
based on the centralisation and intemationalisation of capital (Andreff, 1984: 58), 
embodied in the growth of trans-national corporations (TNCs), and on the creation 
of a global market for labour and production sites (Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 
1980: 44). Encompassed within this process was "the export of capitalist relations 
of production" (Thrift, 1988: 8), to the third world, as many capitalist enterprises 
relocated some of their manufacturing operations to those regions. 
The relocation of manufacturing operations primarily involved labour 
intensive assembly processes, notably in the textiles and electronics sectors (Lipietz, 
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1982: 39), and was facilitated by developments in transport and communications 
(Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980: 36). The fragmentation of tasks and the 
consequent de-skilling associated with the division of labour in capitalist 
manufacturing industries (Bravennan, 1974), however, also facilitated relocation, 
since it ensured that an inexperienced labour force would achieve optimum 
productivity within a short space of time, and with the minimum of training 
(Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980: 35-36). 
Relocation facilitated the objective of capital, which was to generate new 
sources of surplus value to replace that lost as a result of the crisis of Fordism in the 
capitalist heartlands of the first world, because it enabled capitalist enterprises to 
access new and cheaper sources of energy and raw materials (Jenkins, 1984: 44). In 
addition however, relocation pennitted the exploitation of an almost inexhaustible 
supply of cheap third world labour (Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980: 34-35), 
which, unlike that in the capitalist heartlands was largely unorganised, and 
unprotected by the statutory regulation of employment tenns and conditions (Elson 
and Pearson, 1981). Moreover, labour costs were further reduced by the 
employment of disproportionate numbers of young women, who, in addition to 
being cheaper to employ as a result of their position in the secondary labour market, 
were also favoured by capital because they were considered to be easier to control 
than their male counterparts (Elson and Pearson, ibid). 
Relocation also facilitated the penetration of markets closed to imports by 
protectionist policies (Thrift, 1988: 10), although the relative importance of this 
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factor in relation to the generation of surplus value is open to question, given that 
much of the production of capitalist enterprises operating in the third world is 
destined for re-export to the capitalist heartlands (Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 
1980: 45). Nevertheless, the emergent regime of accumulation, of which relocation 
is an integral part, has had some success in creating increased surplus value, as since 
1973 the profit rates of TNCs have increased, whilst those of companies not 
operating internationally have fallen (Andreff, 1984: 63). 
The emergence of a new regime of accumulation has led to the 
reconstruction of pre-existing global economic divisions within the third world, 
which is, as a consequence, increasingly fragmented into proto capitalist and non 
capitalist segments (Lipietz, 1984: 102-103). The new regime furthermore, has 
resulted in the export of Fordist and Taylorist systems of work organisation from the 
capitalist heartlands, to parts of the third world (Lipietz, 1982). The consequences 
of the emergence of a new regime of accumulation however, have been equally 
profound in those nations which comprise the capitalist heartlands. 
The creation of a global economy, as an integral feature of the new regime 
has resulted in the economies of individual nations becoming interrelated to such a 
degree, that no nation, or region, is now independent of developments in another 
(Bradbury, 1985: 54 ; Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1980: 8). Whilst foreign 
investments by corporations based in the capitalist heartlands have increased, 
domestic investment levels have stagnated. Moreover, that investment has been 
used to rationalise, rather than expand domestic capacity (Froebel, Heinrichs and 
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Kreye, 1980: 2-3).The de-industrialisation offOlmer manufacturing centres in the 
capitalist heartlands, and the resultant emergence of persistently high levels of 
unemployment and underemployment in those regions, can therefore be seen as a 
consequence ofthe inability of domestic capacity to compete with re-located 
capacity, which is able to take advantage of the low wage rates of the third world 
(Martin, 1988: 203-204). 
An alternative model of capitalist restructuring which has been advanced, 
involves the development, in the capitalist heartlands, of a new mode of production, 
based upon the flexibility of production techniques, labour and patterns of 
consumption (Martin, 1988: 211). Fordism as a mode of production, it is argued, is 
being replaced by flexible specialisation. This is said to be "a strategy of permanent 
innovation," which seeks to accommodate change (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 17), since 
it developed in response to increasingly volatile markets, characterised by intense 
competition (Sabel, 1989: 18), and rapidly changing customer demands. 
Flexible specialisation is said to represent a renaissance of craft production, 
since it embraces the use of technologically sophisticated, flexible machinery, and 
highly skilled, functionally flexible labour, in order to achieve the re-integration of 
the conception and execution of tasks, for the purpose of producing specialised 
rather than standardised goods, for niche rather than mass markets (Piore and Sabel, 
1984 ; Sabel, 1989). Flexible specialisation, moreover, is said to be underpinned by 
the mutually dependent relationships of companies, who must co-operate on a 
regional basis in order to successfully meet market demands (Sabel, 1989), and 
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indeed, it has been argued that the adoption of flexible specialisation in a number of 
"mature industrial areas," such as the "Third Italy" and Baden Wurttemburg in 
Germany (Pi ore and Sabel, 1984: 205-206), and parts of Denmark, Sweden, Japan, 
France and the USA (Sabel, 1989: 22-23), has led to their re-generation. 
It has also been claimed that as flexible specialisation represents a resurgence 
of craft production, so it also heralds a new era of liberation for workers who are re-
skilled as a consequence, and who, especially through the use of computer based 
technology, are able to gain control of the labour process (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 
261), which was lost under Fordism. 
Technological developments able to facilitate the emergence of flexible 
specialisation have been made, particularly in computer controlled production, 
robotics and flexible manufacturing systems (Martin, 1988: 218 ; Williams et aI, 
1987: 429). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that some capitalist operations, 
particularly those of medium and large size, are utilising such technology, if to a 
limited extent (Williams et aI, 1987). However, the tentative emergence of 
innovative production methods and marketing strategies does not equate to the 
development of a new regime of flexible accumulation in the capitalist heartlands, 
nor is it a viable model of capitalist restructuring. 
The notion of Fordism being displaced by flexible specialisation is open to 
question, not least because flexible production methods are themselves ill defined, 
and, are consequently hard to differentiate from the mass production they are 
Chapter 3 
51 
allegedly replacing (Williams et aI, 1987: 414-417 ; Pollert, 1988: 58). Indeed, 
Tomaney argues that "What post-Fordist writers take to be signs of the end of mass 
production, are better seen as rather more incremental developments in the 
organisation of large scale industry" (Tomaney, 1991: 97). Moreover, the 
fragmentation of mass markets, which is said to have led to the emergence of 
flexible specialisation, is exaggerated, since mature products can be updated, new 
products can be developed, which are compatible with existing productive capacity 
and huge markets also exist for replacement goods (Williams et aI, 1987: 424-425). 
Much of the flexible specialisation literature is concerned with 
manufacturing industry, when this employs, in the case of the UK, just 25 per cent of 
the workforce (Hyman, 1988: 52), and remains a declining sector throughout the 
capitalist heartlands. Indeed, flexible specialisation theorists largely overlook one of 
the major features of contemporary capitalist development, namely, the growth of 
manufacturing in the third world, and the corresponding emergence of persistently 
high levels of unemployment in the capitalist heartlands. Furthermore, they do not 
recognise that these developments exclude large sections of the popUlation in the 
capitalist heartlands from the markets for specialised products (Hudson, 1988: 161-
162). In a further criticism of flexible specialisation, Hyman suggests that the notion 
of flexible enterprises co-operating to ensure mutual survival implies that the 
adoption of flexible production creates "no losers, only winners" (Hyman, 1988 : 
53), and this he quite correctly argues, is untenable given the dynamics of capitalist 
market competition. 
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Labour flexibility, unlike flexible technology or production methods, is 
widely acknowledged to be an established trend within the capitalist heartlands, and 
the theoretical debate surrounding this issue, largely focuses on the extent to which 
this has developed, and its significance (Atkinson, 1984 ; Atkinson and Gregory, 
1986; Hakim, 1987a ; Pollert, 1988). Functional flexibility has been introduced in 
the UK primarily as a result of advances in technology, and most commonly 
involves skilled workers, although supervisory and technical grades have been 
affected to a more limited extent. The objective of functional flexibility from a 
management perspective, has been the removal of demarcations, particularly 
between electrical and mechanical skills, and between production and maintenance 
functions, in order to reduce idle time by speeding up the repair process following 
breakdowns (IDS, 1984; 1986; 1994). 
Far from representing a renaissance of craft production which has positive 
implications for labour then, functional flexibility has, in reality, resulted merely in 
the intensification of work. Moreover, as the range of skills acquired by functionally 
flexible workers are generally plant, or firm specific, their position in the external 
labour market is considerably weaker than that of the traditional craft worker 
(Hyman, 1988: 53). The emergence of functional flexibility then, cannot be said to 
be indicative of the replacement of Fordism by flexible specialisation. Rather, it 
points to the reconstruction of Fordist and in some cases Taylorist modes of 
production, albeit in modified forms (Tomaney, 1990), whereby additional surplus 
value is generated by the more intensive exploitation of labour which results from 
the intensification of work. Similarly, the increasing incidence in forms of 
Chapter 3 
53 
numerical and temporal flexibility (ACAS, 1988), represent the re-introduction of 
"old hire and fire strategies" (Hudson, 1988: 155). 
The emergence of labour flexibility in the capitalist heartlands has been 
facilitated by the existence of mass unemployment within those regions. This has 
seriously undermined the bargaining power of organised labour, and thus the ability, 
and even the willingness ofworkers to resist such developments (IDS, 1984: 4). 
Flexibility has therefore been established on capital's terms (Tomaney, 1990: 54), 
and under such circumstances, assertions that flexibility represents an emancipation 
for workers appear somewhat hollow. 
Capitalist restructuring and coal 
The process of capitalist restructuring, and its impact on global economic divisions, 
has been reflected in developments within the coal industries of the world since the 
early 1970s. 
Throughout this period, non OECD nations were responsible for the majority 
of world hard coal production. However, the proportion of total global production 
supplied by these countries has increased steadily, from 58 per cent in 1971, to 66 
per cent in 1993. Moreover, whereas only one third world nation was represented 
amongst the world's top five producers of hard coal in 1971 (Table 3.1.), by 1993, 
three of the top five producers were third world nations (Table 3.2.). 
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Table 3.1: Leading hard coal producers 1971 
USA 
USSR 
China 
UK 
Poland 
Source: IEA Coal Information, 1994 
Table 3.2: Leading hard coal producers 1993 
China 
USA 
Former USSR 
India 
South Africa 
Source: IEA Coal Information, 1994 
Output 
(MT) 
501.0 
487.5 
392.0 
150.4 
145.5 
Output 
(MT) 
1154.0 
776.4 
418.6 
249.0 
182.2 
The expansion of coal production in the third world is, furthermore, forecast to 
continue, and China, India, Indonesia, Colombia and Venezuela are all expected to 
have dramatically increased production by the tum of the century (ILO, 1994a: 11). 
The expansion of coal production in the third world, and in other non 
traditional mining regions such as Australia, has been driven to a large extent by the 
activities of American and European oil companies, who invested in the 
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development of new coal reserves following the oil shock of 1973 (Rutledge and 
Wright, 1985). It has also been facilitated by developments in opencast technology, 
which have enabled surface mines to operate at much greater depths than had 
previously been the case. This has permitted the new reserves to be exploited by 
companies using opencast techniques and unskilled labour, and as a consequence 
third world mines have much lower operating costs than existing deep mines in the 
capitalist heartlands (Rutledge and Wright, 1985 ). 
Like third world manufacturing, mining operations in the third world are 
frequently labour rather than capital intensive. The Chinese and Indian coal 
industries employed 5,500,000 and 672,200 people respectively in 1992 (ILO, 
1994a: 22), and in the same year productivity was comparatively low, at less than 
1.5 tonnes per manshift in each case (ILO, 1994b), reflecting the lack of capital 
investment in those industries. 
Workers in the coal industries of the third world are, in general, well paid by 
third world standards (ILO, 1994a), and the living costs in those regions are lower 
than in the capitalist heartlands. Low labour costs nevertheless contribute to the low 
operating costs of third world mining, because miners in those regions are paid 
considerably less than their counterparts in the capitalist heartlands. Colombian 
mineworkers, for example, typically earn 75 per cent less than miners in the USA 
(ILO, 1994a: 92 ; The Guardian, 21 November 1992). Moreover, employment 
terms and conditions, and health and safety standards in third world mines are 
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generally poorer, and are the subject ofless statutory regulation than is the case in 
the capitalist heartlands (ILO, 1994a). 
The exploitation of new coal reserves in the third world then, has been 
accompanied by the export of the highly exploitative productive relationships which 
prevailed in the mining industries of the capitalist heartlands at the tum of the 
century. This coupled with the adoption of low cost opencast mining techniques, 
has enabled capitalist operation in the energy sector to generate new sources of 
surplus value to replace that lost following the 1973 oil shock. 
The corollary of the expansion of coal production in the third world has been 
the contraction of coal mining in many parts of the capitalist heartlands, and also in 
the fonner Eastern Bloc. This contraction has been particularly evident since the 
mid 1980s, when rationalisation programmes were introduced in many nations. 
Indeed, since then, the UK, Gennany, Japan and France, alongside the fonner Soviet 
Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland have experienced significant falls in production, 
whilst in Belgium, coal mining has ceased altogether (ILO, 1994a). The USA is a 
notable exception to the general trend of contraction in the capitalist heartlands, as 
production in that nation has increased since the mid 1980s, although employment 
levels have fallen. (ILO, 1994a). 
Between 1988 and 1993, some 182,000 mining jobs were lost in the 
coalfields of Western Europe, whilst over 24,000 jobs were lost in the USA (ILO, 
1994a). Many coalfield areas in the capitalist heartlands then, have, like their 
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manufacturing counterparts, been blighted by de-industrialisation and high levels of 
unemployment, as indigenous industries have been unable to compete with the low 
operating costs and cheap labour advantages of third world mining. 
The contraction of the coal industries in the capitalist heartlands, has 
however been accompanied by significant improvements in productivity, which have 
been generated by a combination of work intensification and the application of new 
technology. 
The effects of work intensification can be seen because reductions in 
employment levels in Europe have been proportionately larger than reductions in 
output, whilst in the USA, employment levels have fallen, although output has 
increased (lLO, 1994a). Far fewer miners then, are producing slightly less, or in the 
case of the USA, slightly more, coal. New technology has also contributed to the 
improvements in productivity experienced by the industries of the capitalist 
heartlands, since this has enabled machine running time to be increased (Tomaney, 
1990: 49-50). The adoption of forms of functional and temporal flexibility have also 
facilitated productivity improvements, as this was similarly designed to reduce 
constraints on machine running time (lLO, 1994b: 10), and to reduce the porosity of 
the miners' working day. The relative importance of these factors however, has 
varied, not only between nations, but also between individual coalfields within 
nations, as Tomaney and Winterton (1995), have demonstrated. 
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The increases in productivity generated by the intensification of work and 
new technology suggests that the flexible specialisation model of restructuring 
cannot be applied to those parts of the coal industries in the capitalist heartlands 
which have survived contraction. Indeed it would appear that work organisation in 
those industries is being reconstructed around what are essentially Taylorist 
principles, in order that increased surplus value can be generated from the more 
intensive exploitation of labour power. This has been facilitated by the contraction 
of the industries, and the resulting high levels of unemployment in mining areas, 
which has rendered organised labour less able to mount any effective opposition to 
these developments. In the case of the UK industry, management strategies and 
government policies also contributed to the inability of the mining unions to offer 
any effective resistance to changes in work organisation. 
Restructuring: the UK dimension 
It has been suggested that state intervention in the nations within the capitalist 
heartlands may have served to delay the onset of restructuring in some of those 
countries (Grahl, 1983: 119), and indeed, during the 1960s and 1970s the UK 
economy was sheltered from many of the negative consequences of capitalist 
restructuring, largely as a result of government policy. 
Successive governments during those years endeavoured to prolong the post 
war boom with a continued commitment to those policies which had generated it. 
All political parties consequently subscribed to Keynesian economics, the 
maintenance of the welfare state, and to a fonn of industrial corporatism which drew 
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organised labour into a "deepening relationship with government" (Tailby and 
Whitston, 1989: 10). As the economic crises of the 1970s deepened however, the 
economic and political orthodoxies of the post war consensus were increasingly 
challenged by advocates of neo liberalism, whose influence had been growing within 
the Conservative Party during the decade (Veljanovski, 1987). 
The central tenets of neo liberalism were the introduction of free market 
competition to all sectors of the economy, and the creation of the minimalist state, 
although somewhat paradoxically, these objectives also rested upon the 
concentration and centralisation of state power (Green, 1989: 6). In 1979 a 
Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher was elected on a manifesto 
which committed the party to the neo liberal agenda (Conservative Party, 1979). In 
its rejection ofthe post war consensus however, the Conservative government also 
implicitly embraced restructuring. Indeed, Conservative policies have accelerated 
this process, and furthermore, have guided it in a particular direction (Green, 1989: 
20), not least because organised labour had been identified as one of the primary 
obstacles in the way of economic regeneration (Tailby and Whitston, 1989: 10-11). 
Privatisation was a major theme in Conservative policy, which came to 
dominate government legislative programmes once neo liberal ascendancy had been 
firmly established within both party and cabinet (Foster, 1992: 108- 110). 
Privatisation took a number of different forms, ranging from highly visible 
and well publicised asset sales, to more subtle manifestations, such as the extension 
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of commercial practices into public sector operations (Young, 1986). All these 
measures however, were consistent with neo liberal philosophy, as they sought to 
decrease the role of the state within the economy, and increase that of the market, 
whilst increasing the efficiency of those operations remaining within the public 
sector. 
It has been suggested that a number of more specific aims, which embraced 
ideological, economic, financial, managerial and party political concerns, were also 
operationalized within the wider objectives of privati sat ion (Vickers and Wright, 
1988). These aims however, received differing emphases at differing stages of the 
development of the policy (Marsh, 1991: 463). 
A number of the subsidiary aims of privatisation have had important 
implications for public sector industrial relations. The neo liberal critique of the 
nationalised industries condemned the prevailing corporatist arrangements 
(Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 1-10), and privatisation was viewed as a means of 
breaking with these, and of distancing the government from public sector industrial 
relations matters (Foster, 1992: 111 ; Marsh, 1991: 472). It has been suggested that 
privatisation was also seen as a way of releasing the nationalised industries from 
their statutory obligation to be "good employers" (Heald, 1988: 31), which was seen 
as a barrier to the development of effective business practice (Moore, 1983: 6-7). 
Privatisation, however, was also explicitly seen by its exponents, as the Ridley 
Report made clear, as a means of curbing excessive public sector pay awards, by 
restricting the power of organised labour in the public sector, which it was argued, 
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had grown too powerful (Moore, 1983: 5). The emphasis placed by advocates of 
privatisation on improving efficiency in the public sector similarly had an industrial 
relations dimension because of the implications for employment levels, as public 
sector inefficiencies, though attributed to that sector's isolation from market 
disciplines (Redwood, 1980; Moore, 1983), were often equated with overstaffing 
(Redwood, 1980; Pryke, 1981). 
Opponents of privati s ati on also suggested that this policy had important 
implications for public sector industrial relations. They argued that privatisation was 
likely to lead to a worsening of the terms and conditions of employment for workers 
in the public sector (Bickerstaffe, 1983: 7 ; McCarthy, 1988: 74), and that it would 
be detrimental to trade union organisation (Whitfield, 1983: 2). Indeed, as Thomas 
has suggested, the trade unions had as much to lose from privatisation as they had 
gained from nationalisation, since legislation enacting nationalisations commonly 
obliged employers to promote collective bargaining. Moreover, closed shop 
agreements were more common, and union density was consequently higher in the 
public sector than in private manufacturing (Thomas, 1986: 299-300). 
Veljanovski (1987), has pointed out that privatisation represents, 
" ... more than a change of ownership from the government to a small number 
of private individuals. It is a complex change in the objectives, property 
rights and business environment of each firm, and - in the case of the utility 
industries - a change in the system of controls they face and in their 
relationship with the government" (Veljanovski, 1987: 19). 
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Other commentators have concurred with this analysis, and have suggested that this 
indicates that privatisation is likely to have a more complex influence on patterns of 
industrial relations in the former public enterprises than the participants in the 
political debate have anticipated. 
Ferner and Colling (1991), like Veljanovski, have suggested that the 
environment in which the management of the former public enterprises formulate 
corporate strategy and industrial relations policies has changed as a result of 
privatisation. This they argue, is because firstly, the government no longer has any 
direct influence over such matters, secondly, former public enterprises have new 
responsibilities towards shareholders and regulators, and thirdly, privatisation has 
enabled some former public enterprises to diversify into other business areas. Ferner 
and Colling contend however, that these contextual changes are likely, especially in 
the first two instances to have an essentially ambiguous influence on industrial 
relations in the former public enterprises. 
The decline in governmental influence over industrial relations policies in the 
privatised industries has been seen by Ferner and Colling as a development which 
may lead to the adoption, by management, of a more conciliatory approach to 
industrial relations. According to their argument, the Conservative governments of 
the 1980s actively encouraged public sector management to restore managerial 
prerogatives, and to adopt a confrontational approach in their dealings with trade 
unions. With this pressure effectively removed then, Ferner and Colling suggest that 
managerial decisions concerning industrial relations issues, "will now be dictated by 
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strategic business considerations rather than the need to accommodate to political 
pressures." (Ferner and Colling, 1991: 395). 
Given that the NUM was regarded as something of a bete noire by the 
Conservatives following their successful strike in 1974, which toppled the Heath 
government, and that the Thatcher government was prepared to underwrite the not 
insubstantial cost of defeating the NUM in the 1984-85 strike, at least in part to 
avenge that defeat, Ferner and Colling's argument is persuasive. Now that the 
"ultimate privatisation" has taken place moreover, there is some reason to believe 
that managerial approaches to industrial relations will become less confrontational, 
not least because, unlike in the past, management will have to meet the cost of 
industrial action taken by the unions (Edwards and Heery, 1989: 205). 
The re-emergence of commercial considerations as the primary determinant 
of industrial relations policies in the former public enterprises may not, however, be 
as benign an influence as Ferner and Colling suggest, since the interests of labour are 
likely to be at variance with those of capital in such circumstances. Indeed the re-
emergence of commercial imperatives may dictate that management in the coal 
industry, as in other former public enterprises, adopts a stance as uncompromising 
towards industrial relations issues as that taken by their ideologically coerced public 
sector predecessors. Ferner and Colling recognise this possibility however, as their 
consideration of the closure of Ravenscraig steelworks demonstrates. 
Chapter 3 
64 
Ferner and Colling (1991) suggest that the new responsibilities which 
privatised concerns have towards their shareholders, and their relationships with 
other financial institutions, may generate pressures for cost reductions, and that this 
may result in operational restructuring designed to reduce labour costs. Further 
pressure to reduce staffing levels, they argue, may also come from the regulatory 
bodies established in the wake of privatisation, to monitor competition, quality and 
pricing in some of the former public enterprises, since the pricing formulae operated 
by the regulators provides something of an incentive for restructuring. 
Ferner and Colling also contend however, that these pressures are 
counterbalanced by the need both to provide and to maintain quality of service. This 
they suggest, has in the short term reduced the apparent attractiveness of cutting staff 
levels, although in the longer term they argue that the tension between the need to 
cut costs and quality of service issues is likely to produce "oscillating" priorities in 
terms of industrial relations. 
As there is no coal industry regulator, and as quality of service is not as 
important in the industry as it is in others, it is clear that industrial relations in the 
privati sed coal industry will not be influenced by these factors. Commercial 
considerations then, are most likely to be the primary determinant of managerial 
industrial relations policies in the coal industry. 
Ferner and Colling (1991) also point out that some of the privatised 
operations, notably British Telecom and British Gas, have taken the opportunity 
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presented by the removal of state control to diversify into other non-core areas of 
business. They contend however, that these developments, unlike those previously 
described, are likely to have less ambiguous, and from the point of view of the trade 
unions, less benign, implications for industrial relations in the former public 
enterprises. 
Ferner and Colling suggest that a two tier pattern of industrial relations is 
likely to emerge in the former public enterprises, since new operations are 
predominantly organised as separate concerns, where management consequently 
"feels freer to adopt new industrial relations strategies unfettered by the assumptions 
and constraints of the past" (Ferner and Colling, 1991: 405). They also suggest that 
union recognition is likely to be a more problematic issue, than in traditional spheres 
of activity. 
As yet, the companies which emerged as the major players in the privatised 
coal industry have announced no plans to diversify into other areas of business. The 
influence of this factor on industrial relations in the coal industry then, remains to be 
seen. RJB however, had significant interests prior to the privatisation of coal in 
opencast mining in the UK ; an industry with very different industrial relations 
traditions from its deep mining counterpart. It is possible that RJB may seek to 
import industrial relations practices commensurate with opencast mining into the 
deep mines the company has acquired. It must be remembered however, that the 
most significant, and sustained attempt to change the industrial relations culture in 
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deep mining was instigated by British Coal during and after the 1984-85 strike, 
when the industry was being prepared for privatisation. 
Ferner and Colling then, maintain that privatisation has, on balance, had an 
essentially ambiguous influence on industrial relations in the former public 
enterprises. Other, more optimistic assessments however, have focused on the de-
centralisation associated with privatisation, and have suggested that, because of 
these developments, trade unions, in spite of their misgivings, may stand to benefit 
from privatisation in some respects. 
Fairbrother (1994) has suggested that because privatisation has been 
accompanied by organisational restructuring, many of the former public enterprises 
have business structures which are significantly less centralised than was the case 
when they were under state control. He argues moreover, that the locus of industrial 
relations has consequently moved away from the national arena, and that emergent 
patterns of industrial relations in the former public enterprises are centred on local 
bargaining, often at workplace level. 
Fairbrother concedes that these developments have taken place on capital's 
terms, since they have been instigated by management in response to commercial 
pressures, and have been accompanied by changes in work organisation, which have 
resulted in a greater emphasis being placed on flexible working, and in the 
intensification of work. He suggests however, that the changing locus of bargaining 
nevertheless provides an opportunity for union re-generation at local level, because a 
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broader range of issues are dealt with by local representatives. Fairbrother, 
moreover, argues that de-centralisation opens up the possibility for trade unions to 
develop new structures at local level based on wider membership participation. 
Fairbrother though, also warns that trade unions which retain structures emphasising 
decision making at national and regional level are in danger of becoming 
increasingly irrelevant given the changing locus of bargaining. 
Edwards and Reery have made much the same point in relation to the coal 
industry, since they contend that de-centralisation "could enhance the power of the 
NUM officials by bringing many more decisions within their sphere of potential 
influence" (Edwards and Reery, 1989: 192). 
The NUM has a federal structure, and local branches continued to function in 
spite of management efforts to undermine the union at local level (Clapham, 1991). 
There is therefore, some possibility of union renaissance at local level as Fairbrother 
and Edwards and Reery suggest. Whether this will embrace wider membership 
participation however, is another matter. Unemployment in mining areas remains 
significantly higher than the national average following restructuring (Edwards, 
1993), and given managerial attitudes towards union activities over the past decade, 
there may be some unwillingness on the part of mineworkers to become actively 
involved in union activity. Fairbrother's claims, in relation to the coal industry at 
least then, seem a little utopian. 
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Colling and Ferner (1992) have also suggested that privatisation has provided 
a major impulse for de-centralisation in the former public enterprises, and like 
Fairbrother they have argued that the trade unions could benefit from these 
developments. Indeed Colling and Ferner have advanced two major reasons why 
this should be the case. 
Firstly, they suggest that de-centralisation will create tensions between the 
concerns of corporate level management, and the obj ectives of local line managers, 
and that this can be exploited by the trade unions. Moreover, they argue that this 
presents an opportunity for tacit alliances to be formed between senior union 
officials and corporate personnel managers, which can then be used to shore up 
central bargaining. 
How relevant these factors will be in relation to the coal industry will depend 
on the organisational structures of the companies operating within the industry. 
Clearly however, they are likely to be of more importance in a large company like 
RJB, which owns several collieries, than in a small concern where one colliery was 
acquired by a worker, or management, buyout team. 
Secondly, Colling and Ferner argue that the break up of some of the former 
public enterprises into several competing private companies may serve to increase 
the bargaining strength of trade unions at local level, since those companies would 
be more vulnerable to localised industrial action, as each business unit would 
represent a larger proportion of their income. 
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Edwards and Reery made a similar point to this in relation to the coal 
industry, when they suggested that operational restructuring in the industry had the 
potential to "enhance the strategic position of the workforces in the collieries that 
survive" (Edwards and Reery, 1989: 188). They have argued that in a smaller 
industry, the output of each colliery represents a greater proportion of aggregate 
output, and that industrial action at individual mines therefore has a greater 
disruptive potential. In addition, Edwards and Reery have suggested that the 
creation of a highly productive, technologically advanced industry may serve to 
strengthen the influence of the unions, firstly, because union influence over pay was 
strongest in the most productive collieries, and secondly because retreat mining 
techniques fostered solidaristic working relationships, which in tum enhanced union 
solidarity (Edwards and Reery, 1989). 
The points raised by Colling and Ferner and Edwards and Reery may have 
some validity at a theoretical level. Their arguments however, overlook the 
existence of high levels of unemployment, which may serve to temper trade union 
militancy, and the presence of a legislative framework designed to strengthen the 
position of capital relative to that of labour. The restructuring of the coal industry, 
which led firstly to its contraction, and then to its return to the private sector was, 
moreover, accompanied by the restructuring of industrial relations in the industry. 
The objective of this institutional restructuring was to enable managerial 
prerogatives to be re-asserted. It could be argued however, that this also aimed to 
lessen the likelihood of industrial action in the industry, although it has only been 
partially successful, since localised industrial action occurred in the industry in the 
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late 1980s. After privatisation, NUM members voted in favour of industrial action 
in support of a pay claim, and company wide collective bargaining at collieries 
owned by RJB (Financial Times, 17 May 1995), although this action was prohibited 
by a ruling made by the Court of Appeal (Financial Times, 13 June 1995). Indeed, 
no stoppages took place within the industry during 1995, making this the first 
recorded strike free year in the industry for some one hundred years (Times, 6 June 
1996). 
The vision of increasing union influence in the wake of privatisation 
presented by Colling and Ferner, Edwards and Reery, and Fairbrother, hereafter 
referred to as the optimists, then is not wholly justified. Whilst some of their 
arguments, particularly in relation to the possibilities of trade union renaissance at 
local level have some validity, these can nevertheless be challenged because the 
factors that these authors suggest may contribute to that renaissance, are 
counterbalanced by other factors which point to any rejuvenation being somewhat 
limited. Furthermore, whilst the optimists focus on the positive possibilities 
afforded to the trade unions by privatisation, they present scant evidence of positive 
outcomes from a trade union point of view. 
Recent empirical studies have found that widespread change, anticipated by 
both advocates and opponents of the privatisation programme, has indeed occurred 
in patterns of industrial relations in the former public enterprises, although some 
degree of continuity is also highlighted. The studies have nevertheless pointed to a 
number of major developments, notably reductions in labour requirements, 
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organisational decentralisation and the de-centralisation of industrial relations, 
which, in addition to changes in working practices, and in managerial industrial 
relations strategies to varying degrees, have been common to the majority of those 
concerns at some point in their transition from public sector organisations to 
privately owned companies. 
In many former public enterprises operational restructuring was undertaken 
in the years preceding privatisation. This commonly resulted in significant 
reductions in employment levels. Thus between 1980 and 1988, employment fell by 
51 per cent in steel (Blyton, 1993: 177), whilst in electricity supply and distribution 
staffing levels were reduced by 24 per cent and 15 per cent respectively over the 
same period (Ferner and Colling, 1993: 113). Similarly between 1979 and 1988,20 
per cent of jobs were lost in gas (IRRR, 1989a: 14), as were 13 per cent of jobs in 
water between 1985 and 1989 (Ogden, 1993a: 49). The most dramatic reductions in 
staffing levels however, occurred in the coal industry, where no less than 74 per cent 
of the workforce was made redundant between 1984/85 and 1991 /92 (See Chapter 
Two). 
A number of factors contributed to the employment reductions seen in the 
former public enterprises. Government financial targets and performance objectives 
imposed during the 1980s provided a major impulse for cost reductions, which in 
tum impacted upon staffing levels. Similarly, changes in working practices, which 
aimed to increase labour productivity, thus reducing aggregate labour requirements, 
were introduced in the majority of these concerns (Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 
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233-235). Other factors which contributed to the reductions in staffing levels in the 
former public enterprises however were more industry specific. Thus the 
introduction of new technology reduced labour requirements in telecommunications 
(IRRR, 1989a : 12), and in coal (See Chapter Two), whilst regulatory pressures 
provided an incentive for employment reductions in water (Ogden, 1994: 69), and 
electricity (Ferner and Colling, 1993: 121). Furthermore, a number of industries, 
notably steel and coal, were the subject of systematic rationalisation programmes 
(Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 233). 
In some of the former public enterprises, such as British Gas, staffing levels 
continued to fall following privatisation, whilst in other industries, employment 
levels stabilised, or indeed increased, following their transfer to the private sector. 
Such was the case at British Steel and British Telecom respectively (Bishop and 
Thompson, 1993: 25). These post-privatisation developments arguably reflect the 
responses of individual companies to the tensions between quality of service issues 
and the need to cut costs, which was anticipated by Ferner and Colling (1991). 
However, they also indicate that optimum labour requirements were established 
within most of the former public enterprises before, rather than after, privatisation 
(Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 240). 
As mentioned earlier, changes in working practices designed to increase 
labour productivity have also been introduced in many of the former public 
enterprises. Empirical studies have highlighted how an increasing emphasis has 
been placed on labour flexibility in a number of these concerns, and how the 
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employment of non-standard and sub-contract labour has grown, especially in new 
and subsidiary areas of business (Blyton, 1992 ; Colling, 1991 ; O'Connell 
Davidson, 1990; 1991 ; Ogden, 1994). 
In the coal industry in recent years changes to working practices have 
similarly focused on increased flexibility. The 1986 Wheeler Plan advocated the 
introduction of flexible working as a means of achieving cost objectives determined 
by management following the 1984-85 strike, and though most emphasis has been 
placed on temporal flexibility, in order that productivity improvements could be 
made by increasing machine running time, functional and numerical flexibility has 
also been pursued, if to a lesser extent (Winterton, 1991). 
In many former public enterprises changes in working practices were 
introduced in the years preceding privatisation. In some, however, the pressure for 
change has intensified since floatation (Ogden, 1993b: 159-160; 1994: 74), 
especially since some companies have used the threat of replacing direct labour with 
outside contractors in order to accelerate change (O'Connell Davidson, 1991: 251). 
Changes to working practices were closely linked to reductions in staffing 
levels since, as Blyton has pointed out, the objective of the introduction o flab our 
flexibility was to enable companies to meet the shortfall arising from this (Blyton, 
1992: 646). Indeed changes in working practices have consequently resulted in an 
intensification of work in a number of the former public enterprises (Nichols and 
O'Connell Davidson, 1993: 721 ; O'Connell Davidson, 1990: 545). 
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Many of the fonner public enterprises now exhibit much higher levels of 
organisational de-centralisation than was the case when they were under state 
control. In some industries such as steel and electricity, moves to establish less 
centralised business structures, and to devolve managerial decision making to lower 
levels were initiated prior to privatisation (Blyton, 1992: 640 ; Colling, 1991: 122). 
Privatisation however, resulted in the fonner public enterprises being exposed to a 
more competitive environment. It therefore provided a strong impulse for de-
centralisation, because de-centralised business structures and devolved managerial 
authority were considered to be more appropriate than the bureaucratic, centralised 
structures of the public sector in such a climate (Colling and Ferner, 1992: 211). 
Moreover, the adoption of de-centralised business structures was seen to be of 
symbolic importance in marking the end of state ownership (Colling and Ferner, 
1992). In addition, the privatisations of water, electricity, buses and the docks 
resulted in the dismembennent of those industries, and in the establishment of a 
number of separate businesses (Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 236), thus giving an 
added fillip to the pressures favouring de-centralisation. 
To a large extent organisational de-centralisation was accompanied by the 
de-centralisation of industrial relations within many of the fonner public enterprises. 
The Conservative governments encouraged management in the fonner public 
enterprises to de-centralise pay bargaining (Ogden, 1993a: 46 ; IRRR, 1989a: 14), 
and some enterprises sought to bring industrial relations structures in line with new 
organisational structures (Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 236). Modest steps were 
taken towards the de-centralisation of bargaining in steel and water in the years 
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before privatisation (Avis, 1990; Blyton, 1992; 1993 ; Ogden, 1993a; 1994), and in 
coal, although managerial strategies here were designed to undermine the influence 
of the NUM (See previous chapter). Privatisation nevertheless provided a major 
stimulus for a shift in the locus of industrial relations in the former public 
enterprises. 
Privatisation was seen by management in many of the former public 
enterprises as an opportunity to break with the formalised industry wide bargaining 
machinery of the public sector past (Ferner and Colling, 1993: 121), and to linle 
bargaining instead to the business performance of individual operating units (Ogden, 
1993a: 46). The break up of a number of nationalised industries following 
privatisation moreover, facilitated the abandonment of industry wide bargaining, and 
indeed in those industries single employer bargaining has replaced national 
bargaining (Pendleton and Winterton, 1993: 236). In addition, individual contracts 
were introduced for managerial grades in several of the former public enterprises 
following privatisation, including gas and telecommunications (IRRR, 1989a: 12 and 
14), and electricity (Ferner and Colling, 1993: 123), which has served to both de-
centralise and de-collectivise bargaining at that level. 
The enthusiasm with which management in the former public enterprises 
moved to change the locus of industrial relations has varied considerably however, 
both between, and indeed within, industries. Thus whilst patterns of industrial 
relations in British Gas exhibited much continuity, with "no change in the 
company's bargaining structure since privatisation" (IRRR, 1989a: 14), in electricity, 
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concerted efforts were made to de-centralise bargaining following privatisation 
(Colling, 1991: 125), although some managers questioned the wisdom of such 
developments (Ferner and Colling, 1993: 124). Similarly in water, the water 
authorities were divided over whether to abandon or retain national bargaining, 
although the former option eventually prevailed (Ogden, 1993a). 
Significant changes have also taken place in managerial industrial relations 
strategies within many of the former public enterprises. Successive Conservative 
governments encouraged managers in both public and private sector companies to 
re-assert managerial prerogatives, and to adopt less conciliatory approaches in 
relation to trade unions, and unitary approaches to industrial relations certainly 
became more common amongst management in the former public enterprises during 
the years of Conservative rule. There was however considerable variation in how 
zealously managerial prerogatives were re-established, and whilst confrontational 
management styles were readily adopted in coal (Winterton and Winterton, 1993a), 
steel (Blyton, 1993), and on the docks (Turnbull, 1993), in other industries such as 
electricity and gas, more consensual approaches have generally prevailed (Ferner 
and Colling, 1993 ; IRRR, 1989a). 
Pendleton and Winterton have suggested that such variations can be partly 
explained by the industrial relations traditions of particular industries. Thus those 
industries where 'macho management' styles were adopted, were those which 
already had long histories of relatively bitter industrial conflict (Pendleton and 
Winterton, 1993: 238), and indeed, in coal, steel and on the docks, the re-assertion of 
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managerial prerogatives occurred in the wake of unsuccessful national strike action. 
They also argue however, that govemment industrial relations policies have been 
contradictory, and that managerial caution has been urged, notably in electricity, 
when this has been politically expedient (Pendleton and Winterton, 1993). 
In many cases changes in managerial approaches to industrial relations in the 
former public enterprises were discemible long before privatisation. The 
environment created by privatisation nevertheless gave added impetus to the re-
assertion of managerial prerogatives in some industries. Thus in electricity "there 
was a strong perception that the transfer to the private sector opened a 'window of 
opportunity' for competent aggressive management" (Colling, 1991: 122), and 
indeed, following floatation consultations with the unions occurred less frequently 
(Colling 1991). Similarly in water, the introduction of single table bargaining by a 
number of the new plcs was accompanied by the effective de-recognition of several 
trade unions (Ogden, 1993b: 162), and union de-recognition generally became more 
common in the water industry following privatisation (Saunders and Harris, 1994: 
113). Furthermore, in enterprises such as British Telecom and a number of the water 
companies, which took the opportunity presented by privatisation to diversify into 
other areas of business, recognition has not been granted in subsidiary activities 
(Ogden, 1994: 76-77 ; IRRR, 1989a: 13), thus enabling the emergence of the two 
tier pattem of industrial relations anticipated by Femer and Colling (1991). 
In addition to these developments however, privatisation has also enabled 
significant variations in management industrial relations strategies to emerge within 
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individual industries. Thus whilst management in some of the new water companies 
have sought to marginalise the influence of trade unions, and to unilaterally impose 
changes to bargaining arrangements, in other companies, management have 
endeavoured to involve the unions in the process of change (Ogden, 1994). 
Although widespread change is clearly discernible in patterns of industrial 
relations in the former public enterprises, a number of commentators have suggested 
that attributing this to privatisation is somewhat problematic. Ferner and Colling 
(1991) have argued that this is firstly because those changes which have occurred 
have not been universal, secondly, because changes in industrial relations practices 
have not been confined to privatised companies, and thirdly, because those changes 
which followed privatisation were not necessarily caused by this. Pendleton and 
Winterton (1993), similarly suggest that the influence of privati sat ion should not be 
overstated, because factors which promoted continuity in industrial relations 
practices were also in operation during the privatisation process, and also, because 
many ofthe changes which did occur, pre-dated privatisation, often by many years. 
The studies of industrial relations in the former public enterprises which 
were considered earlier tend to support many of these points. They have revealed 
that there has been much variation in the nature and pace of change, both between 
and within the privatised industries, and that privatisation was but one of a number 
of factors which contributed to this. They have also demonstrated that pressures for 
continuity have existed alongside pressures for change, and have thus lent weight to 
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the argument advanced by Ferner and Colling (1991), which maintained that 
privatisation was likely to have an ambiguous influence on industrial relations. 
Studies of the former public enterprises have also shown that changes in 
industrial relations practices within those concerns were often visible long before 
privatisation. Such change however, cannot be divorced from privatisation itself, 
since government plans to sell off particular industries were announced, in most 
cases, several years before privatisation occurred, and were often tacitly 
acknowledged, as in the case of the coal industry, prior to this information being 
made public. Management in the former public enterprises consequently had a 
number of years in which to prepare their industries for operation in the private 
sector. Privatisation therefore, arguably represents a relatively long process of 
transition, with the actual transfer of ownership marking the mid point, rather than 
the beginning of this. 
Focus of the research 
The theoretical perspectives contained within the existing body of literature relating 
to industrial relations in the privati sed industries, have facilitated the development of 
a number of hypotheses regarding the possible influence of privati sat ion upon 
industrial relations in the coal industry. Underpinning each of these hypotheses are a 
number of more focused sub-propositions, which relate to particular aspects of 
industrial relations, such as managerial strategies, the role of the unions, collective 
bargaining and the labour process. It is these propositions which will form the focus 
of the research, since an analysis of how specific facets of industrial relations in the 
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coal industry have developed following privatisation, will enable the broader 
hypotheses relating to the influence of privatisation upon patterns of industrial 
relations in the industry to be addressed also. 
One hypothesis which may be posed following a review of the relevant 
literature, is that the privatisation of the coal industry may be beneficial to organised 
labour within the industry. This is because private ownership might precipitate 
changes in the existing pattern of industrial relations, by facilitating the emergence 
of relationships between management and the trade unions which are less conflictual 
than was the case between 1984 and 1994. This hypothesis then, accepts the 
position taken by the optimists. In order for more conciliatory industrial relations to 
develop however, changes would need to occur in managerial industrial relations 
strategies, the role of the unions and in the institutions of collective bargaining. 
Change would possibly also be visible within the labour process. A number of sub-
propositions can therefore be made concerning each of these particular aspects of 
industrial relations, which buttress the broader hypothesis. 
It could thus be proposed, that changes in managerial industrial relations 
strategies following privatisation might include the abandonment of the unitary 
approach which prevailed during the last decade of state ownership. This could be 
replaced by a pluralist or collaborative approach, in which management would seek 
to involve rather than marginalise the unions. Furthermore, management may seek 
to re-establish collective bargaining in the industry. 
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It might also be expected, given changing managerial strategies, that there 
would be a corresponding change in the role of the unions after privatisation. Thus 
all the mining unions might expect to have the same relationship with any given 
company within the industry, and no union would be favoured by anyone company. 
The re-establishment of collective bargaining would also increase the influence of all 
the unions in relation to the determination of pay and conditions of work. A further 
proposition might be that the role of the unions at local level might expand under 
private ownership, and both the strategic position and influence of workplace 
branches would be enhanced, since the fragmentation of the industry resulting from 
privatisation would increase the importance of local bargaining. 
Although industry wide bargaining would not be possible after privatisation, 
given the break up of the industry, it may be that new institutions of collective 
bargaining will emerge, which would facilitate the establishment of company wide 
bargaining. Similarly, company wide conciliation procedures might be introduced 
following privatisation. 
In relation to the labour process, it might be proposed that management 
would recognise the negative health and safety implications of flexibility and work 
intensification. Under such circumstances management would perhaps seek more 
sophisticated methods of increasing productivity, and would thus not seek to extend 
new working arrangements. 
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An alternative hypothesis which could be presented rejects the view of the 
optimists, and suggests instead that privatisation may be detrimental to organised 
labour, because it could result in continuity with the patterns of industrial relations 
established since 1984. For continuity with the existing patterns of industrial 
relations to be evident however, changes in managerial strategies, the role of the 
unions, the institutions of collective bargaining and the labour process, would be 
negligible. The pessimistic hypothesis is therefore similarly underpinned by a 
number of sUb-propositions relating to these issues. 
It could be proposed in support of the pessimistic hypothesis, that managerial 
industrial relations strategies following privatisation might be centred on the 
maintenance of managerial prerogatives, and on the continued marginalisation of 
the unions. It might also be expected that management would continue to employ 
policies aimed at creating division in the workforce, and a culture of individualism 
amongst employees. 
Given such managerial strategies, it may also be proposed that, following 
privatisation, the union considered by management to be most likely to comply with 
corporate objectives, might be accorded greater recognition than the other unions, 
which would continue to be marginalised. In this scenario, moreover, the increased 
importance of local bargaining would arguably not be accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in the influence of the unions at local level, and indeed, 
branch organisation would remain largely ineffective. 
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The continued emphasis on the maintenance of managerial prerogatives, may 
indicate that institutional structures to support collective bargaining would be 
unlikely to emerge after privatisation, and that bargaining would instead take place 
on an ad hoc basis at local level. Wage structures might come to reflect this, with 
pay being increasingly linked to individual perfonnance. 
It might also be expected that management would seek to extend new 
working practices, if the pursuit of profit came to be the main detenninant of 
business strategy following privatisation. Similarly, management might adopt 
additional measures in order to further improve productivity by reducing the 
porosity of the working day. 
The development of industrial relations in the coal industry following 
privatisation may, alternatively, be more complex than either the optimistic or 
pessimistic hypotheses suggest. Privatisation has resulted in the fragmentation of 
the industry, which instead of having one owner, as was the case when it was under 
state control, is now owned by a number of separate companies. It is possible 
therefore, that differing patterns of industrial relations might develop within the 
industry, which reflect the emergence of multiple ownership. Thus industrial 
relations within some companies might come to be characterised by continuity with 
the patterns established between 1984 and 1994, whilst in others, significant change 
might be apparent. 
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The coal companies which emerged as a result of privatisation have the same 
product, and are subject largely to the same market pressures, however, the origins 
and corporate objectives of these companies are markedly different. RJB is the most 
commercially orientated of the companies, having operated for some years in the 
private opencast sector, whilst Coal Investments, and those companies formed as a 
result of management buyout initiatives retain elements of the public sector tradition, 
as many of these companys' senior managers formerly held positions within British 
CoaL By contrast Goitre Tower Anthracite is under co-operative ownership, and a 
number of former NUM branch officials are now part of the senior management 
team. Significant variation therefore may be visible in the managerial industrial 
relations strategies of the different companies, which might be expected to be 
reflected in the development of industrial relations within each company. 
The traditions of the major unions representing workers in the new coal 
companies are also somewhat different. The UDM has, since its foundation in 1985, 
demonstrated its willingness to comply with managerial objectives. The NUM by 
contrast, has remained unwilling to assume such a position, although the union is 
divided between those who wish to adopt a confrontational approach to managerial 
strategies, and those who favour a greater degree of pragmatism (see Chapter Two). 
Differences might therefore be expected in the responses of the various unions to 
managerial strategies which develop in the wake of privatisation, which may also 
influence emergent patterns of industrial relations in the industry. 
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The coalfields which have remained in production following restructuring are 
characterised by differing industrial relations traditions, which reflect historical 
developments, and which overlap with the positions of the unions to a large degree. 
Thus Nottinghamshire, the stronghold of the UDM has enjoyed relatively tranquil 
industrial relations, whilst Yorkshire, South Wales and Scotland, bastions ofNUM 
support have experienced bitter and conflictual industrial relations in recent years. 
These variations in coalfield industrial relations traditions then, might similarly exert 
an influence over patterns of industrial relations in the privatised coal industry. 
The possible consequences of the interaction of the variables discussed 
above, may perhaps be best expressed the model outlined in figure 3.3. below. 
This model then, anticipates that continuity with the patterns of industrial relations 
established during the final decade of public ownership will be most likely to occurr 
at Type D collieries, where both management and the trade unions have adopted a 
confrontational approach to labour relations. By contrast, the model expects that 
change, manifest in the establishment of more consensual relationships between 
management and the trade unions would be more likely to emerge at Type A 
collieries. 
The empirical research which will form the basis for the remainder of this 
study will test the hypotheses presented above. Managerial industrial relations 
strategies, the role, and responses of the unions, the development of the institutions 
of collective bargaining and changes in the labour process, will thus be closely 
examined, in order that the emergent patterns of industrial relations in the coal 
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Figure 3.3: A typology of industrial relations in the privatised coal industry 
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industry can be analysed, and the implications for organised labour assessed. The 
following chapter will consequently consider the methodological approach which 
will best facilitate these objectives. 
Chapter 3 
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As Yin (1994) has pointed out, the selection of a methodological approach for any 
given research project is dependent, firstly upon the nature of the research question, 
that is, upon whether the study is descriptive, exploratory or explanatory in 
character, secondly, upon the degree of control the researcher has over the behaviour 
of actors, and thirdly, upon whether historical or contemporary events constitute the 
focus of the research. A research project which seeks to examine and account for the 
development of patterns of industrial relations in the coal industry following 
privatisation, clearly has both exploratory and explanatory elements. It is also 
obviously focused on contemporary events over which the researcher has no control. 
In such circumstances, case study methodology has a number of specific features 
which make it a particularly appropriate approach for the prosecution of such a 
study. 
The case study approach facilitates the investigation of contemporary 
phenomena within their real life context, and is therefore especially useful when the 
boundaries between phenomena and context are relatively indistinct (Yin, ibid). 
These are important considerations in relation to a study of industrial relations in the 
privatised coal industry, since the phenomenon to be examined, namely the 
emergent patterns of industrial relations cannot be divorced from its contextual 
conditions, these being the patterns of ownership which emerged in the industry 
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after privatisation, the nature of labour representation in the industIy, and the 
accumulated industrial relations traditions of the surviving coalfields. 
Case study methodology moreover, offers "the strengths of experimental 
research within natural settings" (Hakim, 1987b: 61), because it permits the isolation 
of selected contextual conditions, thus enabling relationships between those 
conditions and the phenomenon under study to be explored and accounted for. Case 
studies, unlike experiments, do not seek to divorce phenomenon and context (Yin, 
1982: 52). The similarities that case study methodology has with experimental 
research however, make it a particularly useful approach when the researcher has no 
control over events, nor over the behaviour of actors within the field of study, since 
it enables the same phenomenon to be examined under different conditions. Thus 
the researcher is able to allow for contextual factors which may influence the 
phenomenon under study (Mitchell, 1983: 192). 
The careful selection of cases for a study of the development of industrial 
relations in the privati sed coal industry then, would enable the emergent patterns to 
be considered, and the influence of differing forms of ownership, differing forms of 
trade union representation, and the different industrial relations traditions of 
individual coalfields upon these patterns to be analysed. Similarly, thoughtful case 
selection would facilitate the testing of the hypotheses outlined at the end of Chapter 
Three, which relate to the nature of the relationship between the development of 
industrial relations in the coal industry following privatisation, and the context in 
which this occurs. 
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Despite the benefits afforded by case study methodology to particular types 
of research, this approach has nevertheless been the subject of serious criticism. 
It has been suggested that case study methodology does not have an inbuilt 
corrective against researcher bias, and that as a consequence the approach lacks 
rigour. Indeed it is claimed that because of this, the internal validity and reliability 
of case study research is questionable (Stoecker, 1991: 91). Whilst it may be true, as 
Yin (1994) has pointed out, that no research strategy can completely guarantee 
against bias, the problem of researcher bias within case study research, and the 
attendant threat to internal validity can be countered by the use of multiple sources 
of evidence. Case study research is, indeed, uniquely able to facilitate this, for 
unlike other methodologies which are oriented towards the use of a single source of 
evidence (Yin, 1982: 85-86), "the fieldwork for case studies may incorporate the 
analysis of administrative records and other documents, depth interviews, larger 
scale structured surveys, participant and non-participant observation and collecting 
virtually any type of evidence that is relevant and available" (Hakim, 1987b: 63). 
The internal validity of case studies can also be buttressed by having the draft case 
study report reviewed by the subject of the research (Yin, 1994: 144-146). 
Research into the development of patterns of industrial relations in the 
privati sed coal industry then, could employ depth interviews with both managerial 
and trade union representatives, in order to elicit high quality data, in addition to a 
large scale workforce survey designed to generate a larger volume of lower level 
data. Documentary evidence could also be examined. This strategy could be 
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adopted, in the knowledge that "when we find the same results through different 
methods we can be much more confident of our results" (Stoecker, 1991: 106). 
Alternatively however, this approach could illuminate differing perspectives and 
viewpoints held by the various actors in the industry, which would then have to be 
accounted for. Key respondents furthermore, could be asked to review the draft case 
reports. 
The problem of establishing reliability, which is also associated with case 
study research can similarly be overcome. The use of a well designed case study 
protocol ensures that fieldwork procedures are consistent, this being of particular 
importance in relation to multiple case designs, and thus guards against the 
possibility of errors and bias entering the research (Yin, 1994). Similarly, the 
systematic and methodical documentation of fieldwork procedures ensures that the 
research can be replicated by a later investigator, who is likely to arrive at the same 
findings as a result (Yin, ibid). 
Another criticism which has been levelled at case study research is that the 
findings of such projects cannot be generalised to wider populations, and that as 
such, there is no assurance of external validity (Stoecker, 1991: 91). Such 
arguments are based upon "the common assumption that the only valid basis of 
inference is that which has been developed in relation to statistical analysis" 
(Mitchell, 1983: 197). Case study methodology however, has a different rationale to 
that of quantitative research, since cases are selected on theoretical grounds rather 
than because they are representative. Thus, "cases may be chosen to replicate 
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previous cases or extend emergent theory, or they may be chosen to fill theoretical 
categories and provide examples of polar types" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 539). Moreover, 
irrespective of whether cases are selected in order to achieve literal or theoretical 
replication, the researcher would be seeking to generalise his or her findings to some 
broader theory rather than to some wider population (Yin, 1994: 36), and because of 
this, any inferences subsequently made about wider populations would be "based on 
the validity of the analysis rather than the representativeness of the events" 
(Mitchell, 1983: 190). 
Case study research also stands accused of being a time consuming and 
cumbersome process, which generates voluminous quantities of impenetrable data. 
As Yin (1994) has suggested however, the timetable and prosecution of any case 
study will be influenced by the research strategies employed. Thus, whilst case 
studies utilising an ethnographic or anthropological approach may require lengthy 
periods of fieldwork, this is less likely to be the case with other research strategies. 
Case study research into the development of industrial relations in the coal industry 
following privatisation, which sought to make use of depth interviews with key 
respondents, workforce surveys and documentary evidence, would arguably fall into 
the latter of these categories. 
Selection of cases 
In case study research, the unit of analysis has to be established before cases can be 
selected for study. With regards to research into the development of industrial 
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relations in the coal industry following privatisation, a number of considerations led 
to the colliery being identified as the most suitable unit of analysis. 
The privatisation of coal resulted in the fragmentation of the industry, and in 
the emergence of a number of separate coal companies. The coal industry then, 
cannot now be considered as a single entity, and the choice of the unit of analysis 
had to take this into account. These considerations therefore precluded the selection 
of the industry as the unit of analysis. 
Recent literature has revealed that organisational decentralisation, and the 
decentralisation of industrial relations often accompanied privatisation (see Chapter 
Three). It is possible therefore, that change, or indeed continuity, in the patterns of 
industrial relations in the coal industry would be more readily discernible at local, 
i.e. colliery, rather than corporate level. Indeed in the case of individual collieries 
acquired by management or employee buyout teams, such developments would only 
be visible at colliery level. 
The selection of the colliery as the unit of analysis also permits the isolation 
of a greater number of contextual variables than would be the case if the company 
was selected for this purpose. Implicitly then, the selection of the colliery as the unit 
of analysis, was accompanied by the decision to adopt a multiple case design, in 
order that the emergent patterns of industrial relations in the privati sed coal industry 
could be examined under different contextual conditions. 
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Having selected the colliery as the unit of analysis, cases were selected in 
order that theoretical replication could be achieved. Collieries were selected for 
study therefore, not because they were representative of other collieries, or of the 
industry as a whole, but rather, because they corresponded to the theoretical 
categories identified in the model presented at the end of Chapter Three. 
In the initial selection of cases, two collieries owned by Coal UK (CUK), a 
large corporate enterprise were chosen for study (Table 4.1.). Dearnley colliery, 
which supplies coal to the electricity supply industry was closed by British Coal 
following the 1992 coal crisis, when the entire workforce was made redundant. It 
was acquired by CUK under the lease/license arrangements, and was returned to 
production in March 1994. Dearnley is located in the traditionally militant Yorkshire 
coalfield, and the workforce is represented by the NUM. Dearnley consequently 
conforms to the theoretical type D colliery identified in the model. Nottston 
colliery, like Dearnley also produces coal for the electricity supply industry. Unlike 
Dearnley, however, Nottston was not closed by British Coal, and remained in 
production throughout the privatisation process. Nottston is situated in the more 
moderate Nottinghamshire coalfield, and the UDM is the majority union. This 
colliery then, conforms to the theoretical type B colliery. 
Two collieries owned by English Coal, a management buyout which 
acquired a number of the mines formerly owner by British Coal, were also selected 
for study. Wakeford colliery, which supplied coal to the electricity supply industry 
is located in the Yorkshire coalfield. The NUM is the majority union, and the mine 
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Table 4.1: Summary of preliminary case selection 
Colliery Form of Location Union TUPE? Workforce Product Period of closure 
ownership market 
Deamley Large Yorkshire NUM No 320 ESI October 1992 - March 1994 
enterprise 
I. 
Nottston Large N ottinghamshire UDM Yes 600 ESI Never closed 
enterprise 
Wakeford Management Yorkshire NUM No Data Data Data unavailable 
buyout unavailable unavailable 
Workham Management N ottinghamshire UDM No* 600 ESI April 1994 - April 1995 I 
buyout 
Cwmpridd Co-operative South Wales NUM No 280 Domestic April 1994 - December 1994 
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therefore corresponds to the theoretical type C colliery. Workham colliery similarly 
produces coal for the electricity market. This mine was closed by British Coal in 
April 1994, when the entire workforce was made redundant. The mine was acquired 
by English Coal under the lease license arrangements however, and returned to 
production in April 1995. Workham is situated in Nottinghamshire, and the 
majority of the workforce are represented by the UDM. Workham then, confonns to 
the theoretical type A colliery. 
Cwmpridd colliery, an NUM stronghold located in the traditionally militant 
South Wales coalfield was also selected for study. Cwmpridd, which supplies high 
quality anthracite to domestic markets and local steelworks, was closed by British 
Coal in April 1994, and the workforce was made redundant at this time. In 
December 1994, however, the mine was purchased by Welsh Anthracite (WA), a 
company formed by an employee buyout team. Because this colliery is co-
operatively owned, the relationship between management and the unions is radically 
different from that at other mines selected as cases. Cwmpridd, then, also confonns 
to the theoretical type A colliery identified in the model. It was not included in the 
study in order to facilitate literal replication however, but for its atypicality, since the 
reasons for it corresponding to this theoretical category are somewhat different to 
those associated with Workham. 
The selection of cases outlined above, would enable different combinations 
of ownership, trade union representation and coalfield industrial relations traditions 
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to be considered, thus facilitating the analysis ofthe relationships between these 
factors and the emergent patterns of industrial relations in the industry. 
The selection of Dearnley and Nottston as cases for study, would moreover, 
also permit the implications of the legal framework surrounding privatisation to be 
considered, and any influence that this factor might have had on the development of 
labour relations within the industry to be analysed. For whilst both Dearnley and 
Nottston were acquired by the same company, Nottston was purchased as a going 
concern as part of privati sat ion proper, and was therefore subject to the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (TUPE). Dearnley, 
however, was not subject to this legislation, since this mine was acquired by CUK 
under the lease/license arrangements having been closed by British Coal. 
CUK was the only coal company which acquired collieries which were 
subject to the TUPE regulations as well as mines where this legislation did not 
apply. The legal framework was therefore more likely to influence industrial 
relations developments at collieries owned by CUK than at collieries owned by other 
companies, and because of this, no allowance was made for this factor when 
selecting collieries for study which were owned by companies other than CUK. 
Developments in the industry prior to the commencement of fieldwork, 
prompted a review of the selection of cases however. The collapse of English Coal 
in February 1996 placed doubt over the long term future of the mines owned by the 
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company, and as a consequence the substitution of other collieries in place of 
Wakeford and W orkham had to be considered. 
After a period of uncertainty, the future ofWorkham was assured, when a 
management buyout team acquired this colliery, and another, in the process of 
establishing a new company, which was named English Mining (EM). The change 
of ownership at Workham did not, however, result in the emergence of a different 
form of ownership, since former British Coal employees were included in the senior 
management team of English Mining, as had been the case at English Coal. 
Workham therefore continued to conform to the theoretical type A colliery identified 
in the model, and for this reason the decision was taken to retain the mine as a case 
for study (Table 4.2.). 
The situation at Wakeford, the second mine owned by English Coal which 
was selected for study was somewhat different from that at Workham. Like 
Workham, Wakeford was offered for sale following the collapse of English Coal, 
however potential buyers were slow to come forward. An eleventh hour rescue 
package mounted by the colliery manager in August 1996 ultimately failed, and the 
mine closed in September 1996 as a result. Another mine had to be chosen for study 
therefore, which would conform to the theoretical type C colliery, and which could 
consequently be substituted for Wakeford as a case for study. 
In terms of ownership, trade union representation and coalfield location, 
Abergoed closely resembles Wakeford, and thus constitutes a suitable replacement 
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Table 4.2: Summary of revised case selection 
Colliery Form of Location Union TUPE? Workforce Product Period of closure 
ownership market 
Deamley Large Yorkshire NUM No 320 ESI October 1992 - March 1994 
enterprise 
Nottston Large N ottinghamshire UDM Yes 600 ESI Never closed 
enterprise 
Abergoed Management South Wales NUM No 117 Domestic January 1993 - April 1994 
buyout 
Workham Management N ottinghamshire UDM No* 600 ESI April 1994 - April 1995 
buyout 
Cwmpridd Co-operative South Wales NUM No 280 Domestic April 1994 - December 1994 
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case, although this colliery produces high quality anthracite for the domestic market, 
rather than for the electricity supply industry. Abergoed was closed by British Coal 
in January 1993, when all the workers were made redundant. It was later acquired 
by Anthracite Cymru CAC), a company which was formed as a result of a 
management buyout initiative, and was re-opened in April 1994. Abergoed is 
situated in the South Wales coalfield where industrial relations have traditionally 
been adversarial in character, and the NUM has customarily represented workers at 
the mine. Abergoed then conforms to the theoretical type C colliery, and this colliery 
was consequently selected as a replacement for Wakeford. 
As with all case study research, the selection of cases outlined above 
represented a compromise between the ideal study, and a study that was feasible to 
undertake given the twin limitations of time and resources. The study could 
arguably have been improved by the inclusion of a number of cases which would 
have allowed for literal replication, in addition to theoretical replication. For literal 
replication however, a minimum of four additional collieries, one corresponding to 
each of the theoretical categories A, B, C and D, would have had to have been 
selected as cases. This though, would have raised the total number of cases to nine, 
thus placing the study beyond the capabilities of a single researcher. 
Operationalisation of the research 
In order to collect data with which to address the hypotheses presented at the end of 
Chapter Three, it was decided to conduct depth interviews with representatives of 
both management and the trade unions, at each ofthe collieries selected for study. 
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From the management side, interviews were sought with colliery managers, 
personnel managers, where this function existed, and with the site managers of sub 
contracting firms operating at the collieries, whilst from the trade union side, 
interviews were sought with representatives of the NOM, UDM and NACODS. 
Interviews were also sought with representatives ofBACM, however, it was decided 
to approach national officials rather than colliery representatives in the case of this 
organisation, since BACM members at colliery level would hold management 
positions, and their responses would possibly be coloured by this. 
The purpose of the interviews was to elicit high quality, detailed information 
about management industrial relations strategies, and the responses of the various 
unions to these, in addition to data relating to any developments regarding the 
institutions of collective bargaining, and any changes in the labour process, at each 
of the collieries under study. To facilitate this, two complementary interview 
schedules were designed, one for use with management representatives, the other for 
trade union officials, in order to ensure that each set of interviews conformed to a 
standardised format, thus buttressing the construct validity and reliability of the 
research. The interview schedules for use with management and trade union 
representatives are reproduced in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively. 
Drafts of both interview schedules prepared in advance of the pilot study 
contained initial sections which related to the labour process. Questions in these 
sections consequently sought to establish to what extent numerical, temporal, and 
functional flexibility had been adopted at the collieries under study, and whether 
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there had been any change in the intensity of work, and in the way in which miners 
were supervised since privatisation. A number of questions in the these sections 
sought additionally to examine the degree of workforce fragmentation at the 
collieries under study. These questions consequently sought information concerning 
the extent of sub contracting, and the level of union is at ion, and, by implication, the 
level of non unionism also. Other questions relating to the labour process sought to 
determine whether or not the different companies operating at the five collieries 
offered standardised terms and conditions to their employees, and whether or not 
there had been any change in health and safety standards since privatisation. 
Both interview schedules also contained sections concerning managerial 
industrial relations strategies. Initial questions in these sections sought to establish 
whether or not recognition was granted to all, or indeed to any, of the unions 
operating at the collieries under study, and what form recognition took if this was 
the case. A number of questions however, anticipated the possibility that only one 
union would be recognised, or that one union would be given preferential treatment. 
These questions consequently sought to establish whether or not this situation had 
arisen, and if so, which unions were involved, what form preferential treatment took, 
and why those particular unions were favoured by management. Another group of 
questions took into account the possibility of the unions being refused recognition. 
These questions thus sought to ascertain the strategies of the unions in the event of 
such developments, and the reasons for de-recognition where this had occurred. 
Other questions relating to management strategies aimed to assess the extent to 
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which managerial prerogatives were being enforced, and whether or not 
management was pursuing policies designed to marginalise the unions. 
A section on the role and responses of the unions was also included in both 
interview schedules. Questions in these sections sought to establish whether there 
had been any change in the main locus of bargaining since privatisation, or in the 
range of issues dealt with by local trade union representatives. A number of 
questions also aimed to examine whether there had been any change in the degree or 
locus of union influence following the return of private ownership. Other questions 
in these sections sought to establish whether or not the unions had been able to take 
advantage of the changed environment which resulted from privatisation, and 
whether there was any variation in the responses of the unions to management 
strategies. 
In both interview schedules, the final sections were concerned with the 
institutions of collective bargaining at the collieries under study. Questions in these 
sections therefore sought to ascertain whether or not new institutions of collective 
bargaining had been established, and, if so, whether the unions had been involved in 
their construction. In anticipation of the possible absence of formal bargaining 
machinery however, one question in each schedule sought to examine how disputes 
were resolved in these circumstances. Other questions in these sections sought to 
determine whether or not company wide bargaining had been adopted in the 
industry, or, conversely, whether industrial relations had been de-collectivised to any 
great extent at colliery level. 
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In addition to conducting interviews with management and trade union 
representatives, it was also decided to undertake a large scale workforce survey at 
each of the collieries under study. The object of the surveys was to gather a large 
volume of lower level data relating to how management industrial relations 
strategies, the role of the unions, and developments in relation to institutions of 
collective bargaining, and the labour process, were perceived by the miners who 
worked at the five collieries. 
A questionnaire was designed to facilitate the surveys. This duplicated many 
of the questions included in the interview schedules, although the wording of such 
questions was modified to reflect the fact that the questionnaire was designed to 
elicit information from individual respondents rather than from respondents 
representing organisations. An initial group of questions sought to establish the 
level of workforce fragmentation. It was also envisaged however, that cross 
referencing the responses to these questions with those to later questions, would 
illuminate whether or not particular groups of workers had been disproportionately 
affected by any emergent patterns in industrial relations. In addition, some of the 
questions required respondents to compare their experience of working for British 
Coal, with that of working for a private concern, the purpose of these particular 
questions being to analyse workforce perceptions of continuity and change. The 
questionnaire designed for use within the workforce survey is reproduced in 
Appendix C. 
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The primary concern in relation to the workforce questionnaire was ensuring 
a high response rate, and for this reason the questionnaire was reasonably short. In 
recognition of the relatively poor educational opportunities available to mining 
communities, questions were phrased in uncomplicated language, and the majority 
also offered a number of different answers to respondents. The strategy of utilising 
multiple choice questions was also adopted for ease of coding. 
The strategy of gathering data from depth interviews with management and 
trade union representatives, and from large scale workforce surveys was designed to 
ensure that the attitudes and perceptions of all the actors in the industry were 
available for analysis. This use of multiple sources of evidence then, sought both to 
lessen the threat posed by researcher bias, and to bolster the internal validity of the 
research. 
A pilot study was conducted at a colliery in Yorkshire, which was selected 
because of it's location in the home town of the researcher. Several union officials at 
the colliery were known personally to the researcher, and obtaining their help and 
goodwill was therefore unproblematic. Pilot interviews were conducted with 
representatives of the NOM and NACODS at the colliery, and their responses were 
both frank and informative. The pilot interviews highlighted sensitivities which 
though obvious with hindsight, were nevertheless unforeseen in the first instance. 
As a result some changes were made both to the ordering and the phraseology of a 
number of questions on the trade union interview schedule. Pilot interviews were 
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not conducted with management representatives, however, nor with UDM 
representatives, since there were no UDM members at the colliery concerned. 
Access issues 
Had this research project been considered at any time between the end of the 1984-
85 miners' strike, and the privatisation of the industry, problems relating to access 
would almost certainly have been encountered, because of the political sensitivities 
surrounding the industry at that time. Though such sensitivities have arguably 
declined since privatisation, it was nevertheless anticipated that gaining access 
would be problematic. 
Unlike British Coal, which was the monopoly coal producer in the UK 
between 1947 and 1994, the companies which have emerged as a result of 
privatisation do not enjoy such a position. The possibility of some companies being 
reluctant to participate in the research due to sensitivities relating to market 
competition therefore had to be taken into account. Similarly it was acknowledged 
that companies might be hesitant to grant access, as the research involved gathering 
data from trade union representatives and workmen as well as from managerial 
representatives. In an attempt to overcome such problems, companies whose 
collieries had been selected for study were advised that all information would be 
treated in absolute confidence, and that the collieries selected for study would 
remain anonymous within the thesis. They were similarly informed that draft case 
reports would be available on request for validation with the respective respondents. 
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Because of the sensitivities surrounding industrial relations, particularly in 
relation to the issue of the legitimacy of managerial industrial relations strategies, 
the interview schedule designed for use with management representatives had to be 
carefully prepared. This was reflected in the ordering of the schedule, since it's 
initial section contained questions relating to continuity and change in the labour 
process, this being the least contentious area of the research. In addition, managerial 
terminology was utilised throughout the schedule, and questions relating to 
particularly sensitive issues were phrased in such a way as to decrease any 
misgivings. Such concerns were initially thought to be of less importance in relation 
to the interview schedule prepared for use with trade union officials, although it was 
recognised that gaining the trust of union officials was nevertheless a significant 
Issue. 
In the event, gaining access to the collieries owned by W A, AC and EM 
proved to be unproblematic, and chapters five six and seven, which follow, therefore 
comprise the findings of the holistic case studies which were undertaken at 
Cwmpridd, Abergoed and Workham collieries respectively. 
CUK, by contrast, refused to grant access to their collieries. Whilst 
representatives of the company agreed that independent research would provide 
objective information which might be of use to the company, they stated that a 
number of internal research projects were currently being undertaken in similar 
areas, and that the proposed research would conflict with these. The company did 
however agree to grant access at group level. 
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A review of methodology 
CUK's refusal to grant access at colliery level necessitated a review of methodology, 
since the decision of the company prevented interviews being conducted with 
management personnel at the collieries selected for study, moreover it also meant 
that the workforce questionnaire could not be utilised at collieries owned by the 
company. CUK's refusal to grant access at colliery level did not however, block 
access to the trade unions, since these bodies could be approached independently. 
It was imperative that collieries owned by CUK were included in the study, 
since the company had emerged as the major player in the industry following 
privatisation. It was therefore decided to adopt an embedded case design for the 
study of this company, with the company itself forming one unit of analysis, whilst a 
second unit of analysis would be provided by a number of colliery level studies. 
Although it had initially been proposed to select two collieries owned by CUK for 
study, it was decided to increase the number of collieries studied to four in order that 
firstly, the influence of the legal framework could be fully examined in combination 
with each other variable which had been identified, and secondly, to compensate for 
the insufficiency of management respondents at colliery level (Table 4.3.). 
Deamley colliery had initially been selected as a CUK colliery for study 
because it was located in Yorkshire, was organised by the NUM, and was not subject 
to the provisions of TUPE. It was therefore decided to retain Deamley within the 
study. It was however, necessary to choose another Yorkshire colliery organised by 
the NUM, which was, unlike Deamley, subject to the provisions ofTUPE. 
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Table 4.3: summary of embedded units within CUK case study 
Colliery Location Union TUPE? Workforce Product Period of closure 
market 
Donborough Yorkshire NUM Yes 600 EST Never closed 
Deamley Yorkshire NUM No 320 EST October 1992 - March 1994 
Nottston N ottinghamshire UDM Yes 600 EST Never closed 
Mansthorpe N ottinghamshire UDM No 300 EST May 1993 - January 1994 
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Donborough colliery, which supplies coal to the electricity supply industry was not 
closed by British Coal, and remained in production throughout the privatisation 
process. CUK therefore acquired Donborough as a going concern, and because of 
this the provisions of TUPE applied at the mine. This colliery was therefore chosen 
as an additional mine for study. 
Nottston colliery had similarly been selected as a CUK colliery for study 
during the initial phase of case selection because it was located in Nottinghamshire, 
was organised by the UDM, and was subject to the provisions ofTUPE. It was 
therefore decided to retain Nottston within the study, and to choose another 
Nottinghamshire mine organised by the UDM, which was, unlike Nottston, not 
subject to the provisions ofTUPE. Mansthorpe colliery, which produces coal for the 
electricity market, was closed by British Coal in May 1993, when the entire 
workforce was made redundant. It was acquired by CUK under the lease/license 
arrangements, and was consequently not subject to the provisions ofTUPE. This 
colliery was therefore chosen as an additional mine for study. 
In order to operationalise the CUK case study, it was decided to conduct 
interviews with corporate level managers, and with national and area union officials, 
so that information relating to developments in labour relations at corporate level 
could be gained. In addition, it was decided to utilise interviews with trade union 
branch officials in order to elicit information relating to developments at colliery 
level. The possibility of conducting focus group interviews with members of the 
workforce at each colliery selected for study, in order to gauge workforce 
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Table 4.4: Summary of final colliery selection 
Colliery Form of Location Union TUPE? Workforce Product Period of closure 
ownership market 
Donborough Large Yorkshire NUM Yes 600 ESI Never closed 
enterprise 
Deamley Large Yorkshire NUM No 320 ESI October 1992 - March 1994 
enterprise 
Nottston Large N ottinghamshire UDM Yes 600 ESI Never closed 
enterprise 
Mansthorpe Large N ottinghamshire UDM No 300 ESI May 1993 - January 1994 
enterprise 
Abergoed Management South Wales NUM No 117 Domestic January 1993 - April 1994 
buyout 
Workham Management N ottinghamshire UDM No* 600 ESI April 1994 - April 1995 
buyout 
Cwmpridd Co-operative South Wales NUM No 280 Domestic April 1994 - December 1994 
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perceptions of developments within the sphere of industrial relations was 
also considered. As such an approach would have been unauthorised by CUK, 
however, future research within the company could have been compromised. This 
strategy was therefore rejected. 
No access problems were encountered when approaches were made to 
representatives of the mining unions in relation to the prosecution of the CUK case 
study. It was therefore possible to conduct the proposed research as planned, and the 
findings of the CUK case study comprise chapter eight, which follows. 
A review of fieldwork procedures 
Conducting depth interviews with management and trade union representatives at 
the three collieries which were the subject of holistic case studies proved to be 
unproblematic. Similarly, no problems were encountered in relation to conducting 
interviews with management within CUK, once the perametres of access had been 
established, nor with trade union representatives within that company. 
By contrast, some difficulties were encountered in relation to the distribution 
of questionnaires at the three collieries where workforce surveys were conducted. 
At all three mines management were unwilling to release the names and addresses of 
members of the workforce. This made a postal questionnaire unfeasible, and other 
more unorthodox methods of distribution therefore had to be utilised. 
At Abergoed, the colliery manager and representatives of all the recognised 
unions drew up a joint letter detailing the research, and explaining that the 
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questionnaires would be analysed by a neutral academic researcher. The 
questionnaires, and pre- paid envelopes addressed to the researcher, supplied by 
management were then distributed to members of the workforce when they collected 
their wages. At Cwmpridd, the questionnaires were distributed, and collected by 
trade union representatives at the colliery, who then forwarded them to the 
researcher, whilst at Workham the questionnaires were distributed and collected by 
staff in the wages office, where they were collected by the researcher. 
Such distribution strategies were obviously far from ideal, not least because 
at Cwmpridd and Workham distribution was incomplete. In addition, however, the 
principal of objective research was to some extent undermined at all three collieries. 
Such considerations were less significant at Abergoed, since the covering letter 
signed by members of management and the unions stressed that the questionnaire 
was to facilitate objective research, and the pre-paid envelopes supplied with the 
questionnaire ensured that confidentiality was maintained. The co-operation of 
management at Abergoed was dependent on them receiving the aggregate data from 
the questionnaires however, this presented no ethical questions for the researcher, 
since it had previously been agreed that the individual case report would be made 
available to respondents at the mine, in order that the research could be validated. 
At Cwmpridd and Workham, however, considerations relating to objectivity 
were more significant, since the distribution strategies employed at theses mines 
could have given the impression that the research was being conducted on behalf of 
the trade unions and management respectively, even though this was not the case. 
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Moreover because the completed questionnaires were collected at the workplace, 
respondents at these collieries did not have the same level of confidentiality as that 
afforded to respondents at Abergoed. 
The unorthodox methods of distribution are arguably reflected in the 
relatively low response rates at each of the collieries (Table 4.5.), however 
considerations relating to objectivity and confidentiality might also explain why the 
response rates at Cwmpridd and Workham were lower than that obtained at 
Abergoed. 
Table 4.5: Response rates at collieries where workforce surveys were employed 
Colliery Response rate 
Abergoed 48% 
Cwmpridd 
Workham 
26% 
18% 
When access was being negotiated, it was agreed that copies of the case 
reports would be forwarded on request to respondents, once these had been 
completed. Management respondents within CUK expressed no interest in the case 
report, and moreover, were extremeley dismissive of the notion that anything could 
be learned from independent research into industrial relations within the company. 
Because ofthis, the CUK case report was not made available to CUK management 
respondents. Copies of the report were, however, forwarded to each of the trade 
Chapter 4 
115 
union branch officials involved in the CUK case, since these respondents expressed 
considerable interest in the findings of the research. 
Copies of the Cwmpridd and Workham case reports were made available to 
the respective management and trade union respondents at each colliery, however 
the Abergoed case report was only made available to the colliery manager. This was 
because this respondent, though wholly supportive of objective research, had made 
his co-operation conditional upon the report being made available to him alone. 
Objectivity and detachment 
The researcher involved in the production of this thesis is a native of South 
Yorkshire, and has lived for the majority of her life in a small mining township 
within the county. Her partner is a former mineworker, and both were active 
participants in the 1984-85 strike. Because of this, the researcher came to this 
project with views sympathetic towards the NUM, and hostile towards the UDM. 
She was nevertheless acutely aware that her own sympathies could not be allowed to 
stand in the way of objective research, and therefore endeavoured to mentally detach 
her earlier experiences from current events, whilst continuing to bear in mind that 
the events of 1984-85 provided the context for much of what has followed. The 
researcher approached fieldwork in Nottinghamshire with some trepidation 
nontheless. She met with no hostility from UDM respondents however, and 
discovered that there are some fine trade unionists at branch level in 
Nottinghamshire, who care deeply both about the future of the industry, and about 
those employed within it. 
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* Although Workham colliery was subject to the provisions ofTUPE when it was 
acquired by EM after the collapse of EC, these regulations did not apply when EC 
purchased the colliery in the first instance. 
* Parts of this chapter formed the basis for a paper entitled 'Industrial relations in the 
UK coal industry after privatisation: developing a suitable methodology.' This paper 
was presented at the EDAMBA Summer School, Castera-Verduzan, France, July 
1997. This paper is reproduced in Appendix E. 
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Cwmpridd is located in what remains of the South Wales coalfield. The NUM has 
traditionally represented the miners at the collieries in South Wales, and the 
coalfield has a history of relatively bitter industrial relations. Cwmpridd itself is an 
NUM stronghold, like the other collieries in South Wales, indeed the Cwmpridd 
NUM lodge has customarily been controlled by the political left, and has, over the 
years, gained a reputation for militancy (Trade union representative). 
When preparations were being made for the privatisation of the industry, 
Cwmpridd was initially classified by British Coal as a core colliery, however, 
British Coal later announced that the colliery was to close. The Cwmpridd lodge of 
the NUM mounted a campaign against the closure, but this was ultimately 
unsuccessful, and the mine ceased production in April 1994. 
Following the closure ofCwmpridd, the Cwmpridd lodge of the NUM and 
two colleagues from the other mining unions represented at the mine, formed the 
Cwmpridd Employee Buyout Team (CEBOT), and initiated a bid to purchase the 
colliery. They were supported by over 200 former Cwmpridd employees, who each 
paid £8,000 of their redundancy money towards the bid. In October 1994, the 
government announced that CEBOT had been selected as the preferred bidder for 
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the colliery, which was to be sold as an individual "stand alone" unit, and in 
December 1994, Cwmpridd re-opened under co-operative ownership. The forn1 of 
ownership which emerged at Cwmpridd as a result of privatisation then, is radically 
different to that at any of the other collieries which have survived restructuring. 
Several former union officials who were involved in CEBOT now hold senior 
management positions within the company, Welsh Anthracite (WA), which was 
established as part of the buyout bid. In addition, 80 per cent of the workforce are 
equal shareholders in Welsh Anthracite. 
Cwmpridd represents something of an atypical case, because the co-operative 
ownership which has emerged at the colliery is so different to that at the other mines 
which have survived restructuring. Given the customary militancy of the NUM in 
South Wales, and the history and traditions of the coalfield, it might be anticipated 
that industrial relations at Cwmpridd would continue to be characterised by conflict. 
However, the possibility cannot be discounted that the relationship between 
management and the trade unions would reflect the nature of ownership at the 
colliery, and that this may facilitate the development of pluralistic patterns of 
industrial relations, or, alternatively, in the emergence of a shared unitary 
perpsective. 
Management strategies 
The style of management which has emerged at Cwmpridd following its return to 
the private sector, is very different to that which prevailed in the last decade of 
public ownership. The unitary approach introduced unilaterally by British Coal 
Chapter 5 
119 
management following the 1984-85 strike has been abandoned, and a more 
collaborative regime has been established at the colliery. 
Managerial strategies are no longer centred upon the marginalisation of the 
unions. As a result, collective bargaining has been re-established at the colliery, and 
all the unions recognised by W A have full bargaining rights (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). Moreover, WA stipulates that any 
contracting companies employed by them must also recognise and negotiate with the 
unions. As one trade union representative pointed out, "The contractors would not 
have their contracts renewed if they blacked a union" (Trade union representative 
C). Indeed the Cwmpridd lodge of the NUM has a representative with special 
responsibilities for those employed by the contracting companies (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). WA additionally provide office 
facilities, stationary and unlimited telephone access for all the recognised unions, 
and allow union officials time off with pay for union business (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). 
Changes in management style are also visible at Cwmpridd because the 
maintenance of managerial prerogatives no longer receives the same emphasis as 
was the case when British Coal owned the mine. Strategic decisions relating to the 
long term future of the colliery have to date been jointly made by management and 
the unions. The worker-shareholders who comprise 80 per cent of the workforce, 
however, have to ratify all major decisions, and indeed would be in a position to 
decide between competing strategies forwarded by management and the unions 
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should this situation arise (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives). 
The unions have no formal role in terms of the day to day running ofthe 
colliery, however, consultative meetings occur regularly, and are "encouraged by the 
company" (Management representative B), and informal consultations take place 
"on a daily basis" (Trade union representative A). In addition, trade union officials 
have unlimited access to management representatives, and do not have to wait for 
several days before discussions can take place with a senior manager, as was the 
case under British Coal procedure (Trade union representative). 
The perceptions of the workforce confirm that the unions are involved in, 
rather than marginalised from, decisions relating to the running of the mine in spite 
of their lack of a formal role, as 47 per cent of respondents stated that management 
and the unions came to joint decisions about the running of the colliery, whilst a 
further 41 per cent stated that the unions were consulted (Table 5.1.). 
Table 5.1: Which of the following best describes how decisions are made about 
the day to day running of your pit? (n = 58) 
Management impose their decisions without 
consulting the unions. 
Management consult the unions but still 
have the final say 
Management and the unions come to joint 
decisions 
No response 
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The perceptions of the workforce also confinn that the maintenance of managerial 
prerogatives is not the overriding priority for W A managers, since two thirds of 
respondents believed the managerial regime at the colliery to be finn but fair (Table 
5.2.). 
Table 5.2: Which of the following best describes the overall attitude of 
management at your pit? (n = 58) 
Dictatorial 
Hard line 
Finn but fair 
Relaxed 
Easy going 
No response 
Unlike their British Coal predecessors, management at W A have not 
% 
16 
5 
66 
10 
0 
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endeavoured to foster division and individualism amongst the workforce in order to 
marginalise the unions; Indeed, one management representative described such 
tactics as "taboo" (Management representative B). Management do communicate 
directly with members of the workforce on an individual basis, by way of 
newsletters, noticeboards and pit head briefings (Management representatives and 
trade union representatives). The rationale behind this strategy, however, is to 
remove the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion created by the systematic use of 
misinfonnation by British Coal following the 1984-85 strike, and to create a culture 
of openness, because, as one management representative observed, "Rumours are the 
worst thing in the world" (Management representative A). 
Direct communication with individuals is therefore designed to augment 
rather than replace communication through collective channels, thus ensuring that 
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the workforce is infonned about the perfonnance and prospects of the colliery, and 
indeed the new approach is welcomed by the unions: "It's much better now. People 
are fully infonned of what's happening" (Trade union representative C). 
Significantly however, communication is regarded as a two way process. One 
management representative commented that, "Communication is also to get 
feedback from the men and improve innovation" (Management representative A). 
Members of the workforce are consequently encouraged to share their ideas for 
improving the perfonnance of the colliery with management, this being indicative of 
the development of a more democratic management style at the colliery. 
The management at W A have similarly demonstrated their support for 
collective representation by actively encouraging members of the workforce to join 
the appropriate trade union. As one management representative suggested, "We 
have come from a unionised background, and encourage people to join the union for 
their own safety" (Management representative A). One trade union representative 
suggested that management policy relating to this issue had served to increase the 
membership of his particular organisation, and indeed, 96 per cent of respondents 
stated that they belonged to one of the unions recognised by WA (Table 5.3.). 
Table 5.3: Which union do you belong to? (n = 58) 
% 
NUM 77 
UDM 0 
NACODS 12 
BACM 7 
Other 2 
None 2 
No response 0 
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The changes in management style and strategy discernible at Cwmpridd, 
have been precipitated by privatisation, since this facilitated the establishment of 
co-operative ownership at the colliery, which was conducive to a democratic 
management style. The relationship between management and unions at the colliery 
has changed significantly as a result of this, since a number of former NUM lodge 
officials now hold senior management positions, and their approach towards the 
unions is coloured by their previous experience and ideological standpoint. Indeed 
one senior manager expressed the view that, "You must put into practice what 
you've believed in all your life. There's no point otherwise" (Management 
representative A). 
Another group of managers at Cwmpridd however, formerly held managerial 
positions within British Coal. As a result they subscribe to a different ideology, and 
indeed there is some suggestion that this group disapproves of the style of 
management established at the colliery, and would prefer to see managerial 
prerogatives restored. One trade union representative commented that, "A small 
portion of the management resent information being available to the unions" (Trade 
union representative C), whilst another remarked, "Sometimes they forget 
themselves. Three or four would like to squash us. They don't like the power we've 
got" (Trade union representative A). As this group is a minority within the 
management structure however, they are not in a position to exert significant 
influence on management styles. Indeed, one trade union representative observed, 
"Their ideology hasn't changed, but they have to swallow it" (Trade union 
representative A). 
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The co-operative ownership established at Cwmpridd has also been reflected 
in the structure ofWA, and this in itself has had implications for industrial relations 
at the colliery. Members of management, like members of the directly employed 
workforce are shareholders in W A. Each shareholder however, has shares of the 
same value, irrespective oftheir position in the company, or occupational grade, and 
as a consequence relations between management and the workforce are conducted 
on a more equal basis. The structure of W A then, has also served to constrain the 
industrial relations policies pursued by management, and has made the adoption of a 
unitary approach less tenable, since the worker-shareholders are also trade union 
members. As one management representative stated, "It's very difficult to manage. 
A man can say to XX [the colliery manager] 'You can piss off 1 I've got £8,000 of 
shares same as you' " (Management representative D). 
The role of the unions 
WA has granted recognition to three of the unions which organise within the 
industry, these being the NUM, NACODS and BACM. Recognition however, has 
not been granted to COSA, the white collar section of the NUM, nor to APEX 
(Management representative). All the unions which are recognised have full 
bargaining rights, and W A has not sought to favour unions which are supportive of 
conventional managerial objectives. Indeed, the UDM, which has, since its 
establishment, consistently demonstrated both its deference to corporate policy and 
its political moderation, has not been recognised by W A. The decision not to 
recognise the UDM arguably reflects the ideological standpoint of those members of 
the management team who formerly held positions within the Cwmpridd lodge of 
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the NUM, since one management representative observed, "No, we don't recognise 
the UDM. The UDM is a scab union, always has been and always will be" 
(Management representative A), whilst another commented, "Are they a union? No 
way would they be allowed on site !" (Management representative B). It could be 
argued however, that the presence of former NUM lodge officials within the senior 
management structure ofWA, and the adoption of employee ownership and co-
determination as corporate objectives, indicate that at this particular colliery the 
NUM is the union most likely to be supportive of corporate policy. 
Collective bargaining has been re-established at Cwmpridd, and this has 
served to restore the influence of the trade unions at the colliery. The unions were 
involved in the development of procedural agreements (Management representatives 
and trade union representatives), and indeed have negotiated a number of substantive 
agreements in relation to the terms and conditions of the workforce, in the period 
since the buyout. These agreements are superior to those which exist in other parts 
of the industry (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
Because of this, members of Cwmpridd NUM, unlike their counterparts in other 
collieries, were not balloted in December 1996, nor in February 1997, over industrial 
action in support of a pay claim and bargaining rights (Trade union representative). 
The Cwmpridd workforce appears to acknowledge that the influence of the unions 
has increased under the current regime, since 41 per cent of respondents stated that 
the unions have more influence now, compared with when British Coal owned the 
colliery (Table 5.4.). 
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Table 5.4: Do you think the unions at your pit have more or less influence now 
than they did when the colliery was owned by British Coal? (n = 58) 
More influence now 
About the same level of influence now 
Less influence now 
No response 
% 
41 
28 
24 
7 
The influence of the unions at Cwmpridd has also been affected by the nature 
and structure of W A. Management at the colliery is more sympathetic to the 
demands of the unions than was the case when British Coal owned the mine because 
a number of senior managers formerly held positions within Cwmpridd NUM. As a 
management representative remarked, "They [the unions] are just bargaining with 
themselves" (Management representative C). Furthermore, as all the union officials 
are also shareholders they are additionally able to influence company policy by way 
of the shareholders meetings, this being recognised by the workforce, one of whom 
suggested that, "The union can influence as a union, but also as shareholders" 
(Cwmpridd worker). 
The nature and structure of W A has also precipitated changes in the range of 
issues handled by union officials at the colliery. As a consequence of managements' 
adoption of co-determination, the unions at Cwmpridd are now much more involved 
in strategic planning than was the case in the British Coal era, as one management 
representative acknowledged, "They do have discussions on commercial issues as 
well, on marketing, on the equipment we buy. They never had those rights under 
British Coal" (Management representative A). 
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The role of trade union officials in tenns of making day to day 
representations on behalf of the membership however, is much diminished. This is 
largely the result of management at the colliery being more responsive to union 
demands. Whilst the unions welcome these developments, they have nevertheless 
experienced some problems in adjusting to the loss of their traditional role. A union 
representative intimated that the unions had become accustomed to the adversaria1 
style of industrial relations which characterised the last decade of public ownership, 
and that adapting to relationships based on consensus presented new challenges to 
the unions at the colliery, "The problems we had under British Coal gave us a 
common enemy. Now we don't have an enemy to fight as such" (Trade union 
representative A). Such sentiments were echoed by one management representative, 
who remarked, "If anything they're more content now, but in my opinion they miss 
the fight" (Management representative C), and by another, who suggested, "Yes, 
they find it difficult. I think what we've done is taken their major enemy away from 
them .. .! think they find there's not that many problems at the colliery now, and so I 
think sometimes they feel a little bit in limbo" (Management representative A). 
The policy of open communication adopted by management has also served 
to reduce conflict between management and the unions (Trade union representative), 
and the new mood of co-operation which has emerged between management and the 
workforce following the buyout, has also reduced the number of issues dealt with on 
a day to day basis by union officials. Indeed, one trade union representative 
expressed the view that, "Now there are hardly any issues at all, because we are all 
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equal shareholders, we are all working together, and the pit is doing well" (Trade 
union representative D). 
Changes in the locus of bargaining are not in evidence at Cwmpridd, and as 
in the British Coal era, most contact between W A management and union officials 
takes place at colliery level. It is acknowledged by both management and the 
unions, that negotiations would only involve area or national level union officials in 
the event of serious problems, although as yet, such a situation has not occurred. 
One management representative commented, "The nitty gritty of all problems is at 
colliery level. Problems would only go to area if it couldn't be solved locally" 
(Management representative A), and similarly, a trade union representative 
suggested that "The area was used as a trouble-shooter under British Coal, but this 
situation hasn't arisen since the take-over" (Trade union representative C). 
The importance of local bargaining, and the effectiveness of the unions at 
local level, is apparently recognised by the Cwmpridd workforce, since 57 per cent 
of respondents stated that the unions were most influential at pit level (Table 5.5.). 
A further 21 per cent stated that the unions had most influence at company level, 
however, and as W A owns only one colliery, these figures can be combined, giving 
a total of78 per cent suggesting that the influence of the unions was greatest at local 
level. 
Though the preference of both management and the unions is to retain 
bargaining at local level, the importance of local bargaining has been buttressed by 
Chapter 5 
129 
Table 5.5: At which level do you think the unions have most influence? 
(n =58) 
National level 
Company level 
Area level 
Pit level 
Influential at all levels 
Ineffective at all levels 
No response 
the restructuring which has occurred in the industry. Operational restructuring in 
South Wales has reduced the number of operating collieries to two, and has 
% 
3 
21 
0 
57 
3 
10 
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effectively left the NOM South Wales Area without a role. Indeed, one management 
representative remarked that, "The South Wales Area is struggling to justify itself" 
(Management representative D). Cwmpridd itself now accounts for more than 50 
per cent of mining jobs in South Wales, and to some extent the Cwmpridd lodge of 
the NOM has replaced the South Wales Area as the focal point of NOM organisation 
in the locality. As one of the trade union representatives at the colliery stated, "We 
are South Wales." (Trade union representative A). 
The fragmentation of the industry which accompanied privatisation, and the 
growth of sub-contracting has also undermined national bargaining, since single 
employer bargaining has replaced industry wide negotiations. Although trade union 
structures at national level have remained intact following privatisation, their 
function is much diminished, and one management representative indicated that, 
"National level exists only in name" (Management representative D). There is also 
some suggestion that the fragmentation of the industry, and the emergence of single 
employer bargaining has undermined the solidarity of the NOM. Indeed, one 
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management representative suggested that the Cwmpridd lodge itself was now 
wholly concerned with local matters, and would consequently be unlikely to support 
NUM members in other collieries: "The NUM here is nothing like the NUM 
elsewhere, there's no Arthur Scargill. They have no allegiance to any other pits up 
country, but they're still a pain in the arse to me. They're just looking after 
themselves." (Management representative C). 
Institutions of collective bargaining 
When Cwmpridd was closed by British Coal in April 1994 the entire workforce was 
made redundant. Because of this, the acquisition of the colliery by WA did not 
represent a transfer of undertakings, and the provisions of the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, relating to collective 
agreements consequently did not apply. The institutional structures developed to 
facilitate collective bargaining during the nationalised era therefore, and the 
collective agreements negotiated by the mining unions and the NCB / British Coal 
were no longer in force at the colliery when it re-opened under the current ownership 
in December 1994. 
New institutional structures are now in place at the colliery. These structures 
are based on the institutional arrangements which prevailed in the industry between 
1947 and 1985. As one management representative stated, "Everything was a clean 
start based on an old system" (Management representative C). The conciliation 
scheme currently in operation at Cwmpridd provides for disputes which cannot be 
resolved at colliery level to be referred to area union officials, and, in the event of 
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continued disagreement, to an "independent umpire" (Welsh Anthracite, Staff 
Handbook, January 1995, Section 12 : 2). The disciplinary procedure in place at the 
mine similarly grants employees the right to be represented by a trade union official 
at all stages in the disciplinary process. Employees moreover, also have the right of 
appeal against management decisions in relation to disciplinary matters (Welsh 
anthracite, 1995). The nature of the institutional arrangements currently in operation 
at Cwmpridd is significant, since this is indicative of continuity with the structures 
of the 1947-85 period, rather than with those procedures developed to facilitate 
restructuring following the 1984-85 strike. 
A formal pay structure is also in operation at the colliery. This is similarly 
based on the former British Coal pay structure, however, the productivity bonus has 
been abandoned in favour of a flat weekly wage, and differentials have been 
dramatically reduced (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
Changes to wage rates have to date been made by a wages committee comprised of 
management, trade union and worker representatives (Management representative). 
The emergence of institutional structures to support collective bargaining at 
Cwmpridd reflects the nature of ownership at the colliery. Indeed the conciliation 
scheme, disciplinary procedure, and pay structure, were all developed by CEBOT in 
conjunction with their advisors as part of the buyout bid (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). Moreover, these structures were 
ratified by the worker-shareholders in advance of their implementation (Trade union 
representative). 
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Fonnal colliery level bargaining at Cwmpridd is augmented by infonnal 
bargaining, which is sometimes conducted without union involvement (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). Such arrangements were 
widespread during the final years of public ownership, however the scope of 
infonnal bargaining has been reduced under the current regime. Thus whilst "job 
and knock" agreements, which allow workers to go home early on completion of 
specific tasks, and infonnal bargaining over deployment, and working arrangements 
is pennitted, infonnal financial deals are not tolerated under any circumstances 
(Management representatives and trade union representatives). The continued 
importance ofinfonnal bargaining is reflected in the perceptions of the Cwmpridd 
workforce, since only 5 per cent respondents stated that reference was made to long 
standing fonnal agreements when changes were made to working arrangements 
(Table 5.6.). 
Table 5.6: How are changes to terms and conditions of work usually made at 
your pit? (n = 58) 
By reference to long standing fonnal agreements 
By infonnal talks between management and the unions 
representing the workers concerned 
By infonnal talks between management and the 
workers themselves 
No response 
The institutional structures developed to facilitate collective bargaining at 
% 
5 
48 
29 
17 
Cwmpridd apply to the 80 per cent of the workforce who are WA shareholders, but 
not to those workers employed by either of the two sub-contracting finns which 
operate at the colliery. 
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The largest of these firms, Coalcon, operates nationally, but employs 54 
workers at Cwmpridd, primarily on development work. Coalcon has a conciliation 
scheme and a disciplinary procedure and, whilst those structures are similarly based 
on the institutional arrangements of the nationalised era, they were nevertheless 
developed without union involvement, and were imposed on the company's 
workforce (Management representative). 
The pay structure operated by Coalcon was similarly developed without 
union involvement. Coalcon employees, unlike their W A counterparts receive a 
productivity bonus, and official Coalcon policy is that the wage levels paid by Coal 
UK are used as a benchmark by the company. As one management representative 
stated, "In the last pay award, Coalcon paid in line with Coal UK's payment to the 
NOM" (Management representative D). 
Informal bargaining, which is frequently conducted without trade union 
involvement, is a major feature of Coalcon's operations at Cwmpridd (Management 
representative), and there is some suggestion that this a reflection Cwmpridd's 
relative isolation from Coalcon's administrative headquarters in Yorkshire. Indeed, 
one management representative commented, "I can do private deals that I don't 
publicise, because the company gives me more leeway than they would ifI was 
based up country. All agreements are supposed to be cleared with Coalcon 
management but they aren't" (Management representative D). 
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Unlike the informal bargaining which involves W A employees however, that 
involving Coalcon workers frequently embraces ad hoc financial agreements. 
Indeed it is not uncommon for different groups of Coalcon workers engaged on the 
same task to be paid different rates for the job (Management representative).This is 
significant, since it points to the emergence of a two tier pattern of industrial 
relations at Cwmpridd. 
The labour process 
Productive operations under the current regime at Cwmpridd are influenced by a 
different rationale to that which prevailed when British Coal owned the mine. The 
long term strategy of W A is not geared to increasing output, but is instead based on 
the controlled depletion of reserves, and the protection of employment. One trade 
union representative expressed the view that, "Having suffered the indignity of pit 
closures, the mood is now to keep the pit open for as long as possible, and to keep 
people in work for as long as possible" (Trade union representative C). Marketing 
and production are consequently more closely integrated than was the case under 
public ownership, and as a result, a number of changes are visible within the labour 
process. 
When British Coal owned Cwmpridd, there were three coaling shifts each 
day at the colliery. The policy ofWA however, is to operate only two coaling shifts 
per day, with the third shift being utilised for maintenance, since this level of output 
is, at present, sufficient to meet sales (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives). Furthermore once weekly output targets have been realised, 
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production ceases, and workers are transferred to routine maintenance tasks. Indeed 
it is not uncommon for production to be limited to four days per week. As one trade 
union representative pointed out, "When production targets are met early we use 
Fridays for maintenance" (Trade union representative B). 
Since W A acquired Cwmpridd in December 1994 less emphasis has been 
placed on improving productivity than was the case when British Coal owned the 
mine. In part this represents a recognition that excellent levels of productivity had 
already been achieved under British Coal ownership. A management representative 
alluded to this when he stated: "We've taken no direct steps to improve productivity, 
because the men were working hard before the take-over" (Management 
representative A). 
Though some flexible working practices have been adopted at the colliery in 
order to improve performance, such developments have been limited, and have been 
largely centred on functional flexibility. 
Co-operation between workers has traditionally been a feature of coal 
mining. Indeed, as a management representative indicated, "We have always been 
more flexible in comparison to, say, a factory" (Management representative D). To 
a large extent functional flexibility at Cwmpridd has merely formalised this 
tradition. W A employees are consequently encouraged to train for jobs other than 
their own, and plans are in place for all underground workers to be face trained in 
the future (Management representative). 
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There is some suggestion that the adoption of functional flexibility has been 
resisted by the W A workforce, as one management representative commented that, 
"They're not very good at sticking their hands up to work on different jobs" 
(Management representative C). However, the perceptions of the workforce at 
Cwmpridd suggest that many are embracing the concept of multi-skilling, if 
reluctantly in some cases, since over half of respondents stated that they performed a 
wider variety of tasks in their current employment than they did in the employ of 
British Coal (Table 5.7.). 
Table 5.7: Do you perform a wider or narrower range of tasks in your current 
job than when you were employed by British Coal? Cn = 58) 
Wider variety of tasks 
About the same variety of tasks 
Narrower variety of tasks 
No response 
Numerical flexibility has been adopted at Cwmpridd to a limited degree, 
% 
53 
34 
5 
7 
since 20 per cent of the workforce at the colliery is employed by two sub contracting 
firms. The largest of these firms, Coalcon, was engaged by W A for development 
work, whilst the smaller company, was engaged by British Coal to operate the 
Cwmpridd washery (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
The contractors at Cwmpridd then, perform strictly limited functions, and there are 
no plans to extend sub contracting at the colliery (Management representatives and 
trade union representatives). 
W A's decision to sub-contract development work was taken because of the 
inherently transient nature of mining development. Since permanent posts for 
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development workers could not be guaranteed, it was considered inappropriate to 
encourage such workers to become shareholders (Management representatives). 
Indeed, all Coalcon employees are engaged on temporary contracts, although to date 
the labour requirements of the colliery have enabled all the workers to be re-engaged 
(Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
Temporal flexibility is not a major feature of operations at Cwmpridd. WA 
and Coalcon employees are normally expected to work five shifts per week, each 
being of seven hours and thirty minutes duration, as was the case when British Coal 
owned the mine (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
W A employees are contractually obliged to work overtime on request. As 
the WA Staff Handbook states, "Depending on requirements, from time to time you 
may be asked to work overtime or extra hours which you may not umeasonably 
refuse" (Welsh Anthracite, Staff Handbook, January 1995, Section 3: 1). Similarly, 
Coalcon employees may be required to work additional hours if this is necessitated 
by operational requirements. A management representative remarked that, "The 
contractors have to work overtime if they fall behind schedule" (Management 
representative C). In practice however, overtime working is limited, with most 
additional hours being worked by specific groups of workers, such as winders and 
deputies, whose working time is influenced by their statutory duties (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). Excessive overtime is avoided in 
part because of management concerns relating to the effects of fatigue. Indeed, one 
management representative stressed that, "It is our policy not to overwork the men" 
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(Management representative B). Financial considerations also have some influence 
however, and one management representative made the point that overtime working 
was discouraged because of the cost to the company, "We don't like overtime 
because of the money" (Management representative C). The relatively relaxed 
attitude towards overtime at Cwmpridd is confirmed by the perceptions of the 
workforce, since 83 per cent of respondents stated that overtime was voluntary, thus 
suggesting that there is indeed little pressure on the workforce to work excessive 
hours (Table 5.8.). 
Table 5.8: Is overtime working at your pit voluntary or compulsory? (n = 58) 
Voluntary 
Compulsory 
No response 
Furthermore, more than half of respondents stated that they normally worked 40 
hours per week or less (Table 5.9.). 
Table 5.9: How many hours do you normally work each week, including 
overtime? (n = 58) 
40 or less 
41 - 50 
51 - 60 
60 or more 
No response 
% 
83 
16 
2 
% 
53 
33 
9 
3 
2 
Management at Cwmpridd have not sought to increase productivity with the 
application of new technology, since the colliery had been the subject of large scale 
technological investment under British Coal administration, and MINOS was fully 
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installed prior to the closure of the mine in April 1994 (Management 
representatives). The scope for technological improvement has therefore been 
marginal, and those improvements which have been undertaken have focused on 
increasing the efficiency of existing machinery rather than on reducing the porosity 
of the working day. Routine condition monitoring, for example, uses the analysis of 
oil samples from machinery to predict breakdowns, thus enabling repairs to take 
place during scheduled maintenance periods. Indeed, one management 
representative suggested, "You can plan a repair before it happens." (Management 
representative E). 
The relative neglect of measures to improve productivity by management at 
Cwmpridd is also a consequence of the emergence of a new form of ownership at 
the colliery, since W A employees are also shareholders in the company, and are 
therefore committed to the corporate objective of improving performance. As one 
management representative put it, "It is in their own interest to produce the coal and 
not to waste materials. They're shareholders, so if the pit does well they get 
dividends, the power of the company increases, and so does their job security. If 
they want to act silly, they'll only affect their own business" (Management 
representative C). Such sentiments were echoed by one trade union representative 
who commented that, "People are more aware now that it's their company ... People 
have the will to make it succeed" (Trade union representative C), whilst another 
commented, "There's a willingness to do whatever needs to be done to get the output 
required" (Trade union representative D). 
Chapter 5 
140 
Although productivity levels have been maintained at Cwmpridd, 
management at the colliery are nevertheless mindful of the negative health and 
safety implications of raising productivity through work intensification. Efforts to 
improve health and safety at Cwmpridd have included the development of training 
programmes to facilitate multi-skilling. Indeed Cwmpridd's training programmes 
have gained national recognition, and Cwmpridd was the first mine in the country to 
be recognised as a BTEC approved centre (Management representative). In 
addition, risk assessments and method statements must be produced before the 
commencement of any new task, or before any change in working practices is 
authorised (Management representatives). 
Both management and trade union representatives concede that Cwmpridd 
had a good safety record when it was owned by British Coal; nevertheless the 
accident rate has fallen since the colliery was acquired by W A. Nine major injuries 
occurred in the last year of public ownership, compared with just one in the first year 
since the colliery re-opened under the current regime (Management representative), 
these figures arguably being reflected in the insurance premiums for the colliery 
being reduced by half a million pounds over the same period (Management 
representative). 
The views of the workforce at Cwmpridd would appear to confirm that 
health and safety is given greater priority than was the case when British Coal 
owned the mine, since 74 per cent of respondents suggested that there had been an 
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improvement in safety standards at the colliery under the current ownership (Table 
5.10.). 
Table 5.10: Do you think that safety standards at your pit have improved or 
worsened since privatisation ? (n = 58) 
Improved 
No change 
Worsened 
No response 
Conclusions 
In the short period since Cwmpridd was returned to the private sector, industrial 
relations at the colliery have been transformed. The adversarial nature of labour 
relations which characterised the last decade of public ownership has been 
superseded, and the relationship between management and the trade unions at the 
colliery is now based on co-operation and conciliation rather than conflict. The 
emergent pattern of industrial relations at Cwmpridd then, represents a significant 
break with the recent past, and marks a return to the less conflictual relationship 
between management and the trade unions which characterised labour relations in 
the industry between 1947 and 1984. 
% 
74 
16 
5 
5 
Current managerial industrial relations strategies at Cwmpridd certainly bear 
more resemblance to the labour relations policies pursued by the NCB between 1947 
and 1984, than to those which were operative in the final decade of public 
ownership. Collective bargaining has been re-established at the colliery, and 
management have not sought to marginalise the unions. Moreover, the maintenance 
of managerial prerogatives receives considerably less emphasis than was the case in 
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the last decade of the nationalised era, and indeed, the unions are able to exert 
significant influence in relation to strategic decision making. 
The experience at Cwmpridd then, appears to accord with some of the views 
forwarded by the optimists. Privatisation has, as Ferner and Colling (1991), 
anticipated, changed the environment in which corporate industrial relations 
strategies are developed, and the removal of the influence of government has 
enabled W A to develop new labour relations policies based on consensus and co-
determination. Privatisation, however, has had a much more direct influence on the 
development of industrial relations at Cwmpridd than the optimists might have 
envisaged, since this facilitated the emergence of co-operative ownership at the 
colliery. This in tum gave rise to a more balanced relationship between management 
and the trade unions, and also between management and the workforce, thus making 
the unilateral adoption of a unitary approach to industrial relations by management 
both less likely and less viable, although an alternative interpretation might be that 
privatisation has resulted in the emergence of a shared unitary perspective. 
The role of the unions at Cwmpridd has also changed profoundly in the 
period since privatisation. All the unions which organise at the colliery have been 
recognised, and the re-establishment of collective bargaining has restored their 
influence in relation to pay and conditions. The importance of local bargaining has 
increased following privatisation, and there has been significant change in the range 
of issues dealt with by Cwmpridd lodge officials. 
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Such developments similarly give some credence to the optimistic view 
advanced by Fairbrother (1994), and Edwards and Heery (1989), that the increased 
importance of de-centralised bargaining following privatisation would lead to the 
rejuvenation of trade unionism at local level. Two important qualifications have to 
be made however: firstly, local bargaining was already well established at 
Cwmpridd under public ownership; and secondly, the increasing influence of the 
Cwmpridd NUM lodge is in part, a reflection of the extent to which the role of the 
South Wales Area has been undermined by restructuring. 
The transformation of industrial relations which has occurred at Cwmpridd 
since privatisation is also discernible in the institutional structures which were 
established to facilitate collective bargaining at the colliery. The structures which 
were developed following privatisation owe much to the institutional arrangements 
which were operative in the industry between 1947 and 1984. These new 
arrangements however, apply only to the 80 per cent of the workforce who are 
worker-shareholders, and not to those employed by the sub contracting firms which 
operate at the colliery. It can therefore be argued that a dual pattern of industrial 
relations is beginning to emerge at Cwmpridd. 
Change is also evident in relation to the labour process at Cwmpridd, since 
productive operations at the mine are influenced by the strategy of controlled reserve 
depletion, and the preservation of employment. Less emphasis is placed on 
increasing output than was the case in the last decade of public ownership, and 
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efforts to improve productivity by introducing flexible working arrangements and 
new teclmologies have similarly been marginal. 
Because the new pattern of industrial relations at Cwmpridd represents a 
significant break with the recent past, and a return to the consensual relationships 
between management and the trade unions which characterised the industry between 
1947 and 1984, it is possible to conclude that privatisation has had positive 
implications for labour at the colliery. The Cwmpridd workforce appear to 
recognise that the effects of privati sat ion at their colliery have been favourable, since 
41 per cent of respondents regarded privatisation as a positive change for miners 
(Table 5.11.). 
Table 5.11: Do you think that privatisation has been a good thing or a bad 
thing for miners? Why is this? (n = 58) 
Positive response 
Negative response 
Positive at Cwmpridd, negative elsewhere 
Acceptable alternative to closure 
Positive for WA employees, negative for sub contractors 
No response 
% 
41 
10 
22 
2 
2 
22 
Perhaps the most telling comments however, were made by some of the 22 per cent 
of respondents, who, though acknowledging that the Cwmpridd workforce enjoyed 
an exceptional and advantageous situation, nevertheless suggested that privatisation 
had been a negative experience for the industry as a whole, particularly given the 
restructuring which accompanied this policy. As one respondent stated, "For us at 
Cwmpridd it is a good thing as we now own the pit, but for others, no, as the pits 
have closed" (Cwmpridd worker). 
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Abergoed is one of only two deep mines formerly owned by British Coal to have 
survived the restructuring of the South Wales coalfield. The workforce in South 
Wales has traditionally been represented by the NUM, and historically industrial 
relations in the coalfield have been adversarial in character. Like the other collieries 
in South Wales, Abergoed has been a bastion of NUM support, although the lodge 
has, over the years, gained a reputation for moderation and independence (Trade 
union representative and management representative). 
At the time of the coal crisis in October 1992, Abergoed was earmarked for 
closure, and the colliery ceased production in January 1993. Following the 
government's coal review however, Abergoed along with a number of other 
collieries owned by British Coal, was offered for sale under license to the private 
sector in advance of the privatisation of the core collieries. Three bids were received 
for Abergoed, including one from a management buyout team. The management 
buyout team was ultimately successful in its attempt to purchase the colliery, and in 
April 1994 the colliery re-opened under the ownership of Anthracite Cymru (AC), 
the company which was formed as part of the buyout bid. The colliery currently 
employs 117 people. 
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Because AC was established by the fOlmer British Coal management at 
Abergoed, it might be expected that the company would have inherited some of the 
long standing industrial relations traditions of the public sector, and that patterns of 
industrial relations at the colliery might come to be more pluralistic in character as a 
result of the removal of the influence of government. However, given the 
commercial pressures facing the new company, the customary militancy of the NUM 
in South Wales, and the recent history of the coalfield, it is also possible that the 
relationships between management and the unions at Abergoed might continue to be 
conflictual in character. 
Management Strategies 
The style of management to have emerged at Abergoed following the privatisation 
of the colliery is somewhat different from that which prevailed during the years of 
public ownership. The structure of AC is such that the positions of Company 
Chairman, Managing Director, Colliery Owner and Colliery Manager are all held by 
a single individual (Management representative). This concentration of managerial 
control has facilitated the emergence of an autocratic management style which has 
significantly influenced the development of industrial relations at the colliery. 
Though there has been some change in the managerial style at Abergoed, 
there has nevertheless been a considerable degree of continuity in the industrial 
relations strategies pursued by management at the colliery following privatisation. 
The unitary approach to industrial relations adopted by British Coal during the last 
decade of public ownership has been perpetuated by the current management, and 
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the maintenance of managerial prerogatives similarly continues to receive high 
priority. 
The strategies adopted by the present management at Abergoed in relation to 
the trade unions which organise in the industry, continues to reflect the unitary 
approach to industrial relations adopted by British Coal, as AC has de-recognised 
BACM, NACODS and the NUM at both national and area levels (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). The three unions are recognised 
locally however, and have been granted full bargaining rights (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives), although the unions have been able 
to gain few concessions from management thus far, and one trade union official 
described collective bargaining at the colliery as "very one sided" (Trade union 
representative C). Management provide office and telephone facilities for the trade 
unions, and although the lodge officials are rarely allowed time offwork for union 
business, they are paid the equivalent of one shift at surface rates to complete these 
duties in their own time (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives ). 
Strategic planning in relation to the long term future of the mine is wholly a 
managerial concern, and in practice the colliery manager is responsible for all major 
decisions. One management representative commented, "He does confer with the 
Directors, but only to confirm his decision. Ultimately he makes the final decision" 
(Management representative E), whilst another observed, "It's a one man band 
really" (Management representative B). The trade unions have no meaningful input 
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into strategic planning at Abergoed. They are consulted about matters of strategic 
importance, significantly however, such consultations occur after decisions have 
been taken, rather than as part of the decision making process itself, as one 
management representative pointed out, "An opportunity is made after the decision 
is made for the unions to give their views" (Management representative A). 
Moreover another management representative candidly observed, "You can consult 
somebody and listen to them, and you can consult somebody and not listen to them" 
(Management representative B). It can thus be seen that management strategies in 
relation to strategic planning are geared to exclude the unions from the decision 
making process, and indeed one trade union representative remarked that, "We are 
told what is going to happen, and if we question anything we are told that they run 
the pit" (Trade union representative A), whilst another suggested, "Some things are 
done and we're not consulted. We're told afterwards maybe" (Trade union 
representative C). 
The role of the unions in relation to the day to day running of the colliery is 
also extremely limited, and indeed one management representative stated that, "The 
unions are not involved to any great extent" (Management representative B). 
Management at the colliery have abandoned the formal consultative meetings which 
were a feature of public ownership (Trade union representatives), although union 
representatives do have the opportunity to express their views in relation to everyday 
operational matters, since they meet informally with management representatives on 
a weekly basis, in what was described by one management representative as an 
"open forum" (Management representative C). One union representative however, 
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suggested that issues raised by the unions in these meetings were seldom taken into 
consideration, "We have a meeting every Wednesday where we bring our complaints 
up. Very rarely get satisfied, mind" (Trade union representative B). Another 
representative indicated that the authoritarian tone of the meetings precluded 
meaningful discussion, "In the meetings it is a case of this is what we're going to do, 
and this is how we're going to do it, and this is what will happen if we don't do it" 
(Trade union representative A). 
The workforce at Abergoed acknowledge that management at the colliery 
discuss everyday operational matters with representatives of the trade unions, since 
75 per cent of respondents stated that the unions were consulted over such issues. 
Importantly however, they also recognise that the unions are excluded from the 
decision making process itself, since none of the respondents indicated that 
operational matters were the subj ect of collective decision making (Table 6.1.). 
Table 6.1: Which of the following best describes how decisions are made about 
the day to day running of your pit ? (n = 53) 
Management impose their decisions 
without consulting the unions 
Management consult the unions but 
still have the final say 
Management and the unions come to 
joint decisions 
No response 
The perceptions of the workforce moreover, also confirm the continued priority 
% 
25 
75 
o 
o 
given to the maintenance of managerial prerogatives, as 45 per cent of respondents 
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described the managerial regime at the colliery as dictatorial, whilst a further 19 per 
cent thought it was hard line (Table 6.2.). 
Table 6.2: Which of the following best describes the overall attitude of 
management at your pit? (n = 53) 
Dictatorial 
Hard line 
Firm but fair 
Relaxed 
Easy going 
No response 
% 
45 
19 
34 
0 
0 
2 
Management strategies in relation to communication with the workforce are 
not designed to undermine the position of the unions. Indeed one management 
representative stated, "We don't think it's right to by-pass their role" (Management 
representative C). Management do communicate directly with members of the 
workforce by way of the occasional letter, and through team briefings. In addition, 
the colliery manager makes regular underground visits in order to speak to the men 
on an individual basis (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives). Nevertheless, the majority of communication at the colliery is 
directed through collective channels: "Most of the communication with the 
workforce is done through the unions" (Management representative B). 
It is significant that communication is regarded by management as a one way 
process, and that the unions are seen as vehicles for articulating the position of the 
company and gaining support for managerial decisions. As one management 
representative acknowledged, "We know they understand the business, and would 
like them to present a fair view of the company to the men at all times" 
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(Management representative C). One union representative confirmed that the unions 
are now expected to perform a communicative role which is arguably more 
commonly associated with company unionism: "The manager uses the union as a 
mouthpiece. That's what he thinks we're here for. He will say 'You will tell the men 
this,' or 'You will tell the men that.' He wants us to rubber stamp his decisions" 
(Trade union representative A). Another trade union representative also indicated 
that members of the senior management team do not appear to recognise that the 
unions have a responsibility to communicate the views of their members, and are 
consequently dismissive of any information that they receive from lodge officials, 
"The colliery manager doesn't believe us when we tell him what the men are saying" 
(Trade union representative C). 
The changes which have occurred in management style at Abergoed can be 
attributed to privatisation, since this resulted in the establishment of a new form of 
ownership at the colliery, which in tum gave rise to a new managerial regime. 
The structure of the company which acquired Abergoed facilitated the 
deVelopment of an autocratic management style. In part this is because several of 
the most senior positions within the company are held by a single individual, and 
managerial control at the colliery is thus highly concentrated. As one management 
representative remarked, "the colliery manager is quite happy to think that he can do 
everything himself' (Management representative B). In addition, because AC is a 
small company which owns only one colliery, there is no overarching corporate 
industrial relations policy which serves to constrain decisions taken at local level. 
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Indeed, one trade union representative identified this factor as a major influence on 
industrial relations at Abergoed: "The manager was hot-headed when he was the 
undermanager under British Coal, but there was someone to cool him down then. 
The problem is there isn't anyone like that now" (Trade union representative A). 
Given the style of management to have emerged at Abergoed following the 
return of the colliery to the private sector, it is perhaps unsurprising that there has 
been no significant change in managerial industrial relations strategies, since a 
unitary approach to industrial relations is commensurate with an autocratic 
managerial regime. It is an apparent paradox, therefore, that in engendering the new 
regime, privatisation facilitated the continuation of existing industrial relations 
strategies. 
The role of the unions 
AC has de-recognised BACM, NACODS and the NUM at national and area level, 
although recognition has been granted to all three unions at local level, and all have 
been granted full collective bargaining rights at that level (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). 
AC has not sought to offer preferential treatment to unions which are 
prepared to support managerial objectives at the colliery. The perceptions of the 
Abergoed workforce suggest that management does indeed behave in an identical 
manner towards all three unions, since 88 per cent of respondents believed 
management at the colliery treated the unions on an equal basis (Table 6.3.). 
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Table 6.3: Are all trade unions at your pit treated equally by management? 
(n = 53) 
Yes, management treats all unions in the same way 
No, some unions are treated better than others 
No response 
% 
88 
9 
4 
Comments made by members of the Abergoed workforce however, reveal that such 
equable treatment is regarded with cynicism by many of the employees, since one 
remarked, "Yes they are all treated the same, they are all treated like shit on their 
boots" (Abergoed worker), whilst another commented, "All the unions are treated 
like dirt" (Abergoed worker), and a third expressed the view that, "No union is 
treated good at Abergoed. They all get the same answer: fuck off' (Abergoed 
worker). 
The UDM, which was founded on a platform of political moderation and 
deference to managerial prerogatives, has not been recognised by AC. The decision 
not to recognise this particular organisation however, arguably reflects a pragmatic 
realisation that the UDM has never enjoyed significant support in South Wales, and 
that management consequently had little to gain from recognising this particular 
body. As one management representative pointed out, "Nobody is bothered with the 
UDM here. I'm sure we would recognise them if there was a demand, but no-one 
has shown any interest" (Management representative C). 
For equally pragmatic reasons, management have not endeavoured to 
promote non-unionism at the colliery, and indeed a number of management 
representatives suggested that the presence of the unions offered a number of 
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benefits to the company from a managerial perspective. One management 
representative expressed the view that collective representation made the task of 
managing the colliery more straightforward, "I don't agree that it's to management's 
advantage if the workforce is non-union. With the union at least you're only dealing 
with one or two people. It's far easier to administrate" (Management representative 
D). These comments were echoed by another management representative who 
remarked, "It's better to talk to one body than to half a dozen individual bodies" 
(Management representative F), whilst a third management representative indicated 
that the unions also provided something of a safety valve for workforce discontent: 
"The men have someone to take their grievances to. It gives them a sense of well 
being if they can see that fairness is being enforced" (Management representative 
A). In addition, there was a general recognition amongst management that the 
workforce should be able to enjoy the benefits of trade union membership, 
particularly in relation to legal representation and accident cover. 
The perceptions of the Abergoed workforce suggest that management at the 
colliery nevertheless have an ambivalent attitude towards members of the workforce 
becoming union members, since 60 per cent respondents stated that they were 
neither encouraged nor discouraged from joining a union. Workforce perceptions 
however, do confirm that the creation of a non-union labour force is not a 
managerial objective at the colliery, since none of the respondents stated that they 
were discouraged from becoming union members (Table 6.4.). 
Chapter 6 
155 
Table 6.4: What is the attitude of management at your pit to trade union 
membership? (n = 53) 
Workers are encouraged to join the union of their choice 
Workers are encouraged to join a particular union 
Workers are neither encouraged nor discouraged from 
. . . . Jommg a umon 
Workers are discouraged from joining a union 
No response 
Moreover, 97 per cent of respondents stated that they were members of one of the 
unions recognised by AC (Table 6.5.). 
Table 6.5: Which union do you belong to ? (n = 53) 
NUM 
UDM 
NACODS 
BACM 
None 
Other 
No response 
% 
21 
19 
60 
o 
o 
% 
75 
0 
13 
9 
2 
0 
0 
Although collective bargaining has been re-established at Abergoed, this has 
not served to increase the influence of the unions in relation to pay and conditions, 
and indeed the unions have been able to gain few concessions from management in 
the three years since AC acquired the mine. 
In part, the apparent lack of bargaining progress by the unions is because the 
commercial environment facing the company has limited the room for manoeuvre 
available to management. As one management representative remarked, "In the 
present climate, with the price of coal going down rather than up, there's not very 
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much to bargain about" (Management representative F). Another management 
representative similarly suggested, "They've [the unions] got very little influence 
here because of the tight commercial situation facing the company. They don't have 
any freedom because there isn't any freedom to give. That's why I may come across 
as dictatorial" (Management representative A). A trade union representative 
similarly observed that the commercial environment served to undermine the unions' 
ability to bargain effectively, "We request and demand better terms and conditions, 
but it is flatly denied on commercial grounds" (Trade union representative A). 
Just as it furthered the development of an autocratic management style, then 
the structure of AC itself has also served to limit the effectiveness of the trade 
unions in relation to collective bargaining. Unlike when British Coal owned the 
colliery, there is no higher level of organisation to which the unions can appeal if 
they disagree with decisions taken at colliery level. Indeed one trade union 
representative alluded to this when he stated, "We can ask for different things, but 
the answer ninety-nine times out of one hundred is no, and there is no other channel 
we can follow" (Trade union representative B). 
The emphasis placed on the maintenance of managerial prerogatives at 
Abergoed has also had negative implications for the bargaining power of the trade 
unions at the colliery. Management representatives acknowledge that they use the 
threat of dismissal both to ensure the compliance of the workforce, and to prevent 
industrial action at the colliery. One management representative remarked, "The 
men are fully aware that their livelihood depends on their co-operation and 
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compliance with their contract of employment. They are fully aware of the 
consequences of withdrawing their labour" (Management representative C), whilst 
another unreservedly revealed, "In the event of a dispute, the labour force would be 
dismissed and new labour recruited" (Management representative B). A trade union 
representative similarly suggested that it was not uncommon for management to use 
the threat of dismissal as a bargaining tool: "We get it thrown at us that there are 
plenty outside the gates waiting for our jobs" (Trade union representative C). 
The workforce at Abergoed appear to believe that the bargaining power of 
the trade unions at the colliery has decreased since privatisation, as 94 per cent of 
respondents stated that the influence of the unions at the colliery had declined under 
the current ownership (Table 6.6.). 
Table 6.6: Do you think the unions at your pit have more or less influence now 
than they did when the colliery was owned by British Coal? (n = 53) 
More influence now 
About the same level of influence now 
Less influence now 
No response 
One of the management representatives however, expressed the view that the 
% 
2 
4 
94 
o 
influence of the unions prior to privatisation had been overstated: "You can question 
the influence that the NUM had under British Coal. It wasn't as great as it was 
purported to be, especially after 1984" (Management representative B). Another 
management representative similarly suggested that the 1984-85 strike, rather than 
privatisation, represented a watershed in industrial relations in the industry: "After 
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the miners' strike their [the unions'] negotiating facility was non-existent" 
(Management representative E). 
Changes in the locus of bargaining are evident at Abergoed, because AC has 
de-recognised BACM, NACODS and the NUM at area and national level, which has 
increased the importance of local bargaining. The majority of contact between 
management and union officials occurred at colliery level throughout the era of 
public ownership, but it is important to note that bargaining now is wholly a local 
preserve (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
The significance of local bargaining has also increased because privatisation 
was accompanied by the fragmentation of the industry. The establishment of a 
number of separate coal companies has led to the emergence of single-employer 
bargaining, which has served to undermine bargaining at national and area levels. 
As one management representative observed, "There is no talk of national 
agreements now. The industry is so fragmented it wouldn't happen anyway. I think 
Coal UK are the only ones that have what you might consider to be national 
agreements (Management representative C). 
The increasing importance of local bargaining however, has not been 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the influence of the trade unions at 
local level, nor has it resulted in a broader range of issues being the subject of 
negotiations. Though management do now inform the unions of commercial 
developments affecting the colliery (Management representatives and trade union 
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representatives), the unions are unable to influence policy in this area, because they 
are excluded from the decision-making process, and indeed bargaining is centred 
around the same issues that were the subject of negotiation when the colliery was 
owned by British Coal (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives ). 
The perceptions of the Abergoed workforce indicate that there has been no 
rejuvenation of the unions at local level as a result of the increasing importance of 
local bargaining, and 57 per cent of respondents claimed that the unions lacked 
influence at all levels (Table 6.7.). 
Table 6.7: At which level do you think the unions have most influence? (n = 53) 
% 
National level 8 
Company level 6 
Area level 6 
Pit level 22 
Influential at all levels 2 
Ineffective at all levels 57 
No response 0 
Institutions of collective bargaining 
When Abergoed ceased production following the 1992 coal crisis, the workforce 
was made redundant. The subsequent acquisition of the colliery by AC therefore, 
did not represent a transfer of undertakings, and as a result, the provisions of the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 did not 
apply at the mine. The institutional structures which were developed to facilitate 
collective bargaining during the era of public ownership, and the collective 
agreements which had been negotiated by the NCB / British Coal and the mining 
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unions, were, therefore, no longer in force at Abergoed when the colliery re-opened 
in April 1994 under the CUlTent ownership. 
Some institutional structures have emerged at Abergoed to replace those 
mechanisms which supported collective bargaining during the years of public 
ownership. 
There is no formal conciliation scheme at Abergoed. However, as the 
grievance procedure at the colliery applies to "both individual and collective 
grievances" (Anthracite Cymru. Code of conduct, disciplinary and grievance 
procedures, June 1995, Section A: 7), a mechanism does exist for the resolution of 
disputes. Because AC only recognises the trade unions at local level, however, this 
procedure, unlike the NCB conciliation scheme which operated until 1986, does not 
provide for disputes which cannot be resolved at colliery level to be refelTed to area 
and/or national union officials. Similarly it does not make provision for arbitration 
by an independent body (Anthracite Cymru 1995). 
The disciplinary procedure currently in operation at the colliery provides for 
local trade union representatives to be present during disciplinary hearings, 
(Anthracite Cymru 1995), but employees have no right of appeal against 
management decisions in relation to disciplinary matters (Anthracite Cymru 1995). 
A formal pay structure is also in operation at the colliery, and, as in the years 
of public ownership, the rate of pay received by each worker is related to his or her 
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occupational grade (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
In all other respects, however, the pay system in operation at Abergoed is strikingly 
different from that which was in operation during the nationalised period, since the 
wages received by Abergoed employees are also influenced by the operation of what 
is known at the colliery as the pool system. 
The pool system was devised by members of senior management as part of 
the buyout bid, and was designed to ensure that stability was maintained both in the 
output level of the colliery, and in the level of the weekly wage earned by Abergoed 
employees (Management representatives). The output target for the colliery 
stipulated by management does not vary, and the workforce is required to produce 
the same amount of coal each week. When this target is exceeded, the surplus 
production is added to what is known as the pool. When the output target is not 
achieved, however, the shortfall is taken from the pool. The pool therefore 
subsidises any deficiencies in production. As a consequence of the operation of the 
pool, the weekly pay of Abergoed employees does not fluctuate with variations in 
production levels, as was the case under public ownership, although workers are 
paid a production bonus on a monthly basis if the weekly output target is 
consistently exceeded. 
The pay structure and the disciplinary and grievance procedures currently 
operating at Abergoed were developed by members of senior management without 
union involvement (Management representatives and trade union representatives), 
although union representatives were asked for their comments after these 
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arrangements had been finalised (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives). These procedures then, do not constitute collective agreements, 
and indeed all were imposed on the workforce (Management representatives and 
trade union representatives). As one management representative remarked in 
relation to the pay structure, "The men were told, 'This is the rate for the job. Do 
you want ajob?' " (Management representative C). It could be argued, then, that 
those institutional structures to have emerged at Abergoed following privatisation, 
have more in common with the procedures developed unilaterally by British Coal 
following the defeat of the NUM in the 1984-85 strike, than to the collective 
agreements negotiated during the period 1947 to 1984. 
Formal bargaining structures have emerged at Abergoed, but informal 
bargaining between members of junior management and trade union representatives 
continues to be a feature of industrial relations at the colliery, despite attempts by 
management to reduce the scope of such agreements. 
"Job and finish" agreements, where workers are allowed to finish work 
before the official end of the shift on completion of particular tasks, were 
commonplace under public ownership. Such arrangements are no longer permitted 
at Abergoed because of a management belief that this practice would compromise 
health and safety standards at the colliery. As one management representative 
pointed out, "I discourage that totally. I don't think that's a good thing. It 
encourages men to rush and to take short cuts, and that's when accidents can happen" 
(Management representative A). Ad hoc financial agreements between members of 
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junior management and groups of workers are similarly prohibited (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). 
Informal bargaining in relation to deployment and shift times, however, does 
occur at the colliery (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
Indeed, the continued importance of informal bargaining is acknowledged by the 
Abergoed workforce, since only 17 per cent of respondents stated that reference was 
made to formal agreements when changes were made to working arrangements 
(Table 6.8.). 
Table 6.8: How are changes to terms and conditions of work usually made at 
your pit? (n = 53) 
By reference to long standing formal agreements 
By informal talks between management and the unions 
representing the workers concerned 
By informal talks between management and the workers 
themselves 
No response 
% 
17 
70 
8 
6 
Interestingly, 70 per cent of respondents stated that trade union representatives were 
involved in informal bargaining, compared with 8 per cent referring to informal 
discussions directly between management and members of the workforce. This is 
significant, since it indicates that informal bargaining is not utilised by management 
to undermine the trade unions, and there is some suggestion that informal 
arrangements made between members of junior management and trade union 
representatives serve instead to circumvent senior management at the colliery (Trade 
union representatives). 
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The labour process 
The change in ownership which has occurred at Abergoed, has been accompanied by 
a radical transformation in production methods at the colliery, and as a result marked 
changes are also visible within the labour process. 
British Coal operations at Abergoed exhausted large parts of the available 
reserves, and only small pillars of coal remained when the colliery ceased 
production in January 1993 (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives). The business plan developed by AC as part of the buyout bid 
therefore, centred on the abandoning the longwall mining technique utilised under 
public ownership, and re-introducing pillar and stall working (Management 
representative), a method of extraction which employs shorter coalfaces (For a full 
discussion of both longwall and pillar and stall working see Winterton, 1994). 
Though abandoned in much of the UK following technical and productive 
developments, pillar and stall working nevertheless remained commonplace in the 
small licensed mines of South Wales. Indeed it was these mines which provided the 
inspiration for the introduction of the pillar and stall method to Abergoed, as one 
management representative explained, "What we've done is refine a very basic 
production method used in the private mines, and adapt it to the situation at 
Abergoed" (Management representative C). 
In addition to changing production methods at Abergoed, AC has also 
initiated changes in relation to the technical base of the colliery. The capital costs 
both of installing and running coal cutting machinery on shortwall faces would have 
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rendered the colliery unprofitable (Management representatives). For this reason 
hand filling has been introduced by the current owners, despite this mode of working 
having been phased out in UK collieries during the years of public ownership. 
Indeed one management representative observed, "In a sense we've taken a 
backward step in time" (Management representative B), whilst a union 
representative similarly commented, "We've gone back to the methods of the 1930s 
and 1940s. Every ounce that's filled here is filled with a shovel" (Trade union 
representative B). 
Although the production process at Abergoed is no longer mechanised, 
modern conveyor systems are still utilised at the colliery to bring the coal to the 
surface (Management representatives and trade union representatives). Moreover, 
AC has recently invested in a number of small "cob" conveyors, which transport 
coal from the stalls to the main belts, thus reducing the need to move coal manually 
(Management representatives). It can thus be seen that AC has incorporated both 
new technology and old techniques in their operations at Abergoed, in order that 
coal can be produced profitably in what remains a very difficult market. 
Because the production techniques employed at Abergoed are labour 
intensive, the scope for increasing output is somewhat limited. As a management 
representative explained, "The level of output is determined by the skill and work of 
the men. Once a man's physical capacity is reached that's it" (Management 
representative A). Increasing output is not therefore a corporate objective, and 
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operational policy at the colliery centres on maintaining aggregate production at a 
stable level. 
In order to achieve the objective of maintaining stable production levels, 
senior managers at Abergoed developed the pool system described earlier. This 
links production levels to pay, but perhaps more importantly, in relation to the 
labour process, this system also links output levels to hours of work, because if the 
output target is not reached on a number of consecutive weeks, and the amount of 
coal in the pool falls below a stipulated level, management are at liberty to introduce 
extended shifts, and each employee must then work an additional one hour each day 
without additional payment, until output rises, and the amount of coal in the pool 
returns to a specified level (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives). 
Although operational policy at Abergoed is not focused on increasing the 
output ofthe colliery, measures have nevertheless been taken to improve 
productivity. 
AC has endeavoured to utilise recruitment policy in order to increase 
productivity, since management at the colliery have sought to recruit workers 
familiar with handfilling techniques and pillar and stall working. Recruitment 
strategies have consequently centred on attracting labour from the private mines of 
the locality where such techniques are employed (Management representatives). 
Indeed, around 70 per cent of the production workers currently employed at the 
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colliery were fonnerly employed within the licensed mine sector, although the 
majority of these also had experience of working for British Coal (Management 
representatives and trade union representatives). There is, however, some 
suggestion that labour was recruited from the licensed sector because some of the 
fonner British Coal workers found the physical conditions of un-mechanised mining 
too arduous, and left the colliery as a result. As one management representative 
remarked, "The British Coal boys were a bit soft" (Management representative B). 
Flexible working has also been introduced at the colliery in order to improve 
perfonnance, although such developments have centred on functional and temporal 
flexibility. Management have not sought to promote numerical flexibility at the 
colliery, and indeed less than 5 per cent ofthe Abergoed workforce is employed by 
sub contractors (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
Rigid job demarcation has never been a feature of operations at Abergoed, as 
one management representative pointed out, "Even under British Coal it wasn't one 
man one job, not in this part of Wales anyway" (Management representative F). 
Demarcations have been further reduced under the current managerial regime, 
however, and indeed the summary oftenns and conditions within the employment 
contract given to Abergoed workers states that, "The company reserves the right to 
deploy you to do any other work for which you are able and competent" (Anthracite 
Cymru, Written Particulars of Main Tenns and Conditions of Employment, March 
1995 : 2). Abergoed workers themselves recognise that multi-skilling is a major 
feature of operations at the colliery, since 77 per cent of respondents stated that they 
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performed a wider variety of tasks in their current post than was the case when they 
were employed by British Coal (Table 6.9.) 
Table 6.9: Do you perform a wider or narrower range of tasks in your current 
job than when you were employed by British Coal? (n = 53) 
Wider variety of tasks 
About the same variety of tasks 
Narrower variety of tasks 
No response 
Outbye and surface workers are encouraged to embrace multi-skilling, but 
faceworkers are not, and coal cutting remains their primary responsibility. As one 
management representative remarked, "Colliers themselves in the main do not 
% 
77 
9 
9 
4 
perform multiple functions. They are there to fill coal" (Management representative 
B). This is significant since it indicates that the functional flexibility of outbye 
workers is being utilised in order to reduce the porosity of the faceworkers' working 
day. One management representative suggested that, "Flexibility is designed to 
maximise the time the colliers spend on the coal" (Management representative A), 
whilst a trade union representative similarly observed, "The outbye teams give 
assistance to the colliers. They keep them supplied with props, powder and the like, 
to keep them on the coal as much as possible" (Trade union representative B). 
The introduction of functional flexibility has also contributed to the 
intensification of work, because it has precipitated changes to the way in which 
miners are supervised at the colliery. The pit deputies at Abergoed are now 
incorporated into the production teams (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives), and are thus in direct contact with the workforce for a greater 
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proportion of the time than was the case when British Coal owned the mine. As one 
trade union representative remarked, "The deputy is not up and down the district 
anymore, he's on the shovel next to you" (Trade union representative A). The 
workforce is consequently more closely supervised under the current managerial 
regime, and it could be argued that as a result there are fewer opportunities for 
unscheduled breaks. 
Temporal flexibility is a major feature of operations at Abergoed. Indeed it 
is an intrinsic characteristic of the pool system, and Abergoed workers are 
contractually obliged to work extended shifts to maintain output levels when this is 
deemed necessary by management (Anthracite Cymru, Written Particulars of Main 
Terms and Conditions of Employment, March 1995: 4), although overtime working 
is optional at all other times. 
Abergoed workers acknowledge that there is an element of compulsion in 
relation to overtime working, since 40 per cent of respondents stated that overtime 
was compulsory, whilst a further 13 per cent indicated that overtime working was 
compulsory in some instances (Tab Ie 6.10.). 
Table 6.10: Is overtime working at your pit voluntary or compulsory? (n = 53) 
Voluntary 
Compulsory 
Compulsory in some instances 
No Response 
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The weekly output target at Abergoed does not take into account geological 
conditions within the mine (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives), nor are allowances made for absenteeism (Anthracite Cymru, Code 
of Conduct, Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures, June 1995, Section C : 9), and 
one management representative indicated that as a result, extended shifts were in 
operation, "about 40 per cent of the time" (Management representative A). The 
introduction of temporal flexibility at Abergoed can therefore be seen as an 
essentially Taylorist solution to the question of increasing productivity at the 
colliery, and indeed, one trade union representative stated that, "They've got no 
answers except to keep men underground longer for no extra pay" (Trade union 
representative A). 
Health and safety continues to have a high profile at Abergoed, and one 
management representative indicated that company policy is to maintain the 
standards of safety that prevailed at the colliery during the years of public 
ownership, "The emphasis has been on maintaining Abergoed's safety record, which 
was excellent under British Coal" (Management representative C). The trade union 
representatives also appear to acknowledge that there has been no reduction in the 
priority accorded to safety, since one remarked, "Safety is still paramount, I'll give 
them that" (Trade union representative A), whilst another stated, "Safety is regarded 
as very important. It receives the same priority as under British Coal" (Trade union 
representative B). Nevertheless both management and trade union representatives 
concede that the production techniques currently employed at Abergoed have had a 
number of negative implications for health and safety at the colliery. 
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Because Abergoed is an un-mechanised mine, a larger proportion of the 
workforce is employed at the point of production, where the most potentially 
hazardous conditions are to be found. As one management representative 
commented, "Most of our employees are at the sharp end if you like" (Management 
representative C), and another management representative indicated that because of 
this, there is a relatively high incidence of minor injuries at the colliery, "We have 
loads of cuts and bruises, but nothing really serious" (Management representative F). 
In addition, the use of explosives on the coalface has increased dust levels in the 
colliery (Trade union representatives), and although dust suppression systems have 
been installed on the coalfaces, there is some suggestion that members of the 
workforce are unwilling to utilise this equipment (Management representatives and 
trade union representatives). This reluctance is because the water used to suppress 
the dust makes the coal heavier to move, thus making it more difficult for the miners 
to achieve the weekly output target and avoid the imposition of extended shifts 
(Trade union representatives). 
The perceptions of the Abergoed workforce suggest that overall safety 
standards have been maintained at the colliery since privatisation, as the majority of 
respondents indicated that safety standards had neither increased nor decreased since 
the colliery had been acquired by the current owners (Table 6.11.). A significant 
minority of respondents however, stated that safety standards have worsened, 
indicating that there is some recognition of the existence of problem areas in relation 
to health and safety at the colliery. It is not clear however, whether these problems 
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are thought to result from changing production methods, work intensification, or a 
combination of these factors. 
Table 6.11: Do you think that safety standards at your pit have improved or 
worsened since privatisation ? (n = 53) 
Improved 
No change 
Worsened 
No response 
Conclusions 
Industrial relations at Abergoed have not undergone any profound change in the 
three years since the colliery was privatised, and considerable continuity with the 
patterns established during the period 1984-94 is evident. The unitary approach to 
industrial relations adopted by British Coal management following the 1984-85 
% 
6 
62 
30 
2 
strike continues to be favoured by the current managerial regime, and the adversarial 
relationships between management and the trade unions which were characteristic of 
the final decade of public ownership similarly continue to be a feature of labour 
relations at Abergoed today. 
Privatisation has led to some change in managerial style at Abergoed. These 
developments have not, however, been accompanied by changes in the industrial 
relations strategies pursued by management at the mine. As in the last decade of the 
nationalised era, considerable emphasis is placed upon the maintenance of 
managerial prerogatives. Furthermore, all the mining unions have been de-
recognised at area and national level, and although the unions have been granted 
recognition at local level, they have been excluded from decision making at the 
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colliery, and are consequently unable to exert any significant influence in relation 
either to operational or strategic matters. 
Developments at Abergoed in relation to management industrial relations 
strategies do not then, support the argument presented by Ferner and Colling (1991), 
that a more conciliatory management approach would emerge from the new 
environment engendered by privatisation. Commercial pressures have replaced the 
influence of government as the main determinant of management industrial relations 
strategies at Abergoed, but this influence has not been benign, and has encouraged 
management at the colliery to adopt as uncompromising a stance towards labour 
relations issues as that taken by their public sector predecessors. Privatisation has 
also had a more direct influence on managerial industrial relations strategies at 
Abergoed however, since it has engendered a new form of ownership at the colliery 
in which management control is highly centralised. These developments have led to 
the emergence of an autocratic management style at the colliery, and have thus 
facilitated the maintenance of a unitary approach to industrial relations by AC. 
The role of the unions has similarly undergone little change since 
privatisation. Although BACM, NACODS and the NUM have been de-recognised 
by AC at area and national level, it could be argued that this development has, 
particularly in relation to the NUM, merely formalised the de facto situation which 
existed during the final decade of public ownership. The unions have been granted 
recognition and full collective bargaining rights at local level, although this has not 
served to increase their influence in relation to the terms and conditions of Abergoed 
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employees. Furthermore, changes in the locus of bargaining have not been 
accompanied by changes in the range of bargaining issues handled by local lodge 
officials, and indeed branch organisation at Abergoed continues to be largely 
ineffective. 
At Abergoed then, there is no evidence to support the view presented by 
Fairbrother (1994), and Edwards and Heery (1989), who suggest that the increasing 
importance of de-centralised bargaining following privatisation would lead to the 
renewal of local trade union branches. It would however, be wrong to attribute the 
current weakness of the trade unions at Abergoed wholly to privatisation, since 
labour relations within the industry were comprehensively restructured during the 
final decade of the nationalised era, when the position of capital was strengthened 
relative to that of labour. Privatisation has nevertheless led to the consolidation of 
these developments at Abergoed. 
Continuity with the patterns of industrial relations established during the 
period 1984-94 is also evident at Abergoed, because those institutional structures 
developed to support bargaining at the colliery, owe more to those procedures 
introduced by British Coal following the 1984-85 strike than to those agreements 
negotiated by the NCB / British Coal and the mining unions in the period 1947-84. 
The procedures currently in operation at Abergoed were developed unilaterally by 
AC management, and were imposed upon the workforce. Unlike the institutional 
structures which operated between 1947 and 1984 then, they do not constitute 
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collective agreements, and consequently cannot be said to represent a return to 
consensus at the colliery. 
The production methods at Abergoed have been transformed in the three 
years since privatisation, and because ofthis, operational policy has centred on 
maintaining stable levels of production rather than on increasing output. 
Management at the colliery have nevertheless continued to seek productivity 
improvements, and the measures employed in pursuit of this objective have 
continued to be largely focused on the intensification of work and on reducing the 
porosity of the working day. 
Because the emergent patterns of industrial relations at Abergoed exhibit 
more of the features associated with industrial relations during the final decade of 
public ownership, than with those patterns established during the period 1947-84, it 
can be argued that privatisation has had a deleterious impact upon organised labour 
at the colliery. The perceptions of the Abergoed workers suggest that they 
themselves recognise this, since 79 per cent of respondents thought privatisation had 
been disadvantageous for miners (Table 6.12.). 
Table 6.12: Do you think that privatisation has been a good thing or a bad 
thing for miners? Why is this? (n = 53) 
Positive response 
Negative response 
Privatisation has had both negative 
and positive features 
No response 
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Furthermore, more than a third of those who stated that privatisation had been a 
detrimental development, suggested that this was because it had resulted in the 
consolidation of managerial control at the colliery. Indeed one Abergoed worker 
remarked, "The miner today has virtually lost all his rights of negotiation. You 
either do as you are told or are down the road. All that the mineworker fought for 
has now gone" (Abergoed worker). Similarly, another employee commented, 
"Management seem under privatisation to think that people in their employment 
should be grateful for being given work. British Coal was overmanned and badly 
run, but the pendulum has definitely swung too much towards the owners" 
(Abergoed worker). 
* Parts of this chapter formed the basis for a paper entitled 'Back to the future: old 
labour process in a new mine.' This paper was presented at the 16th Annual 
International Labour Process Conference, Manchester School of Management, 7-9 
April 1998. This paper is reproduced in Appendix F. 
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Workham is one of six collieries formerly owned by British Coal that remain in 
operation in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. Nottinghamshire miners and their 
representative bodies have been associated with political moderation for many 
decades, and labour relations in the coalfield have not been as conflictual as in those 
coalfields where workers have traditionally subscribed to a more militant brand of 
trade unionism. In common with the other Nottinghamshire collieries, the majority 
of the Workham workforce has been represented by the UDM since its foundation in 
1985, although the NUM continues to have a small presence at the colliery. 
Workham was not selected for closure during the coal crisis of 1992, 
however British Coal later decided to mothball the mine, and the colliery ceased 
production in April 1994 (Management representatives and workforce 
representatives). Workham was one of six collieries retained on a care and 
maintenance basis which were offered to private-sector bidders as "stand alone" 
packages, in sales which ran parallel to the privatisation of the core collieries. 
English Coal (EC), a consortium which included a group of individuals who 
formerly held positions within the senior management structure of British Coal, and 
the UDM, made a bid for Workham during the summer of 1994, and in October 
1994, the government announced that this company had been selected as the 
preferred bidder for the colliery. 
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Workham was re-opened by EC in April 1995, but the collapse of the 
company in February 1996 placed the future ofthe colliery in doubt. In June 1996 
however, Workham and another mine formerly owned by EC, were acquired by 
English Mining. English Mining (EM), was established by a group of senior EC 
managers, but despite the change in ownership, managerial continuity was preserved 
at Workham, as many of those involved in the formation of EM had also previously 
held senior management positions within British Coal. EM has continued to operate 
Workham, and the colliery now employs some 600 workers. 
Because a number of former British Coal managers hold positions within the 
management structure of EM, it might be anticipated that the company would be 
influenced by the long-standing industrial relations traditions of the nationalised era, 
and that management at Workham would consequently seek to adopt a more 
conciliatory approach to labour relations, especially since the influence of 
government has been removed from this sphere. Moreover, given the political 
moderation ofthe UDM, and the history of the Nottinghamshire coalfield, it might 
be expected that the co-operative relationships between management and the unions 
which were characteristic of the period 1947-84, would be re-established at the 
colliery. It is also possible however, given the market pressures facing EM, that 
industrial relations at the colliery would become more adversarial in character than 
has previously been the case. 
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Management strategies 
The style of management adopted by EM at Workham following their acquisition of 
the colliery in June 1996 exhibits some continuity with that developed by British 
Coal nationally during the final decade of public ownership, as EM favours a unitary 
approach to labour relations and similarly places a significant emphasis on the 
maintenance of managerial prerogatives. There is however, much evidence to 
suggest that EM has sought not only to consolidate those patterns of industrial 
relations developed by British Coal between 1984 and 1994, but also to intensify 
them. 
The strategies adopted by the current management at Workham in relation to 
the trade unions which operate in the industry reflect the unitary approach to labour 
relations favoured by British Coal following the 1984-85 strike. However, whilst 
British Coal strategies in the last decade of public ownership were designed to 
maintain dual unionism in the industry, and led to the de facto de-recognition of the 
NUM, the strategies embraced by EM at Workham have arguably been designed to 
de-collectivise industrial relations at the colliery, since EM has withdrawn 
recognition from all the trade unions which operate in the industry (Management 
representatives, workforce representatives and trade union representatives). 
Moreover EM provides neither office nor telephone facilities for union officials, has 
refused to grant the unions check off facilities (Management representatives, 
workforce representatives and trade union representatives), and has refused to allow 
the unions to display posters on colliery premises (Management representative and 
Chapter 7 
180 
workforce representative). In addition, EM only pennits branch officials time off 
work for union duties as the law requires (Trade union representative). 
The three sub contracting companies which operate at Workham, employing 
around 20 per cent of the workforce, similarly do not recognise any of the unions 
which organise at the colliery. However, this can be seen as an opportunistic 
response to the position taken by EM, since two of these companies, Coalcon and 
Minecon grant recognition to the unions at their other sites. As one management 
representative pointed out in relation to Minecon, "At Workham none of the unions 
are recognised. Nationally Minecon grants recognition where a majority of the 
workforce request it, but at Workham they follow the line established by EM" 
(Management representative E). 
In addition to refusing recognition to the trade unions, however, management 
at Workham have also adopted policies designed to undennine trade union 
organisation at the colliery, as the current manager has sought to recruit labour from 
the Yorkshire coalfield rather than from Nottinghamshire. A management 
representative suggested that Yorkshire miners were being recruited because the 
manager was familiar with their skills, having been employed by British Coal at a 
colliery in Yorkshire before being appointed to his current position, "The manager 
brought men from Yorkshire because he knew their skills and abilities. He had 
another pool of labour he could use" (Management representative B). However, a 
trade union representative, suggested that the Yorkshire recruitment was designed to 
dilute UDM membership at the colliery, "I can't prove it, but I suspect they're 
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bringing in lads from Yorkshire because they know damn well they won't join the 
UDM. They'd rather be in no union than join the UDM" (Trade union representative 
A). Similarly, one workforce representative intimated that workers were being 
recruited from Yorkshire in anticipation of any changes to employment legislation, 
which would require employers to grant recognition to trade unions where this was 
requested by the majority of the workforce, "There's an effort to recruit anyone that's 
not UDM. As long as UDM membership stays below 50 per cent, they're not 
bothered where they're from or what union they're in" (Workforce representative C). 
Management at Workham have arguably also sought to undermine trade 
union organisation at the colliery with the introduction of an accident insurance 
scheme available to all employees at the colliery. This is paid for by EM, and 
incorporates a twenty four hour telephone hotline which any employee can use in the 
event of an accident (Management representative and workforce representative). It 
can thus be seen that management at the colliery have sought to appropriate the 
major role of the trade unions at the colliery, given that recognition and collective 
bargaining rights have been denied, thus making the remaining benefits of trade 
union membership appear less attractive to the workforce. As one management 
representative candidly revealed, "The thing about it is, it's completely free. Joining 
a trade union isn't." (Management representative B). 
Though trade unions are not recognised at Workham, management at the 
colliery do discuss operational matters, safety issues and workforce grievances with 
a consultative committee comprised of elected workforce representatives 
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(Management representatives and workforce representatives). The Consultative 
Committee (CC), was established as a concession to the workforce following an 
industrial dispute at Workham in December 1996. The dispute was ostensibly 
related to management's imposition of changes to working arrangements, and to the 
manner in which managerial prerogatives were being enforced at the colliery 
(Management representatives, workforce representatives and trade union 
representatives), however, the underlying issue behind the dispute was that EM's de-
recognition of the unions had led to the absence of an effective channel of 
communication between management and the workforce. As one management 
representative stated, "The workforce was saying that there was no vehicle for 
communication" (Management representative B). Significantly, however, the 
question of union recognition was not raised during the dispute, as a management 
representative pointed out, "When the first dispute happened in December the men 
made it very clear that they didn't want the unions involved because it wasn't related 
to recognition" (Management representative B). This view was echoed by a 
workforce representative who stated, "The strike was not about union recognition; 
that particular issue was never raised" (Workforce representative B). 
Union representatives are not prevented from standing for election to the CC, 
as one management representative indicated, "Everyone was eligible to stand for the 
Consultative Committee" (Management representative B). Members of the CC are, 
however, recognised only as workmen (Workforce representative). This is 
significant, since it indicates that management at Workham will not tolerate 
collective representation under any circumstances, and indeed currently, no member 
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of the CC is a serving branch official with any union, although a number of 
committee members have held posts at branch level within the UDM in the past 
(Management representatives, workforce representatives and trade union 
representative) . 
Although the workforce themselves rejected a UDM branch official who 
stood for election to the CC (Management representatives and workforce 
representatives), it can nevertheless be argued that management at Workham have 
sought to utilise the CC as a conduit for communication with the workforce, whilst 
maintaining de-collectivised industrial relations at the colliery. Indeed, as one trade 
union representative observed, "Management are seeking to utilise the skills ofthe 
individuals without the baggage of the organisation [the union]" (Trade union 
representative A). 
Management at Workham have granted rights of consultation to the CC, but 
not bargaining rights, as a management representative pointed out, "The 
Consultative Committee was for consultation not negotiation" (Management 
representative A). The commitment of the Workham management to meaningful 
consultation is however, open to question, since the CC has been side-stepped by 
management on a number of occasions. As one workforce representative remarked, 
"It is bypassed sometimes. Sometimes things are introduced that weren't discussed 
at the Consultative Committee meeting the previous day. Management will say that 
they thought of it in the afternoon, after the meeting" (Workforce representative C). 
Furthermore, there is some suggestion that management regard consultation as a 
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one-way process, and consequently see the CC as a medium for conveying the 
position of the company, and for gaining workforce acceptance of managerial 
decisions. As one workforce representative observed, "Management's idea of 
consultation is different to the idea of consultation that the men had. They would 
tell us what to tell the men" (Workforce representative A), whilst another 
commented, "We're like a government leak. Management let us let the men know a 
little bit. Let them smoulder before it comes in. Let them get used to it" (Workforce 
representative B). 
Although there is little evidence of workforce resistance to the de-recognition 
ofthe trade unions, workforce discontent relating to the CC's lack of bargaining 
rights has been widespread, as a management representative acknowledged, "The 
men thought that they could use the Consultative Committee to negotiate over heat 
money, water money etc., and they couldn't" (Management representative A). 
Another management representative moreover conceded that the perception of the 
workforce was that the CC did not provide a forum for genuine consultation, "The 
men had no confidence in the Consultative Committee, they called it the insultative 
committee" (Management representative C). By contrast, a trade union 
representative suggested that members of the workforce also believed that the 
workforce representatives on the committee were too willing to concede to 
managerial demands: "The men were saying that the Consultative Committee would 
agree to owt. They were saying they might as well be in the offices with them" 
(Trade union representative A). 
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Managerial efforts to marginalise the Consultative Committee nevertheless 
lay behind a second dispute which occurred at the colliery in May 1997. As one 
management representative observed, "If you asked people, they would say that the 
dispute was caused by the fact that nothing had changed, and that the Consultative 
Committee wasn't working" (Management representative A). Such sentiments were 
echoed by a workforce representative who remarked "Management were using the 
Committee for their own ends, but this led to another strike" (Workforce 
representative A). 
It can thus be seen that management at Workham have sought to de-
collectivise industrial relations at the colliery, by de-recognising the trade unions 
that operate in the industry, and by undermining their ability to organise effectively 
at the colliery. However, having de-recognised the unions, management have sought 
to maintain de-collectivised industrial relations by marginalising the Consultative 
Committee. 
Because the trade unions have been refused recognition by EM, they have no 
input in relation to strategic decision making at corporate level, nor do they have any 
influence in relation to the everyday running of W orkham (Management 
representatives, workforce representatives and trade union representatives). It is not 
surprising therefore, that 80 per cent of respondents stated that management imposed 
their decisions without consulting the unions (Table 7.1.). 
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Table 7.1: Which of the following best describes how decisions are made about 
the day to day running of your pit? (n = 86) 
Management impose their decisions without 
consulting the unions 
Management consult the unions but still have the 
final say 
Management and the unions come to joint decisions 
No response 
% 
80 
10 
1 
8 
A high priority is accorded to the maintenance of managerial prerogatives at 
Workham, and indeed strategic planning in relation to the long term future of the 
colliery is wholly a managerial concern, with decisions in relation to strategic 
matters being taken at corporate rather than colliery level (Management 
representatives). The CC is informed of strategic decisions made by management, 
however this body has no role within the decision-making process itself. As one 
management representative stated, "The Consultative Committee are not involved in 
the decision-making process, but are informed and given an explanation" 
(Management representative B). 
Decisions relating to everyday operational matters are similarly considered to 
be the prerogative of management, although management does consult with CC 
representatives in relation to these issues, and suggestions made by the Committee 
are sometimes adopted (Management representatives and workforce 
representatives). One management representative, however, suggested that 
management had sought to consult directly with members of the workforce rather 
than with the CC in relation to operational matters, "These decisions are made by 
management, but when it necessitates, the management meet the men. Where it's 
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really major they meet the Consultative Committee" (Management representative 
C), whilst a second management representative made a similar point when he 
revealed that, "There is some input into these decisions from the men that such 
decisions actually concern" (Management representative B). Management have, 
moreover, periodically sanctioned workforce ballots in relation to proposed changes 
to the terms and conditions of work at the colliery (Management representatives and 
workforce representatives). These developments are significant, since they are an 
indication that management has also sought to undermine collective representation 
by communicating directly with members of the workforce rather than with their 
elected representatives. 
Industrial relations strategies at Workham are primarily determined at 
corporate, rather than colliery level. Indeed, the decision to refuse recognition to the 
unions was taken at corporate level, and there is some suggestion that this decision 
was prompted by a belief that the animosity between the NUM and the UDM would 
undermine effective relations between management and the trade unions at company 
level. As a management representative explained, "Recognition is problematic. 
Workham is a UDM pit, but the other mine owned by the company is NUM. One 
union therefore couldn't represent the workforce. There are some advantages to 
having a body you can talk to, but when it's two bodies that don't talk to each other 
it's difficult" (Management representative B). There is some evidence to suggest 
that other members of management view this explanation with scepticism, however. 
Indeed one management representative suggested that EM had simply adopted the 
industrial relations policies implemented by their forerunner EC: "English Coal 
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didn't recognise the trade unions so I think they [EM] thought that was a good idea" 
(Management representative A), whilst another management representative 
intimated that the factor of personality was of greater importance than any practical 
considerations in relation to the decision not to recognise the unions, "I've not 
bottomed it. I think the head of human resources has just got a bee in his bonnet 
about trade unions" (Management representative C). 
The decision to appoint the current manager at Workham was also taken at 
corporate level, three months after EM acquired the colliery, and there is some 
suggestion that the objective of this appointment was to assert managerial 
prerogatives at the colliery more firmly. Indeed, one workforce representative 
stated, "The manager was told by the Directors to beat us with a big stick" 
(Workforce representative B). A management representative however, suggested 
that the appointment of the current manager was designed to affect change in 
relation to the industrial relations culture at Workham, "He was set on to alter the 
regime. Them at head office didn't like the way the previous manager was running 
the pit" (Management representative C), whilst a second management representative 
suggested that the previous manager, who had managed the colliery under both 
British Coal and English Coal ownership, had been replaced because he had adopted 
a more conciliatory approach towards the trade unions than the company approved 
of, "There was a certain amount of collusion between the previous manager and the 
UDM. He was ignoring some aspects of company policy" (Management 
representative A). 
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There is some suggestion that the change in managerial style precipitated by 
the appointment of the present manager has been resented by the Workham 
workforce, because it has differed significantly from that which has traditionally 
prevailed within the Nottinghamshire coalfield. As one management representative 
commented, "The manager doesn't know the men. He doesn't realise that he's not in 
Yorkshire now. Notts men don't like being shouted at" (Management representative 
C), and indeed one workforce representative suggested that the change in managerial 
style was a contributory factor in the disputes of both December 1996, and May 
1997, "We've always said 'look at them Yorkshire lads, they're always out on strike', 
but now we've had a manager from Yorkshire we say 'no bloody wonder!' He's had 
us out on strike twice in six months when Arthur [Scargill]couldn't get us out in a 
year" (Workforce representative C). The perceptions ofthe Workham workforce 
confirm the presence of an uncompromising managerial style at the colliery, since 
52 per cent of respondents suggested that the regime was dictatorial, whilst a further 
23 per cent of respondents described the regime as hard line (Table 7.2.). 
Table 7.2. Which of the following best describes the overall attitude of 
management at your pit ? (n = 86) 
Dictatorial 
Hard line 
Firm but fair 
Relaxed 
Easy going 
No response 
Privatisation has exerted a major influence on the style of management at 
Workham then, because this has resulted in the emergence of a new form of 
ownership at the colliery. This has in tum resulted in the establishment of a new 
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managerial regime, which has introduced a more conflictual approach to labour 
relations issues than has traditionally been adopted within the Nottinghamshire 
coalfield. The new managerial regime, moreover, has also chosen to adopt, and 
extend, those managerial strategies developed by British Coal during the period 
1984 to 1994, rather than those which were operative during the period 1947 to 
1984. 
The structure of the company which acquired Workham has also 
significantly influenced the development of management industrial relations 
strategies at the colliery, however, because the company owns more than one 
colliery, and industrial relations strategies are determined at corporate rather than 
colliery level. Indeed there is some suggestion that management at colliery level are 
constrained by the industrial relations policies developed at company level, since a 
trade union representative expressed the view that some members of the 
management team at Workham would welcome change in corporate policy in 
relation to the unions, "There are some members of management who would like the 
union to be recognised, but it's not company policy" (Trade union representative A). 
The role of the unions 
EM does not recognise BACM, NACODS, the NUM or the UDM for collective 
bargaining at any level (Management representatives, workforce representatives and 
trade union representatives). This is significant since it indicates that the company 
has not sought to favour those unions which may have been prepared to support 
managerial objectives at the colliery. The perceptions of the Workham workforce 
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confinn that management at the colliery does behave in the same manner towards all 
the unions which operate in the industry, since 55 per cent of respondents believed 
management treated the unions on an equal basis (Table 7.3.). Furthennore, there 
was no significant difference between the perceptions ofNUM and UDM members 
in relation to this issue. 
Table 7.3: Are all the trade unions at your pit treated equally by management? 
(n = 86) 
Yes 
No 
No response 
It is particularly significant that recognition has been refused to the UDM, 
% 
55 
5 
41 
since this body entered into a consortium with Ee, EM's forerunner, in order to bid 
for collieries offered to the private sector during privatisation (Financial Times, 13 
October 1994). Moreover, the UDM was founded on a platfonn of political 
moderation and has, since its foundation, demonstrated its support for managerial 
objectives and its willingness to adopt a role commonly associated with company 
unions. EM's position in relation to the UDM would be inconsistent if the objective 
of the company was to promote company unionism at Workham, but if the objective 
of the company has been to de-collectivise industrial relations at the colliery, the de-
recognition of the UDM can be regarded as a rational development. 
Although none of the trade unions are recognised for collective bargaining, 
management and workforce representatives have stated that Workham employees 
are nevertheless free to join trade unions if they choose, and indeed one management 
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representative stated that EM has not sought to promote non-unionism at Workham, 
"The company's viewpoint is that you can join any union you wish. We don't 
actively discourage people from joining the unions. It's up to the individual" 
(Management representative B). The perceptions of the Workham workforce 
however, do not support the assertions that the creation of a non-union workforce is 
not a management objective. Although 56 per cent of respondents suggested that 
management are ambivalent in relation to this matter, a sizeable minority of 
respondents stated that management discourage trade union membership, despite 
this being illegal under the terms of existing employment legislation. Moreover, just 
1 per cent of respondents stated that union membership was encouraged at the 
colliery. (Table 7.4.). 
Table 7.4: What is the attitude of management at your pit to trade union 
membership? (n = 86) 
Workers are encouraged to join the 
union of their choice 
Workers are encouraged to join a 
particular union 
Workers are neither encouraged nor 
discouragedfrom joining a union 
Workers are discouraged from joining a 
umon 
No response 
It is acknowledged by management representatives, workforce 
representatives and trade union representatives that a significant proportion of the 
% 
1 
o 
56 
42 
1 
Workham workforce does not belong to any of the trade unions which operate in the 
industry. Indeed one workforce representative suggested that the majority of 
Workham workers were not union members, "The biggest sector at Workham is 
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non-UnIOnIsm. There are about 160 UDM, and a handful ofNUM" (Workforce 
representative A). The responses ofWorkham employees to the question relating to 
trade union membership confirm that a large proportion of the workforce is not 
unionised, since 41 per cent of respondents stated that they were not union members 
(Table 7.5.). 
Table 7.5: Which union do you belong to ? (n = 86) 
% 
NUM 16 
UDM 34 
NACODS 2 
BACM 2 
None 41 
Other 2 
No response 2 
It is not clear whether the relatively high level of non unionism at Workham 
can be ascribed to management attempts to promote non unionism at the colliery, or 
to the fact that Nottinghamshire miners have traditionally had a weaker attachment 
to solidaristic behaviour than their counterparts in other coalfields. However, trade 
union de-recognition provides the pre-conditions for non unionism, as Winterton and 
Winterton (1993b: 24), have pointed out. Furthermore, a management 
representative suggested that trade union recruitment at Workham had been 
undermined by EM's refusal to grant check-off facilities to the unions, "They'd all 
join tomorrow if they were on call off' (Management representative C). 
Because EM has de-recognised the trade unions, there has been a complete 
cessation of collective bargaining, and indeed bargaining no longer takes place at 
any level. As one management representative observed: "There isn't any discussion 
Chapter 7 
194 
with the unions, that's a change in itself' (Management representative B). De-
recognition has also resulted in a significant reduction in the range of bargaining 
issues falling within the jurisdiction of the local trade union branches, since 
management does not negotiate with the unions over any issue (Management 
representatives, workforce representatives and trade union representatives), although 
local and area UDM safety representatives are consulted over matters of health and 
safety, since this is a legal requirement (Management representatives, workforce 
representatives and trade union representative). 
One workforce representative expressed the view that the trade unions are 
able to exert an indirect influence over the terms and conditions of their members, as 
a result of the existence of the CC: "In a way management have given the unions a 
bit of collective bargaining back, unofficially like" (Workforce representative A). 
However, given that the trade unions are not represented on the CC, and that this 
body has been denied negotiating rights, and given also that management at 
Workham have endeavoured to marginalise the CC, such unofficial bargaining is 
clearly circumscribed by managerial prerogative. 
The trade union branches at Workham then, have considerably less influence 
over the terms and conditions of their members than was the case when the colliery 
was owned by British Coal, and according to management representatives the unions 
are now unable to exert any influence at all in relation to such matters. Indeed one 
management representative stated: "They [the unions] have no influence now" 
(Management representative B), whilst a second declared: "They [the unions] have 
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no influence at all" (Management representative A). The Workham workforce 
appears to recognise that the influence of the unions has declined since privatisation, 
since 72 per cent of respondents stated that trade union influence had decreased 
under the current ownership (Table 7.6.). 
Table 7.6: Do you think the unions at your pit have more or less influence now 
than they did when the colliery was owned by British Coal? (n = 86) 
More influence now 
About the same level of influence now 
Less influence now 
No response 
Although the unions are not recognised, and have been denied collective 
bargaining rights, informal contact between corporate level management and 
Workham UDM branch officials has nevertheless taken place. Such contact has 
% 
1 
1 
72 
26 
however occurred only in relation to the industrial disputes which have occurred at 
the colliery, and has been necessitated by management's need to secure a return to 
work. As a trade union representative pointed out, "When the strike happened a few 
months ago XX [the head of human resources] came to ask the UDM reps what was 
going on" (Trade union representative A), and indeed, one management 
representative candidly suggested that corporate level management has been 
prepared to temporarily abandon company policy in relation to the unions when this 
has been seen to be expedient: "The disputes focus minds at head office. This brings 
XX [the head of human resources] galloping down and then they [management and 
the unions] start talking" (Management representative C). However, as the informal 
contact between management and branch officials has been on an ad hoc basis and at 
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management's behest, this cannot be said to have increased the influence of the trade 
union branches at Workham. 
Informal contact has also taken place between members of management and 
UDM area officials as one management representative acknowledged, "XX [a senior 
UDM official] has never been turned away from the pit. He's allowed to go 
underground even though the UDM is not recognised" (Management representative 
B). Indeed, one workforce representative suggested that the UDM Nottinghamshire 
Area officials were currently more influential than the Workham UDM branch 
officials, because the area representatives have been able to intervene in relation to 
matters of health and safety, "Area level is the most influential now, but this is 
because of safety issues, not collective bargaining ... When you have the route cut off 
to collective bargaining, you take up health and safety issues. That's what the area 
officials are doing. The Inspector has been called in on several occasions after 
anonymous 'phonecalls" (Workforce representative A). 
It is however, somewhat questionable whether the area officials of the UDM 
are more influential than their local counterparts, since area representatives have, 
like the Workham branch officials, been unable to secure either recognition or 
collective bargaining rights. Indeed one management representative intimated that 
the UDM area representatives had no coherent strategy to gain recognition, other 
than to await changes in labour legislation proposed by the incoming Labour 
government, "I think they've given up [trying to secure recognition]. They're hoping 
that Tony Blair is going to do it for them" (Management representative A). The 
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perception of the Workham workforce moreover suggests that the unions are equally 
ineffective at all levels since 47 per cent of respondents stated that this was the case 
(Table 7.7.). 
Table 7.7: At which level do you think the unions have most influence? (n = 86) 
% 
National level 9 
Company level 0 
Area level 2 
Pit level 9 
Influential at all levels 1 
Ineffective at all levels 47 
No response 31 
Institutions of collective bargaining 
When Workham ceased production in April 1994, the entire workforce was made 
redundant. The subsequent acquisition of the colliery by EC was not, therefore, 
affected by the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) legislation 
(TUPE), since EC's purchase of the colliery did not represent a transfer of 
undertakings. The institutional structures developed to support collective bargaining 
during the nationalised era, and the collective agreements which had been negotiated 
by the NCB / British Coal and the mining unions then, were no longer in force at the 
mine when it was re-opened by EC in April 1995. 
When EM acquired Workham in June 1996 however, the workforce which 
had been employed by EC was retained, and their existing contracts were extended. 
As a workforce representative explained, "They [EM] tippexed out English Coal and 
put English Mining instead. That was the only change to the contract" (Workforce 
representative C). A transfer of undertakings therefore did take place when EM 
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acquired the colliery, and the TUPE regulations consequently applied. 
(Management representatives and workforce representatives). However, EC did not 
recognise any of the mining unions, and did not negotiate any collective agreements 
with those bodies (Management representatives, workforce representatives and trade 
union representatives), and consequently EM did not inherit any jointly negotiated 
procedural or substantive agreements under the provisions ofTUPE. Because EM 
have also de-recognised the unions, few institutional structures have emerged at the 
colliery to replace those mechanisms which facilitated collective bargaining during 
the nationalised era. 
There is no conciliation scheme in operation at Workham, and the grievance 
procedure outlined in the EM contract of employment applies only to individual 
grievances, rather than to both individual and collective disputes (English Mining 
Limited. Contract of Employment: 5). There is then, no formal mechanism for the 
resolution of disputes, and indeed the disputes which occurred at the colliery in 
December 1996 and May 1997 were both resolved on an ad hoc basis (Management 
representatives, workforce representatives and trade union representatives). One 
workforce representative suggested that the CC now provides a forum for the 
solution of disputes, "We [the CC] try to stop problems being blown out of 
proportion" (Workforce representative B), however the absence of formal 
conciliation procedures indicate that any future disputes are also likely to be 
resolved by way of informal ad hoc arrangements. As one management 
representative observed, "Now there aren't the back up structures, disputes are 
solved by sitting down and talking about it. You get a whole host of issues being 
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brought up, and you have to sort the wheat from the chaff' (Management 
representative B). 
In contrast to the disciplinary and grievance procedures which were 
operational in the industry between 1947 and 1984, the procedures currently in 
operation at Workham do not provide employees with the right to appeal against 
managerial decisions in relation to disciplinary matters. These procedures were 
inherited from EC under the provisions of TUPE (Management representatives and 
workforce representatives), and were drawn up by the Directors of EC, without trade 
union involvement. The disciplinary and grievance procedures then, do not 
constitute collective agreements. 
The pay structure currently in operation at Workham is loosely based on the 
pay structure formerly operated by British Coal, and as in the nationalised era the 
pay received by each worker is related to his or her occupational grade, and is 
supplemented by a production bonus (Management representatives, workforce 
representatives and trade union representatives). This structure, like the disciplinary 
and grievance procedure was inherited from EC under the provisions of TUPE. The 
structure was, moreover, developed by the Directors of EC without union 
involvement, and therefore does not constitute a collective agreement. 
The pay structure, and the disciplinary and grievance procedures currently in 
operation at Workham then, arguably owe more to the procedures developed 
unilaterally by British Coal following the end of the 1984-85 strike, than to the 
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collective agreements negotiated by the NCB and the mining unions during the 
period 1947 to 1984. It could be argued, however, that whilst the structures imposed 
by British Coal in the final decade of public ownership were developed in order to 
institutionalise dual unionism in the industry, those structures currently in operation 
at Workham reflects management's objective to de-collectivise industrial relations at 
the colliery. 
The pay structure and disciplinary and grievance procedures operated by EM 
at Workham apply only to those members of the workforce who are directly 
employed by the company. The contracting companies which operate at the colliery 
have their own arrangements (Management representatives), although the structures 
employed by these companies are influenced by the relationship that the companies 
have with EM. One management representative commented, "The wage paid by 
Coalcon varies according to the host colliery; at Workham the wages are in line 
with those paid by EM" (Management representative D). Another management 
representative observed, "Minecon has to adopt some of the disciplinary policies that 
English Mining has adopted, but it's up to the site manager how to implement these" 
(Management representative E). The arrangements adopted by the contracting 
companies, moreover, were formulated without the involvement ofthe trade unions, 
and were imposed upon the workforce. 
Informal bargaining between junior members of management and the 
workforce which did not involve the trade unions was an important feature of 
industrial relations at Workham throughout the nationalised era, and informal 
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financial agreements were also commonplace (Management representatives). The 
current management team at the colliery have, however, sought to limit both the 
number and scope of informal agreements, although ad hoc financial contracts are 
nevertheless utilised for specific tasks, particularly if the completion of such tasks is 
a matter of urgency. As a management representative pointed out, "We use ad hoc 
contracts for specific jobs, where these need doing quickly, but they are quite rare" 
(Management representative C). 
Senior managers at Workham discourage "Job and finish" agreements, where 
members of the workforce are allowed to cease work prior to the official end of their 
shift on completion of particular tasks, largely because operational strategies at the 
colliery have centred on maximising production. As a management representative 
commented, "There is no job and finish now. We need the coal" (Management 
representative C). Informal agreements between members of junior management 
and the workforce in relation to deployment and shift times are, however, 
widespread at Workham, and indeed one management representative suggested that 
such agreements had compromised safety at the colliery, "There's a lot of funny 
shifts here. It's all on the nod, and nobody knows where anybody is. They 
[members of junior management and the workforce] do it to suit themselves, and it's 
not safe. I don't know where people are" (Management representative A). The 
continued importance of informal agreements at the colliery is reflected in the 
perceptions of the Workham workforce, since only 6 per cent of respondents stated 
that reference was made to formal agreements when changes were made to working 
arrangements at the colliery (Table 7.8.). 
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Table 7.8: How are changes to terms and conditions of work usually made at 
your pit ? (n = 86) 
By reference to long standing fonnal agreements 
By infonnal talks between management and the unions 
representing the workers concerned 
By infonnal talks between management and the workers 
themselves 
No response 
% 
6 
13 
66 
15 
According to 66 per cent of respondents, changes in working arrangements are made 
by infonnal talks between members of management and the workforce without trade 
union involvement. This is not surprising given that the unions are not recognised at 
the colliery, but it nevertheless indicates that management have sought to 
communicate directly with members of the workforce rather than with their elected 
representatives in relation to working arrangements. 
Infonnal bargaining which does not involve trade union representatives is 
also a feature of the contracting finns' operations at Workham. A management 
representative suggested that the policy of Coalcon was to restrict the number of 
infonnal agreements, "I can't say they don't happen, but we try to avoid them if 
possible" (Management representative D). Ad hoc financial deals for weekend 
work, and job and finish agreements have nevertheless involved Coalcon employees 
at Workham, although the management representative emphasised that such 
agreements were, "Very unofficial" (Management representative D). 
The labour process 
Productive operations under the current regime at Workham have been influenced 
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by EM's need to repay the creditors of the company, and operational strategies at the 
colliery are consequently geared to maximising output, and increasing productivity. 
As one management representative stated, "The priority is to chum out the coal so 
that we can pay the banks" (Management representative C). 
Management have not sought to introduce new technology in order to 
increase output and improve productivity at Workham. The colliery was fully 
automated during the years of public ownership (Management representatives, 
workforce representatives and trade union representatives), and the scope for 
technological improvement has therefore been minimal. Those improvements which 
have taken place then, have focused on increasing the efficiency of existing 
machinery, and reducing downtime. MINOS has consequently been extended to 
new faces and parts of the mine currently under development (Management 
representatives), and all underground conveyors have been fitted with automatic 
start-up mechanisms, which has served to increase conveyor running times from 70 
to 90 per cent (Management representatives). 
Because the scope for technological improvement has been limited, 
management at Workham have sought to improve both output and productivity with 
the adoption of flexible working practices. Such developments have however 
largely focused on functional and temporal flexibility. 
Functional flexibility and co-operation between workers has traditionally 
been associated with the mining industry. As a management representative 
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commented, "Mining is a co-operative type industry anyway. You'd always have 
fitters and electricians helping out, because miners work in teams" (Management 
representative B). Management at Workham have nevertheless sought to further 
reduce job demarcations, and one management representative alluded to the 
widespread adoption of multi-skilling at the colliery, "Everyone is doing other jobs 
now. Only the winders are not multi-skilled, and that's because they can't do 
anything else" (Management representative C). Such sentiments were echoed by a 
trade union representative who observed, "There is multi-skilling in a lot of senses 
now, because people are expected to do a lot more than what their normal job is. All 
workers are affected. Ifwe see something that's wrong, or needs doing to help the 
job on, we're expected to do it" (Trade union representative A). The perceptions of 
the Workham workforce confirm the increased significance of functional flexibility 
at the colliery, since 83 per cent of respondents stated that they carried out a wider 
range of tasks in their current posts than was the case when they were employed by 
British Coal (Table 7.9.). 
Table 7.9: Do you perform a wider or narrower range of tasks in your current 
job than when you were employed by British Coal? (n = 86) 
Wider range of tasks 
About the same range of tasks 
Narrower range of tasks 
No response 
Functional flexibility at Workham has contributed to the intensification of 
work at the colliery, because multi-tasking has facilitated reductions in staffing 
levels. A management representative stated that, "The rationale behind multi-
skilling is that we don't need so many men" (Management representative C), and 
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indeed a workforce representative gave one example of how multi-tasking had 
affected two particular groups of workers at the colliery, "The deputies now have to 
complete belt patrol work, and the belt patrol men have been got rid of' (Workforce 
representative C). Functional flexibility has also contributed to the intensification of 
work because it has reduced the porosity of the mineworkers' working day. As one 
management representative candidly revealed, "I wouldn't call it multi-skilling, it's 
just giving the guy more to do because the time wasn't taken up" (Management 
representative A). The perceptions of the Workham workforce confirm that work 
intensification has been a feature of operations at Workham since privatisation, since 
63 per cent of respondents stated that the pace of work at the colliery had increased a 
great deal following privatisation, whilst a further 29 per cent suggested this had 
increased a little (Table 7.10.). 
Table 7.10: Do you think the pace of work has increased or decreased since 
privatisation ? (n = 86) 
Increased a great deal 
Increased a little 
Neither increased nor decreased 
Decreased a little 
Decreased a great deal 
No response 
% 
63 
29 
7 
1 
o 
o 
Temporal flexibility is a major feature of EM's operations at Workham, and 
indeed the contract of employment given to Workham employees states that, 
"Employees will be required to work any shift pattern or roster so devised by the 
Company to meet operational or safety requirements" (English Mining, Contract of 
Employment: 2). EM has recently introduced coaling on four shifts at the colliery in 
order to increase machine availability time, and weekend coaling is also a routine 
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occurrence (Management representatives, workforce representative and trade union 
representatives). Temporal flexibility at the colliery is, however, primarily manifest 
in overtime working, and one management representative indicated that many 
Workham employees were working considerably more than the standard 40 hour 
week described in the EM Contract of Employment, "Many work 50,60, 70 hours" 
(Management representative C), whilst another estimated that overtime working 
accounted for 30 per cent of all shifts worked at the colliery in any given week 
(Management representative A). The Workham workforce confirm that overtime 
working is a major feature of operations at the colliery, since fewer than 7 per cent 
of respondents stated that they normally worked 40 hours or less (Table 7.11.). 
Table 7.11: How many hours do you normally work each week, including 
overtime? (n = 86) 
40 hours or less 
41 to 50 hours 
51 to 60 hours 
Over 60 hours 
No response 
Workham employees are contractually obliged to work, " a reasonable 
% 
7 
30 
30 
29 
3 
amount of overtime at such times and in such a manner as the Company shall, in its 
sole discretion determine, to meet the operational and safety requirements of the 
Company" (English Mining, Contract of Employrnent: 2). One workforce 
representative indicated that Workham employees had sometimes been pressurised 
by management to work overtime, "Letters have been sent insisting that men work 
overtime, and men have been seen in the office and accused of holding the pit to 
ransom and jeopardising peoples' jobs" (Workforce representative C), whilst a trade 
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union representative revealed that management had used the threat of dismissal to 
ensure that W orkham employees worked overtime when required, "They 
[management] tell them [the workforce] 'You've got to work overtime or you're no 
good to us' " (Trade union representative A). A management representative 
similarly intimated that Workham employees had experienced a degree of coercion 
in relation to overtime working, "Because we've been going through a bad patch, 
pressure is applied both directly and indirectly. The company is young. We need to 
pay the banks, and people know what they have to do" (Management representative 
C). 
The Workham workforce do not perceive themselves to be under pressure to 
work overtime, as 87 per cent of respondents stated that overtime working was 
voluntary (Table 7.12.). There is some suggestion, however, that many Workham 
employees have volunteered to work excessive hours because of low pay at the 
colliery. As a workforce representative declared, "You have to work a decent 
amount [of overtime] to get a decent wage, especially when the bonus is down" 
(Workforce representative A). Members of the underground production teams at 
Workham are paid a basic hourly rate of £5.25, whilst the basic hourly rate for 
underground support workers is just £4.67 (English Mining, Contract of 
Employment: 1). There may then, be some validity in such claims. 
Table 7.12: Is overtime working at your pit voluntary or compulsory? (n = 86) 
Voluntary 
Compulsory 
No response 
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Numerical flexibility has also been adopted at Workham, if to a limited 
extent, since some 20 per cent of the workforce is employed by one of the three sub 
contracting companies which operate at the colliery. Coaicon, the largest sub 
contracting company on site was engaged by EM to carry out development work, 
whilst Minecon is employed to operate the Workham washery, and a smaller 
company provides underground workers for a small number of designated tasks 
(Management representatives and workforce representatives). All three companies 
then, perform limited functions at the colliery, and indeed management have no 
plans to extend sub contracting at Workham (Management representatives). 
Management at Workham do not appear to acknowledge the negative health 
and safety implications of work intensification, and there is some suggestion that the 
intensification of work has indeed compromised safety standards at the colliery. A 
management representative acknowledged that a reduction in the time available for 
routine maintenance was an inevitable consequence of increasing machine 
availability time, "You can't do maintenance without downtime" (Management 
representative C), and indeed a workforce representative made the point that 
reducing downtime had led to a reduction in coal clearance operations, and that this 
had increased the risk of underground fires, particularly around belts and transfer 
points, "If you're not getting maintenance it doesn't help. Conveyor fires are a 
potential problem. We've had a couple of those already" (Workforce representative 
C). 
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There is also some suggestion that health and safety standards no longer 
receive the priority they were accorded when British Coal owned the mine, because 
commercial considerations have determined that the prime concern of the current 
management is to increase both production and productivity. One workforce 
representative remarked, "Safety standards have deteriorated to an alarming extent. 
Productivity and production come before safety ... The current climate is that they've 
[the workforce] got to meet production targets or they [management] will let men 
go. You put that in mens' minds and safety takes a back seat" (Workforce 
representative A). A trade union representative similarly observed; "Standards have 
declined. There's that much pressure on people now, and ifthere's no one watching 
them [the workmen] they take shortcuts. The manager says he wants a safe pit, but 
the underlying message is get the job done. He's [the colliery manager] not bothered 
how the job is done and ifthere isn't an accident, that's o.k. and nothing changes" 
(Trade union representative A). Indeed, another workforce representative 
unreservedly declared: "This is the most unsafe pit I've ever worked at" (Workforce 
representative B). 
The Workham workforce appear to recognise that safety standards at the 
colliery have declined following privatisation, since 65 per cent of respondents 
stated that health and safety standards had deteriorated under private ownership 
(Table 7.13.). 
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Table 7.13: Do you think that safety standards at your pit have improved or 
worsened since privatisation ? (n = 86) 
Improved 
No change 
Worsened 
No response 
Management representatives at Workham concede that the accident rate at 
the colliery is higher than it was when the mine was publicly owned, but attribute 
this to changes in the way in which accidents are recorded (Management 
% 
5 
29 
65 
1 
representatives). There is however, some suggestion that management at Workham 
have attempted to manipulate the accident figures for the colliery. One workforce 
representative intimated that management had discouraged employees from 
reporting accidents: "There's a lot of accidents not being reported. There's a lot of 
men frightened to report accidents" (Workforce representative C). A second 
workforce representative, moreover, indicated that management had allocated 
injured workers light jobs above ground in order to avoid registering major 
accidents: "The accident figures are a farce. There aren't no three day accidents 
because they [management] bring them [injured workers] in, and give them ajob on 
the pit top" (Workforce representative A). Another workforce representative 
similarly remarked, "Injured men are brought back to work and put on the pit top; 
There's one in the offices now who cut the guiders [tendons] in his hand" 
(Workforce representative C). 
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Conclusions 
The developing pattern of industrial relations at Workham exhibits much continuity 
with those patterns which emerged nationally during the final decade of public 
ownership, since the unitary approach adopted by British Coal has been favoured by 
the present owners ofthe colliery, and relationships between management and the 
unions are characterised by conflict rather than co-operation. The apparent 
continuity with national developments between 1984 and 1994, however, disguises 
significant discontinuity with the style of industrial relations which has traditionally 
characterised the Nottinghamshire coalfield, and labour relations at the colliery are 
now considerably more adversarial than has previously been the case. 
EM's acquisition ofWorkham has precipitated a marked change in the style 
of management at the colliery. This has been manifest in the abandonment of the 
conciliatory style of management which was formerley evident, and the adoption of 
a more confrontational approach to labour relations issues. Managerial industrial 
relations strategies at the colliery have reflected the labour relations policies adopted 
nationally by British Coal following the 1984-85 strike, rather than those which 
were operational between 1947 and 1984, as the maintenance of managerial 
prerogatives receives considerable emphasis at the mine, and management have 
employed policies which appear to have the objective of fostering workforce 
division. Change is also evident in relation to management industrial relations 
strategies at the colliery however, for whilst the labour relations policies introduced 
by British Coal during the final decade of public ownership were designed to 
institutionalise dual unionism in the industry, the de-recognition of all the mining 
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unions, and the policies adopted to undennine collective organisation at Workham 
suggest that the current owners of the colliery have sought to de-collectivise 
industrial relations at the mine. There is then, no evidence at Workham to support 
the argument forwarded by Ferner and Colling (1991), that privatisation would 
engender changes in the environment in which contact between management and 
trade union representatives takes place, and that a more conciliatory managerial 
approach to labour relations would follow from this. 
EM's decision to de-recognise the mining unions would similarly appear to 
refute the view of Fairbrother (1994), and Edwards and Reery (1989), that the 
increasing importance of de-centralised bargaining in the privati sed industries would 
lead to the re-generation of local trade union branches. De-recognition, and the 
tennination of collective bargaining rights, has brought about a profound change in 
the role that the trade unions play at Workham, resulting in a complete cessation of 
bargaining, and a consequent reduction in the range of issues dealt with by the local 
trade union branches. Indeed the unions at the colliery are unable to exert any 
influence in relation to the tenns and conditions of their members, and branch 
organisation is itselfwholly ineffective. 
Because recognition has been refused to the mining unions, few institutional 
structures have emerged to facilitate collective bargaining at Workham. The pay 
structure and the disciplinary and grievance procedures which are operational at the 
colliery were inherited by the current owners of the colliery under the provisions of 
TUPE. They were nevertheless developed without union involvement, and were 
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imposed upon the Workham workforce, and therefore bear a closer resemblance to 
those procedures introduced unilaterally by British Coal during the period 1984 to 
1994, than to those collective agreements negotiated by the NCB and the mining 
unions between 1947 and 1984. 
There has been no significant change in the labour process at Workham following 
privatisation, other than initiatives to increase productivity at the colliery through the 
intensification of work, and through reducing the porosity of the mineworkers' 
working day. The commercial pressures engendered by privatisation have, however, 
determined that management at the colliery have accorded a greater priority to 
production targets and productivity improvements than was the case under public 
ownership, and this has compromised safety standards at the colliery. 
Since the emergent pattern of industrial relations at Workham exhibits both 
continuity with, and an extension of, the patterns established nationally during the 
period 1984 to 1994, rather than a return to the labour relations traditions which 
characterised the industry between 1947 and 1984, and because these patterns also 
represent a significant break with the established style of labour relations within the 
Nottinghamshire coalfield, it is possible to conclude that privatisation has had 
negative implications for organised labour at the colliery. The Workham workforce 
apparently recognise that privatisation has had adverse consequences for labour, 
since 72 per cent of respondents believed privatisation had been unfavourable for 
mineworkers (Table 7.14.). 
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Table 7.14: Do you think that privatisation has been a good thing or a bad 
thing for miners? (n = 86) 
Positive response 
Negative response 
Privatisation has had both negative and 
positive features 
No response 
Moreover, more than one in three of those who stated that privatisation had been a 
detrimental development, suggested that this was because it had led to a more 
% 
5 
72 
5 
19 
uncompromising style of management at the colliery. One Workham employee for 
example, remarked: "I think it's a bad thing because the management have become 
more dictatorial in their attitude towards the employees, often quoting that if you 
don't like the job someone else will take your place" (Workham worker) ; whilst 
another commented: "Privatisation has been a bad thing for the miners because the 
management totally impose their views and the workers have no say" (Workham 
worker). 
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In December 1994, the majority of the core collieries which were privati sed by the 
Conservative government, were acquired by Coal UK (CUK). In addition, the 
company purchased a number of the mines which were offered for sale as "stand 
alone" units in parallel with the main privatisation package. CUK had also 
purchased under the lease / license arrangements, a number of those mines closed by 
British Coal following the 1992 coal crisis, and indeed, when the privatisation of the 
coal industry was completed, the company had secured ownership of over 60 per 
cent of the deep mines in the UK. 
CUK acquired a number of mines in the Yorkshire coalfield, including 
Donborough colliery, which was purchased by the company as part of the main 
privatisation package, and Deamley colliery, which was acquired under lease / 
license following the 1992 coal crisis. Industrial relations in the Yorkshire coalfield 
have been characterised by bitter conflict in recent decades, and the workforce at 
both Donborough and Deamley, as at the other mines in Yorkshire, has traditionally 
been represented by the NUM. 
CUK also purchased several mines in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. These 
included Nottston colliery, which, like Donborough, was acquired as part of the 
main privatisation package, and Mansthorpe colliery, which, like Deamley, was 
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purchased by the company following the coal crisis of 1992, under the provisions of 
the lease / license arrangements. The Nottinghamshire coalfield has not experienced 
the confrontational industrial relations characteristic of Yorkshire, traditionally 
enjoying labour relations based on co-operation. As at the other collieries in 
Nottinghamshire, the workforce at both Nottston and Mansthorpe has been 
represented by the UDM since its foundation in 1985, although a small number of 
workers continued to be members of the NUM at each of these mines. 
Because CUK operated for some years in the private opencast sector before 
diversifying into deep mining, the company already had its own established 
industrial relations practices, and therefore did not simply adopt the labour relations 
practices which developed within the deep mine sector during the years of public 
ownership. Given this culture and the commercial pressures currently facing the 
company, coupled with the customary militancy of the NUM and the recent history 
of the Yorkshire coalfield, it might be expected that industrial relations at CUK 
collieries located within the Yorkshire coalfield would come to be characterised by 
confrontation rather than conciliation. However, given that privatisation removed 
the influence of government from the industry, the possibility cannot be discounted 
that labour relations at CUK's Yorkshire collieries might become less conflictual 
than has been the case in the recent past. 
In the Nottinghamshire coalfield, by contrast, the removal of the influence of 
government and the customary moderation of the UDM might have been expected to 
result in the development of patterns of industrial relations based on co-operation 
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rather than conflict. However given CUK's origins as a private sector company, and 
the commercial pressures facing companies operating in the deep mine sector, it was 
also possible that industrial relations at CUK's Nottinghamshire collieries would 
come to be somewhat more confrontational than has hitherto been the case. 
It was also possible that the nature of privatisation would itself have 
implications for the development of industrial relations at individual collieries 
owned by CUK, since those mines such as Donborough and Nottston, which were 
purchased as part of the main privatisation package represented a transfer of 
undertakings, and were consequently subject to the provisions of the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, (TUPE). The 
acquisition of mines such as Dearnley and Mansthorpe which were purchased under 
the provisions of the lease / license arrangements following their closure by British 
Coal, did not represent a transfer of undertakings, so the provisions of TUPE did not 
apply at these particular collieries. 
Donborough colliery 
Management strategies 
The style of management which has emerged at Donborough following privatisation 
is strikingly similar to that which prevailed during the final decade of public 
ownership. Moreover, the industrial relations strategies which have been adopted by 
management at Donborough continue to reflect the unitary approach to labour 
relations developed by British Coal following the 1984-85 strike, and there has 
consequently been no return to pluralism at the colliery. 
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Within CUK industrial relations strategies are detennined at corporate, rather 
than colliery level (Management representatives and trade union representatives). 
CUK has refused recognition to all the mining unions at national level, but has 
recognised the unions at colliery level. In respect of the NUM and the UDM, 
however, the company has granted sole recognition to the union with the largest 
membership at each colliery (Management representatives and trade union 
representatives), so that the NUM is the recognised union at Donborough. 
Although the NUM is recognised at Donborough, it is significant that 
collective bargaining has not been fully restored at the colliery, since management 
will not discuss wage levels with the unions (Management representatives). Indeed 
an NUM representative intimated that bargaining rights at the colliery are delimited 
by management, when he expressed the view that: "We have collective bargaining, 
to an extent" (NUM branch official A). 
Management at Donborough provide office, stationary and telephone 
facilities for NUM branch officials, and officials are allowed time off work for union 
duties. Moreover an NUM representative pointed out that management at the 
colliery recognised that the work of the branch had increased as a result of the 
restructuring programme which preceded privatisation, and was also willing to 
sanction time off in relation to this: "The outstanding compensation claims from all 
the pits that have closed came to this branch, because we're the only pit left in the 
area. We also deal with all the pensioners from the closed pits. There's a 
recognition [from management] that my workload is heavy, and they're flexible in 
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this respect" (NUM branch official A). There is evidence that management is 
willing to facilitate union organisation at Donborough because this eases the task of 
managing the colliery. As an NUM representative observed: "They're [management] 
not flexible for nothing. They get something out of this because it smoothes the 
running of things" (NUM branch official A). 
CUK's unitary approach to industrial relations at Donborough is also evident 
because the maintenance of managerial prerogatives receives the same emphasis as 
was the case during the final decade of public ownership. 
Strategic decisions in relation to the long term future of the colliery are 
entirely a managerial concern (Management representatives), but because 
Donborough is subject to the provisions ofTUPE, the formal consultative meetings 
between management and the unions that occurred at colliery level throughout the 
nationalised era continue to take place, and questions of strategy are consequently 
discussed with the unions at the colliery (NUM representative). As strategic 
decisions are taken at corporate rather than colliery level however, (Management 
representatives), trade union branch officials are excluded from the decision making 
process itself, and as a consequence have little meaningful influence in relation to 
such matters. 
Decisions relating to everyday operational matters at Donborough are 
similarly a managerial prerogative. However, branch officials have unlimited access 
to senior managers at the colliery, and requests for information are usually granted. 
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As an NUM representative stated: "I can just walk into the manager's office and ask 
for information" (NUM branch official A). Furthermore, the unions are able to exert 
some influence in relation to operational matters, because of the continued existence 
of formal consultative meetings (NUM representative). 
In common with CUK employees at other collieries, each Donborough miner 
receives a copy of the company newsletter, but this is a corporate initiative, and 
colliery level strategies for communication with the workforce, have not been 
designed to undermine the position ofthe unions. Since privatisation management 
at Donborough have withdrawn the colliery newsletter (NUM representative), and an 
NUM representative pointed out that all communication between management and 
the workforce at the colliery is directed through collective channels: "No, the union 
is not bypassed. All communication is directed through the union" (NUM branch 
official A). There is however, some suggestion that management at the colliery see 
communication as a one way process, and regard the unions as vehicles both for 
promoting, and gaining workforce support for, managerial objectives. As an NUM 
representative commented: "If I'm being cynical, I'd say we'd be used in a way to 
appease people, to let them [the workforce] know they'd [management] made the 
right decisions" (NUM branch official A). 
The role of the unions 
CUK has de-recognised all the mining unions at national and area levels. Selective 
recognition has been granted to the unions on a local basis however, and in 
accordance with corporate policy, management at Donborough has recognised the 
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NUM, since this organisation represents the majority of the workforce at the 
colliery. It would appear that CUK has not sought to offer preferential treatment to 
the union most prepared to assent to managerial objectives at the colliery, since the 
UDM, which was founded on a platform of political moderation, has not been 
granted recognition at Donborough, and management at the colliery have not sought 
to promote the union. The decision not to recognise the UDM at Donborough, 
however, arguably reflects a pragmatic recognition that management would have 
little to gain from recognising this organisation because the UDM has never had 
significant support in the Yorkshire coalfield, and, moreover, has "not one member" 
at Donborough colliery itself (NUM branch official A). 
Management at Donborough have similarly not sought to promote non-
unionism at the colliery (NUM representative), and indeed amongst the workforce 
directly employed by CUK, union density remains high (NUM representative). 
Some 40 per cent of the total workforce at the colliery however, is employed by a 
number of sub contracting companies, and an NUM representative conceded that 
some ofthese workers were not union members: "Non-unionism is a problem 
amongst the contractors" (NUM branch official A). 
It is not clear whether management within the sub contracting companies 
discourage trade union membership, although one management representative 
revealed that the sub contracting companies employed by CUK were under no 
obligation to adopt CUK's policy in relation to trade union affiliation: "They [the sub 
contracting companies] have their own policies in relation to the unions" (Corporate 
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management representative A). Nevertheless, some observers have suggested that 
sub contracting was initially introduced in the mining industry in order to undermine 
trade union organisation (Prowse and Turner, 1996: 154), and given also that sub 
contract employment has become increasingly casualised, it is not surprising that 
union density is somewhat lower amongst the sub contract workers at Donborough 
than amongst the core employees. 
Although collective bargaining has been re-established at Donborough, the 
scope of this is severely proscribed by managerial prerogative, because corporate 
policy dictates that wage levels are not subject to negotiation. As a management 
representative stated: "There is no collective bargaining for pay" (Corporate 
management representative A). The restoration of collective bargaining at 
Donborough then, has not served to increase the influence of the trade unions in 
relation to the terms and conditions of their members at the colliery. 
Changes in the locus of bargaining are evident at Donborough, because CUK 
has de-recognised all the mining unions at national and area levels, thereby 
increasing the importance of local bargaining. Moreover, national NUM officials 
are prohibited from entering colliery premises at Donborough, in common with all 
other collieries owned by CUK. As an NUM representative pointed out: "They 
[CUK] won't allow me and Arthur [Scargill] within a mile of a pit" (NUM national 
official). During most of the years of public ownership the majority of contact 
between management representatives and union officials occurred at colliery level, 
but bargaining is now wholly a local preserve. An NUM representative however, 
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suggested that the national union was able to influence local bargaining at 
Donborough in spite of their de-recognition, because local NUM branches were 
instructed by national NUM policies: "National level has influence because they 
steer local branches. Local branches implement national policy" (NUM branch 
official A). 
The increasing importance of local bargaining at Donborough has not, 
however, been accompanied by an increase in the influence of the local trade union 
branch. Indeed, a national NUM representative, whilst acknowledging the change in 
the locus of bargaining expressed considerable scepticism about the influence of 
local NUM branches at collieries such as Donborough: "Local is the only level they 
[CUK] talk to anyway. Whether the branches have any influence is another 
question, of course. I don't think they have. I've never heard any reports that CUK 
has changed policy because of the influence of local branches" (NUM national 
official). Similarly, the increasing significance of local bargaining has not led to a 
wider range of issues being the subject of negotiation. Indeed an NUM 
representative stated that bargaining remained focused around the same issues as 
was the case when the colliery was publicly owned: "It's more or less exactly the 
same. If you'd been in a coma for six years you wouldn't notice any difference" 
(NUM branch official A). There is then, little evidence of local trade union 
rejuvenation at Donborough, and the NUM branch at the colliery is largely 
ineffective. 
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Institutions of collective bargaining 
Because Donborough was never closed by British Coal, and remained in production 
throughout the privatisation process, CUK's purchase of the colliery in December 
1994 represented at transfer of undertakings and the provisions of TUPE 
consequently applied at the mine. Under the terms of this legislation, CUK had a 
legal obligation to recognise all the existing agreements negotiated by British Coal 
and the mining unions prior to privatisation, and because of this, those agreements 
continued to apply at Donborough after the colliery was privatised. Although CUK 
has sought to undermine the agreements protected under the provisions of TUPE, the 
institutional framework which was developed to facilitate collective bargaining in 
the industry during the years of public ownership nevertheless remains largely intact. 
The British Coal conciliation scheme which applied throughout the industry 
prior to privatisation, was inherited by CUK under the provisions of TUPE. In 1996, 
however, CUK withdrew the existing scheme and replaced it with a corporate level 
agreement (Management representative). The current CUK scheme was negotiated 
by senior CUK managers and UDM national officials (Management representatives 
and UDM representatives). The NUM was opposed to the scheme, but the union 
was not party to the negotiations, and the scheme was consequently imposed at 
Donborough, along with all other collieries organised by the NUM where the 
provisions ofTUPE applied (NUM national official). Like its predecessor, the CUK 
conciliation scheme is based on the majority / minority principle, although the 
automatic right to independent arbitration has been removed, except when disputes 
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are referred to an independent body, with the agreement of the Chief Executive and 
the UDM National President (UDM national official). 
The disciplinary and grievance procedure currently in operation at 
Donborough was also inherited by CUK under the TUPE legislation, but this 
machinery has been modified, and, as with the conciliation scheme, the right to 
independent arbitration has been withdrawn (UDM national representative). The 
revised disciplinary and grievance procedure was negotiated by senior CUK 
managers and UDM national officials (UDM national official). The NUM, by 
contrast had no input in relation to the changes to the procedure, which was 
unilaterally imposed at Donborough, along with other collieries organised by the 
NUM (NUM national official). 
The pay structure inherited from British Coal under the provisions of TUPE, 
has also been amended by CUK. Employees at Donborough, as at all other CUK 
collieries continue to receive a basic weekly wage and a production bonus, as was 
the case when the British Coal pay structure was in operation, but the grading 
structure has been simplified, and differentials have been reduced as a consequence. 
The changes to the pay structure were negotiated by senior CUK managers and 
UDM national officials (UDM national official). The NUM, however, was not 
included in the negotiations, and the modified pay structure was imposed at 
collieries subject to the provisions ofTUPE where the NUM was the majority union. 
As an NUM representative remarked: "They told us what they were doing, and our 
members had got it whether they liked it or not" (NUM national official). The 
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Donborough NUM representative however, described the modifications as "minor 
cosmetic changes" (NUM branch official A), and indicated that the Donborough 
branch of the NUM would not have challenged the changes made to the pay 
structure, since no employee at the colliery was financially worse off as a result of 
re-grading. 
The provisions of TUPE then, have ensured that formal structures are in 
place to facilitate collective bargaining at Donborough, however as these structures 
were not negotiated with NUM representatives they do not constitute collective 
agreements. Moreover, the NUM branch at the colliery has been unable to negotiate 
any formal substantive agreements as yet (NUM representative). The existence of 
such structures is, moreover, relatively meaningless in relation to corporate level 
bargaining, because the mining unions have no official recognition at national or 
area level, and because any contact between senior managers and national union 
officials is on an informal basis. NUM members at Donborough and other collieries 
owned by CUK have, on a number of occasions, voted in favour of industrial action 
in support of collective bargaining rights at corporate level, and the negotiation of 
new institutional arrangements. This strategy has, however, failed to secure its 
objectives, because industrial action has, in each case, been ruled unlawful. 
A BACM representative expressed the view that "TUPE is something that 
has been understated by management and overstated by the unions" (BACM national 
official), and indeed there may be some validity in this viewpoint, since unlike the 
nationalisation statutes, the provisions of TUPE, whilst safeguarding existing 
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procedures, have not required CUK to enter into collective agreements with the 
mining unions. The institutional bargaining arrangements currently in force at 
Donborough therefore, bear more resemblance to those procedures introduced 
unilaterally by British Coal during the final decade of public ownership, than to 
those pertaining up to 1984. The negotiated structures operating between 1947 and 
1984, were significantly delimited by managerial prerogative after 1984, with the 
objective of consolidating the institutionalisation of dual unionism within the 
company. 
The institutional structures described above apply to all members of the 
workforce who are directly employed by CUK, but not to the 40 per cent of 
Donborough employees who work for the sub contracting companies which have 
operations on site, and indeed these companies each have separate arrangements 
(NUM representative). This is significant since it points to the emergence of a two-
tier pattern of industrial relations at the colliery. 
Although formal structures are in place to facilitate collective bargaining at 
Donborough, informal bargaining between junior members of management and 
members of the workforce which have no union involvement, continues to be a 
feature of labour relations at the colliery. Unlike in the final decade of public 
ownership, however, ad hoc financial agreements do not take place. As an NUM 
representative observed: "there is no ad hoc" (NUM branch official A). Informal 
agreements in relation to shift times and deployment, however, remain widespread at 
Donborough, and are condoned by the NUM at the colliery, providing operational 
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requirements are not compromised. As an NUM representative commented "men 
often swap shifts. There is a lot of co-operation. There is no opposition to this from 
the union, but this would never be done where the position of the pit would be 
jeopardised" (NUM branch official A). 
The labour process 
The change in ownership which has occurred at Donborough has been accompanied 
by some changes in the labour process at the colliery, although, as in the final decade 
of public ownership, maximising productivity remains a central objective of 
operations at the colliery. 
Although the same emphasis is placed on improving productivity as was the 
case in when the mine was publicly owned, the current management at Donborough 
have not sought to introduce new technology in order to improve productivity 
further at the colliery. This is because Donborough had been the subject oflarge 
scale technological investment whilst under public ownership, and there has 
therefore been little scope for technological improvement. As an NUM 
representative commented: "Technology has moved on in leaps and bounds in the 
last ten years, but the majority of damage was done under British Coal" (NUM 
branch official A). 
Because the scope for increasing productivity through technological 
developments has been limited at Donborough, management at the colliery have 
instead sought to improve productivity with the adoption of flexible working 
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practices. British Coal paved the way for the introduction of flexible working at 
Donborough after privatisation, because shortly before this, NUM members at the 
colliery who intended to remain in the industry after its return to the private sector, 
were, like those at other mines, offered a £6,000 one-off payment in return for 
accepting flexible working (NUM representatives). An NUM representative 
conceded that the majority ofNUM members had accepted this payment during their 
employment at British Coal, and consequently have contracts which incorporate a 
flexibility clause. Indeed forms of functional, numerical, and temporal flexibility are 
all in evidence at Donborough. 
Functional flexibility has been widely adopted at Donborough, and job 
demarcations have been reduced in many areas as a consequence (NUM 
representative). However, because functional flexibility has been utilised in order to 
reduce labour requirements, it has also contributed to the intensification of work, 
through reducing the porosity of the mineworkers' working day. As an NUM 
representative observed: "They've [management] reduced manpower, and are 
expecting the remaining men to do more" (NUM branch official A). The NUM 
representative, however, suggested that even though multi-skilling was an initiative 
that was originally introduced by management, the workforce apparently recognised 
that productivity improvements generated by functional flexibility would prolong 
the life of the colliery: "There's certainly a lot more flexibility in terms of what 
people are prepared to do. In part this is because of management pressure, but 
there's also a willingness on the part of the men to keep the pit open" (NUM branch 
official A). 
Chapter 8 
230 
Numerical flexibility is also a feature of CUK's operations at Donborough, 
since some 40 per cent of the workforce is currently employed by one of several 
subcontracting firms that operate at the colliery (NUM representative). There is 
some suggestion however, that it is a corporate objective to reduce the number of 
subcontractors employed by the company (NUM representatives), and indeed in 
November 1997,49 sub contract workers were laid off at Donborough (NUM 
representative) . 
Temporal flexibility has also been introduced at Donborough, if to a limited 
extent. CUK employees at Donborough are contracted to work 37 hours per week 
over 5 days (Management representative), in addition to which, an NUM 
representative estimated that each worker completed an average of sixteen overtime 
hours each week. There is some evidence that management periodically expect 
Donborough employees are to work overtime. As an NUM representative 
commented: "Pressure is applied, especially if development work falls behind" 
(NUM branch official A). The representative, also suggested that workers at 
Donborough were under indirect pressure to work overtime because of the insecurity 
facing the industry: "Because of the redundancy scheme, the men have to earn £300 
per week to qualify for the maximum payout, and a lot work overtime because of 
this" (NUM branch official A). 
Although increasing productivity continues to be a corporate objective, 
management are nevertheless mindful of the negative health and safety implications 
of work intensification. An NUM representative suggested that CUK had restored 
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the health and safety functions perfonned by pit deputies, which had been 
undennined during the final decade of public ownership, and indeed he also 
indicated that health and safety standards had improved at Donborough under the 
current ownership: "The accident rate is certainly running lower than in the last few 
years of British Coal" (NUM branch official A). At the same time, there is evidence 
to suggest that management at the colliery have manipulated the accident statistics 
under the current ownership. An audit of accident reporting within the company, 
conducted by the Mines Inspectorate, revealed that management at Donborough had 
failed to report a number of serious accidents, and indeed the manager of 
Donborough was suspended in November 1997 pending the outcome of an internal 
inquiry into these matters. 
Dearnley Colliery 
Management strategies 
The style of management which has emerged at Dearnley following CUK's 
acquisition of the colliery, exhibits much continuity with that which predominated 
during the final decade of the nationalised era. Management at the colliery have 
continued to pursue the unitary approach to labour relations embraced by British 
Coal following the end of the 1984-85 strike, and as a result there has been no return 
to a pluralistic approach to industrial relation issues at the mine. Continuity with the 
period 1984-94 is also apparent since the maintenance of managerial prerogatives 
continues to receive significant emphasis. There is, however, some evidence to 
suggest that CUK has sought not only to consolidate the patterns of labour relations 
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developed at Deamley during the last decade of public ownership, but also to de-
collectivise industrial relations at the colliery. 
The strategies adopted by management at Deamley in relation to the trade 
unions which operate in the industry reflect corporate industrial relations policies, 
which in tum mirror those strategies adopted by British Coal during the final years 
of public ownership. In respect ofthe NUM and the UDM, recognition is granted 
only to the NUM, since the workforce at Deamley has traditionally been represented 
by this body, and no employees at the mine are UDM members (NUM 
representative). However, whilst the NUM has been granted rights of 
representation, the union has no bargaining rights at the colliery, and no formal 
meetings take place between management representatives and trade union branch 
officials, with the exception of safety meetings, which are required by statute (NUM 
representative) . 
NUM branch officials at Deamley are permitted to take time off work to 
attend to union business "as and when required" (NUM branch official B), and 
management provide office and telephone facilities for NUM branch officials at the 
colliery. There is, however, some suggestion that this is an informal local 
arrangement which may not accord with company policy. As an NUM 
representative observed: "Yes, they give us an office, telephone and stationary, but 
whether it's official or not I don't know" (NUM branch official B). This question is 
significant, since it may indicate some dissent at colliery level from corporate level 
policies towards the trade unions at Deamley. 
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The unitary approach in relation to industrial relations adopted by 
management at Dearnley is also apparent because the maintenance of managerial 
prerogatives continues to receive high priority, as was the case during the final 
decade of public ownership. 
Strategic decision making in relation to the long-term development of 
Dearnley is wholly a managerial concern. Dearnley is not covered by the provisions 
of TUPE, and as a consequence management at the colliery have unilaterally 
abandoned the formal consultative meetings with the trade unions which were a 
feature of industrial relations at the colliery when it was publicly owned (NUM 
representative). The unions then, are not consulted in relation to strategic matters 
affecting the colliery (NUM representative), and as strategic decisions are, in any 
event, made at corporate rather than colliery level (Management representatives), the 
unions are unable to exert any influence in relation to strategic issues concerning 
Dearnley. 
Decisions in relation to operational matters at the colliery are similarly a 
managerial preserve, and such issues are not discussed with the unions at the 
colliery. An NUM representative explained that although branch officials had 
access to management representatives, such contact was informal, and the scope of 
such meetings was highly restricted: "There's not a problem getting to see the 
manager, but officially it's only over things like disciplinary matters" (NUM branch 
official B). The unions then, have no opportunity to influence decision making in 
relation to operational issues, and indeed, an NUM representative declared that the 
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union had "no influence whatsoever" (NUM branch official B), in relation to such 
matters. 
In addition to placing great emphasis on the maintenance of managerial 
prerogatives, management at Deamley have also sought to communicate directly 
with Deamley employees. In order to facilitate this, management hold meetings in 
the pit canteen with members of the workforce. Moreover, an NUM representative 
revealed that such meetings take place regularly, both on a formal and informal 
basis: "These [meetings] are called four times a year, but they also take place as and 
when required if anything special pops up" (NUM branch official B). It is 
interesting to note that management at Deamley have employed a communications 
technique formerly utilised by the NUM at Yorkshire collieries (NUM National 
official), all the more so since they have adopted strategies designed to bypass 
collective channels of communication, and further marginalise the unions at the 
colliery. 
The role of the unions 
Although all the mining unions have been de-recognised by CUK at national and 
area levels, it is company policy to grant recognition to the unions on a local basis. 
Management at Deamley have therefore recognised the NUM, because this 
organisation has traditionally represented the workforce at the colliery, and indeed 
continues to command the support of the majority of De am ley employees. The 
UDM, which has been associated with political moderation since its foundation in 
1985, has not been granted recognition at Deamley, and management have not 
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sought to promote the union at the colliery (NUM representative). It would then, 
appear that CUK has not treated more favourably the union most prepared to support 
managerial objectives at Deam1ey. However, as the UDM has never been strongly 
supported in the Yorkshire coalfield, and as there are no UDM members at Deam1ey 
(NUM representative), management would clearly have little to gain from 
recognising the UDM at the colliery. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the creation of a non-union workforce is 
a managerial objective at Deam1ey, and indeed, the majority of the workforce 
recruited by CUK when the colliery was re-opened, were former Deam1ey 
employees, most of whom were previously members of the NUM. As an NUM 
representative observed: "In most cases they re-emp10yed the people who were there 
in the past" (NUM branch official B). Although management have not sought to 
promote non-unionism at the colliery, however, an NUM representative conceded 
that union density at Deamley was nevertheless relatively low, with around 35 per 
cent of the workforce having no trade union affiliation (NUM representative). 
Winterton and Winterton (1993b: 24) have pointed out that falling union density 
may be attributed in part to workforce perceptions of trade union weakness, and 
indeed, this viewpoint is shared by an NUM representative at Deamley, who 
commented: "Yes, the level of [union] influence has fallen. I think that's part of the 
problem. A lot of the men are not in the union because they think 'Well, what can 
they do for us?' " (NUM branch official B). 
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Although the NUM is recognised at Deamley for the purpose of individual 
representation, collective bargaining has not been re-established at the colliery. This 
is because the provisions of TUPE do not apply at the mine, and management have 
therefore been able to abandon the consultative arrangements which existed during 
the years of public ownership. There is no formal contact between management 
representatives and NUM branch officials, but informal contact does take place. 
However, as all the collective agreements negotiated by British Coal and the mining 
unions at Deamley were no longer in force when CUK acquired the colliery, because 
it was not subject to the provisions ofTUPE, there is consequently no framework for 
negotiations between management and union representatives. As a result, 
management are able to impose change both in relation to terms and conditions of 
employment at the colliery and to working practices. As an NUM representative 
explained: "There's a tendency for them [management] to make the rules up as they 
go along. Without agreements it's chaotic" (NUM branch official B). The NUM at 
Deamley then, has considerably less influence in relation to the terms and conditions 
of their members employed at the colliery than was the case when the mine was 
owned by British Coal. 
With neither formal contact between management and union representatives, 
nor institutional structures to support bargaining at Deamley, the importance of local 
bargaining has not increased at the colliery, despite recognition being granted to the 
local branch of the NUM rather than to the national and area levels of the union. For 
the same reasons there has also been a significant reduction in the range of issues 
coming within the jurisdiction of the local NUM branch. There is then, no evidence 
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of union renewal at Dearnley colliery, and indeed branch organisation at the colliery 
is wholly ineffective. 
Institutions of collective bargaining 
Dearnley colliery was closed by British Coal following the coal crisis of 1992, and 
the entire workforce was made redundant. Because of this CUK's acquisition of the 
colliery did not represent a transfer of undertakings, so the provisions ofTUPE did 
not apply at the mine. All the existing agreements negotiated by British Coal and 
the mining unions prior to privatisation, therefore, were no longer in force at 
Dearnley when the colliery was returned to production in March 1994, and few 
institutional structures have emerged at Dearnley to replace those mechanisms which 
facilitated collective bargaining during the years of public ownership. 
There is no conciliation scheme at Dearnley colliery (NUM representative), 
and therefore no formal mechanism exists for the resolution of disputes. As yet, 
there have been no disputes at Dearnley under the current ownership. An NUM 
representative however, indicated that in the absence of a formal disputes procedure, 
any future disputes were likely to be resolved by way of informal ad hoc 
arrangements: "Because we haven't any collective agreements or anything, it's a bit 
of an as it happens situation. We would take it up with the manager, but it would 
probably be a correspondence exercise" (NUM branch official B). 
The disciplinary and grievance procedure currently in operation at Dearnley, 
is the same as that which exists at those CUK collieries which were subject to the 
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provisions ofTUPE (NUM representative). The British Coal disciplinary and 
grievance procedure was inherited by CUK under the TUPE legislation, but this 
structure was modified, and the right to independent arbitration was withdrawn 
(UDM national representative). The revised disciplinary and grievance procedure 
was negotiated by senior CUK managers and UDM national officials (UDM national 
official). The NUM, however, had no influence over the changes to the procedure, 
and once modified, the revised procedure was imposed at all collieries organised by 
the NUM, including Deamley (NUM representative). 
The pay structure in operation at Deamley is loosely based on the British 
Coal pay structure, although it differs from the structure in place at those collieries 
subject to the provisions ofTUPE. Wages at Deamley are related to the 
occupational grade of individual employees and the wages received by each 
employee comprise a flat rate weekly wage combined with a production bonus. 
Unlike during the years of public ownership, however, the production bonus at 
Deamley does not vary, and is equal to 30 per cent of the basic weekly rate. This is 
because the production strategy at the colliery is based on the same quantity of coal 
being mined each week (NUM representative). Moreover, employees at Deamley 
receive no additional payments for working in water or heat (NUM representative). 
The pay structure at Deamley was not negotiated with the local branch of the NUM, 
but was imposed upon the workforce at the colliery by management (NUM 
representative). 
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Those formal structures which exist to facilitate bargaining at Deamley are 
not collective agreements, because they were not negotiated with NUM 
representatives, and were imposed upon the workforce at the colliery. Furthermore, 
little significance can be attached to the presence of such structures because fOlmal 
bargaining is not permitted at the colliery. The institutional arrangements currently 
in force at Deamley then, have been significantly influenced by managerial 
prerogative, and as such, bear considerably more resemblance to those procedures 
introduced unilaterally by British Coal during the final decade of public ownership, 
than to those negotiated structures which were operational between 1947 and 1984. 
NUM members at Deamley, as at the other collieries owned by CUK have voted for 
industrial action in support of collective bargaining rights, and the establishment of 
new jointly negotiated procedural agreements on a number of occasions. This 
strategy has not been successful, however, and planned industrial action was 
cancelled, having been ruled unlawful. 
Informal bargaining between junior members of management and members 
of the workforce which does not involve union officials, is not a significant feature 
of industrial relations at Deamley colliery. Unlike in the final decade of public 
ownership, job and knock agreements, where members of the workforce were 
allowed to go home before the end of their shift on completion of a specific task or 
tasks, no longer occur at the colliery (NOM representative), and informal agreements 
relating to shift times and deployment occur only "occasionally" (NOM branch 
official B). 
Chapter 8 
240 
The Labour Process 
Productive operations at Dearnley are governed by a different strategy to that which 
was in operation when the colliery was publicly owned. This is because the colliery 
is not required to increase output, but is instead expected to produce the same 
quantity of coal each week. As an NOM representative remarked: "The pit is on a 
fixed tonnage. All they've [management] asked us, is to be consistent" (NUM 
branch official B). 
Although less emphasis is placed on increasing output than was the case 
under public ownership, management at Dearnley have nevertheless sought to 
improve productivity at the colliery. MINOS and it's associated sub systems were 
installed at Dearnley during the years of public ownership (NUM representative), 
and there has consequently been little scope for improving productivity with further 
automation. Management have however, sought to secure productivity 
improvements by investing in other mining equipment, and by better utilising the 
skills and experience of the workforce. As an NOM representative explained: 
"They've [management] learned the lessons of the past and now provide the right 
equipment for the job, unlike Be, who would buy equipment and then say 'Make it 
work.' They respect the experience of the men. The men are involved in planning 
work now" (NUM branch official B). Productivity improvements have also been 
achieved because management have reduced the labour force at the colliery under 
the current ownership (NUM representative). 
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Although some flexible working practices have been adopted at Deamley in 
order to improve performance, such developments have been extremely limited. 
Functional flexibility is evident at the colliery because job demarcations 
particularly in relation to face and outbye tasks have been reduced (NUM 
representative). An NUM representative however, pointed out that although 
management had encouraged the adoption of functional flexibility to some degree, 
this had not been widely embraced, and employees at the colliery continued to 
perform a similar range of tasks as when the mine was publicly owned: "Multi-
skilling has been introduced to a point. Courses have been run to give people 
additional skills, but it's not changed a great deal here" (NUM branch official B). 
Numerical flexibility is not a major feature of operations at Deamley, and at 
present, all the underground workers at the colliery are directly employed by CUK 
(NUM representative). Some surface work is completed by contractors, and an 
NUM representative acknowledged that underground contractors were periodically 
employed for specific tasks: "Contractors are brought in for specialised work. For 
example, an electrical company might come to install equipment" (NUM branch 
official B). The contractors at Deamley however, perform strictly limited functions, 
and there is no evidence to suggest that management plans to extend the role of the 
sub contracting companies at the colliery. 
Temporal flexibility has similarly not been adopted at Deamley to any 
significant extent. Under the terms of their contracts, employees at the colliery are 
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expected to work 40 hours per week, and are also obliged to work a reasonable 
amount of overtime when required, in relation to production needs (NUM 
representative). In practice however, overtime working at the colliery is extremely 
limited. In part this is because the operational strategy of the colliery does not 
necessitate overtime working, since the weekly output target can be produced within 
the standard working week (NUM representative). However, an NUM 
representative also pointed out that the budget allocated to the colliery manager by 
CUK would not allow for large amounts of overtime working: "Overtime is limited 
by the pit budget" (NUM branch official B). Furthermore, as the pay structure in 
place at the colliery does not incorporate an incentive scheme which would reward 
workers for increasing output (NUM representative), there is no incentive for 
Deam1ey employees to volunteer for overtime. 
Although it is a managerial objective to maintain production levels at 
Deam1ey, corporate level management have continued to accord the same priority to 
health and safety as was the case when the mine was publicly owned. As an NUM 
representative stated: "We were very much in the spotlight when we were first 
privatised. There was a lot of people watching. It was made very, very clear that 
safety wouldn't be compromised and this has continued" (NUM branch official B). 
There was, however, some suggestion that labour reductions amongst the pit 
deputies at Deam1ey had jeopardised health and safety standards at the colliery, 
because the remaining workers no longer had the time to properly carry out safety 
inspections (NUM representative). 
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Like their public sector predecessors, the current management at Nottston colliery 
have favoured a unitary approach to industrial relations issues. As a result, there has 
been no return to the co-operative relationships between management and the trade 
unions which characterised the period 1947-84, and as in the final decade of the 
nationalised era, significant emphasis is placed on the maintenance of managerial 
prerogatives at the colliery. 
Managerial strategies at Nottston reflect corporate industrial relations 
policies, which, as in the final decade of public ownership, have centred upon the 
maintenance of dual unionism, and upon the promotion of the moderate UDM. In 
keeping with corporate policy, the UDM has been recognised at Nottston, since the 
majority of employees at the colliery are members of this organisation. A UDM 
representative described the bargaining rights accorded to the union at the colliery 
as: "exactly the same as under British Coal" (UDM branch official A), however, as 
CUK will not negotiate with any of the trade unions in the industry over the question 
of pay, collective bargaining cannot be said to have been fully re-established at the 
mine. The NUM, in contrast to the UDM, is not recognised at Nottston, even 
though a UDM official at the colliery conceded that some 17 per cent of the Nottston 
workforce are NUM members (UDM representative). 
Management at Nottston provide office and telephone facilities for UDM 
branch officials. Moreover, UDM officials at the colliery are engaged full time in 
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relation to union business, and are given unlimited access to the mine, and to 
Nottston employees (UDM representative). The NUM officials at the colliery 
however, receive notably different treatment to that accorded to their UDM 
counterparts. As a UDM branch official candidly revealed: "The NUM reps are not 
given the same privileges" (UDM branch official A). Management at Nottston do 
not provide any facilities for NUM officials at the colliery, do not permit NUM 
representatives to take time off work in order to attend to their union duties and do 
not allow the distribution ofNUM recruitment material on colliery premises (NUM 
representative). Furthermore, NUM officials are only allowed to represent their 
members in disciplinary hearings in an unofficial capacity, as a UDM representative 
pointed out: "NUM reps are only allowed to represent their members as a friend, 
because they are the minority union" (UDM branch official A). 
The unitary approach in relation to industrial relations adopted by 
management at Nottston is, however, not only manifest in relation to the 
maintenance of dual unionism at the colliery, and the promotion of the UDM, as the 
maintenance of managerial prerogatives also continues to receive high priority, as 
was the case during the final decade of public ownership. 
Strategic planning in relation to the long term development ofNottston is a 
managerial preserve. However, as the colliery is subject to the provisions ofTUPE, 
formal consultative meetings continue to take place between management 
representatives and representatives of the recognised unions at the colliery, as was 
the case when British Coal owned the mine. Because the NUM is not recognised at 
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Nottston, the union is not allowed to send representatives to the consultative 
committee (NUM representative). A UDM representative indicated that the NUM 
has indirect representation on the consultative committee, since the delegates 
selected by some groups of workers are NUM members: "Some groups are 
represented by the NUM as their rep is in the NUM" (UDM branch official A). 
However, an NUM representative suggested that even though the NUM organised 
the majority offaceworkers at Nottston, as at CUK's other Nottinghamshire 
collieries, the union nevertheless had little opportunity to influence strategic 
planning at the mine: "Most Notts facemen are NUM, but to be perfectly frank we've 
very little influence" (NUM area representative). 
The UDM, by contrast, is directly represented on the consultative committee, 
and is consequently consulted about strategic matters. A UDM representative 
however, indicated that in some instances, management at Nottston were prevented 
from disclosing information in relation to strategic concerns to branch officials 
because of corporate policy: "There are constraints on them [colliery managers]. 
There are limits on what they can actually tell us. Less information is made 
available to colliery managers from headquarters about the state of the industry, 
CUK has really clamped down. The manager rings me these days to ask if I've heard 
anything" (UDM branch official A). Furthermore, the UDM representative also 
suggested that the union was excluded from the decision making process itself: "We 
are not directly involved. We are informed" (UDM branch official A). 
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The UDM at the colliery has been able to influence both strategic decision 
making, and corporate policy, however, through recourse to industrial action. When 
the reserves of a nearby colliery closed before privatisation were allocated to another 
nearby mine, instead of to Nottston, the future of Nottston was placed in jeopardy. 
A ban on weekend work, however, led to a corporate level management statement 
that no decision had been taken in relation to the reserves (UDM representative). 
This is significant, since it suggests that trade union militancy may, in some 
circumstances, be able to force concessions from management at both colliery and 
corporate level. It is, however, perhaps equally significant that the limited action 
that took place at Nottston, did not challenge the unitary approach to industrial 
relations adopted by management, but was instead directed towards wholly 
economistic obj ectives. 
Decisions relating to operational questions at Nottston are also subject to 
managerial prerogative. Because the NUM is prevented from sending 
representatives to the consultative committee, the union is not fonnally consulted 
about such matters. An NUM representative, however, pointed out that the union 
was infonnally consulted about operational issues, because the union represents the 
majority of workers employed at the point of production: "We haven't got the 
influence we had, but because we represent the faceworkers we're spoken to 
unofficially underground" (NUM area official). This is significant, since it indicates 
that managerial strategies in relation to the NUM at Nottston have been constrained 
by practical considerations. 
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The UDM is represented on the committee, it is therefore formally consulted 
in relation to operational matters, although a UDM representative indicated that 
management often sought to marginalise the union by withholding relevant 
information: "They [management] hold back with information until they think it's 
absolutely necessary. I have to ask more questions now" (UDM branch official A). 
Having de-recognised the NUM in accordance with corporate policy, 
management at Nottston have also sought to marginalise the recognised unions at the 
colliery by communicating directly with members of the workforce, rather than by 
directing communications through their elected representatives. As a UDM 
representative observed: "Management seek to resolve problems with individuals or 
groups rather than through collective channels" (UDM branch official A). A BACM 
representative suggested that direct communication between management and the 
workforce at collieries such as Nottston, which are competing with neighbouring 
mines for reserves, was designed to reinforce colliery, rather than company, loyalty 
(BACM national official). A UDM representative acknowledged that management 
at Nottston frequently urged the workforce to outperform their rivals: "We're always 
being told we've got to be better than them" (UDM branch official A). This official 
nevertheless suggested that direct communication was also designed to by-pass the 
unions at the colliery, thus making their position less tenable: "I think it's designed 
to eradicate the role of the trade unions. The more information they [management] 
can give to the men, the less need they have to go to the trade unions. If they 
[management] can eradicate your involvement there's no position for the union" 
(UDM branch official A). 
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The role of the unions 
At Nottston colliery, management have clearly sought to offer more favourable 
treatment to the union most likely to be supportive of managerial objectives at the 
mine, since recognition has been granted to the moderate UDM, but not to the NUM, 
which has traditionally subscribed to a more militant brand of trade unionism. As at 
CUK's other Nottinghamshire collieries, however, management at Nottston have not 
endeavoured to sign a single union agreement with the UDM, since this would not 
be in accordance with corporate policy. As a corporate level management 
representative stated: "No, there is no single union agreement with the UDM, and 
this won't be considered" (Corporate level management representative A). It is 
significant, given the history and traditions of the UDM, that CUK has rejected the 
possibility of a single union agreement with this organisation. This would suggest 
that CUK was opposed to collective organisation, however moderate, and indeed a 
corporate level management representative alluded to this when he declared: "I don't 
think there would be any advantage to be gained [form signing a single union 
agreement with the UDM], because the company doesn't see the unions as a vehicle 
for representation. We prefer to deal with the workforce" (Corporate level 
management representative A). 
Management at Nottston have not directly sought to encourage employees at 
the colliery to join the UDM rather than the NUM (UDM representatives and NUM 
representative). However, a UDM representative indicated that NUM members at 
Nottston were under indirect pressure to change their affiliation, because if they 
approached management with a problem they were directed to the UDM branch 
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officials: "IfNUM members have a problem management refer them to the UDM 
secretary" (UDM branch official A). 
An NUM representative expressed the view that CUK regarded trade unions 
per se as an irrelevance, and as a consequence, did not consider the trade union 
affiliation of individual employees to be an important issue: "They [CUK] have not 
interfered with the men like British Coal did. They couldn't care less what union 
they're in. The unions are seen as an irrelevance, therefore CUK sees it as an 
irrelevance which union they're in" (NUM area official). Given that CUK has 
expressly sought to maintain dual unionism within the industry however, it could be 
argued that this is an over simplistic view, and that if individual trade union 
affiliation is regarded as unimportant this is only because the UDM's majority 
support is not threatened at collieries such as Nottston, since if it were, this would 
undermine the basis on which recognition is denied to the NUM. 
Management at Nottston have not sought to promote non-unionism at the 
mine (UDM representative), and a UDM representative indicated that there were few 
Nottston employees who did not belong to a trade union: "There is no significant 
problem with non-unionism" (UDM branch official A). Even so, a national UDM 
representative conceded that no colliery in Nottinghamshire was fully organised: 
"There are between 40 and 50 non-union members at each pit" (UDM national 
official). Nevertheless, as some 600 men are employed at Nottston, union density is 
high at the colliery. 
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Collective bargaining has been re-established at Nottston, but the scope of 
negotiations is severely proscribed by managerial prerogative, because corporate 
policy states that wage levels are not negotiable (Management representative). The 
restoration of collective bargaining at Nottston then, has not served to increase the 
influence of the trade unions in relation to the terms and conditions of their members 
at the colliery. 
Changes in the locus of bargaining are evident at Nottston, because CUK has 
de-recognised all the mining unions at national and area levels, which has increased 
the importance of local bargaining. As a UDM representative commented: "They 
[management] don't want anything to do with the full time officials. They always 
tell me not to bring anyone in from a higher level. They always want to sort things 
out at the pit" (UDM branch official A). This view was echoed by a UDM national 
official who suggested that local bargaining was being encouraged by the company 
in order to undermine the principal of corporate level bargaining, despite existing 
corporate level agreements being protected by TUPE: "They'd [CUK] sooner do 
away with national and area officials. CUK's intention is to de-centralise 
agreements" (UDM national official). 
Although all the mining unions have been officially de-recognised at national 
level, a UDM representative indicated that unofficial bargaining does take place 
between senior CUK managers and UDM national officials: "CUK officially will not 
agree to collective bargaining. The Chief Executive has got a hang up over the term 
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining does occur, it's just not called collective 
Chapter 8 
251 
bargaining" (UDM national official). Another UDM representative, moreover, 
indicated that although the national union was unable to influence local bargaining at 
Nottston, they did have some influence at corporate level because of the informal 
contact between national officials and senior managers, and because of the 
commercial environment engendered by privatisation: "Berry Hill [UDM national 
office] is most influential in terms of the company. CUK are very conscious of the 
fact that adverse statements made by national officials could have a negative effect 
on the share price, and I think this gives the UDM some bargaining power" (UDM 
branch official A). 
The increasing importance of local bargaining at Nottston has not, however, 
resulted in a wider range of issues coming within the jurisdiction of the Nottston 
UDM branch. Indeed, a UDM representative indicated that the branch was involved 
with fewer issues than in the days when the colliery was publicly owned, because of 
the emphasis placed on the maintenance of managerial prerogatives: "They've 
[management] tended to phase us out of planning and operational matters. They 
don't think the union has a right to have an influence" (UDM branch official A). 
There is then, little evidence of union renewal at Nottston. It would, however, be 
wrong to suggest that the Nottston UDM branch is ineffective, since the use of 
limited industrial action has forced concessions from management, albeit in relation 
to economistic goals. The Nottston NUM branch is, by contrast, wholly ineffective. 
Institutions of collective bargaining 
Nottston colliery was never closed by British Coal, and consequently remained in 
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production throughout the privatisation process. CUK's purchase of the colliery in 
December 1994 therefore represented at transfer of undertakings, bringing the 
colliery within the scope of the provisions of TUPE. Under the terms of TUPE, 
CUK was obliged by statute to recognise all the existing agreements negotiated by 
British Coal and the mining unions prior to privatisation, and because of this, those 
agreements continued to apply at Nottston following privatisation. The institutional 
framework which was developed to facilitate collective bargaining in the industry 
during the years of public ownership remains largely intact, although CUK has 
sought to undermine the agreements safeguarded by the provisions of TUPE. 
When CUK purchased Nottston in 1994, the colliery continued to be subject 
to the British Coal conciliation scheme, since this was inherited by CUK under the 
provisions of TUPE. In 1996, however, CUK withdrew the existing conciliation 
scheme and replaced it with a corporate level agreement (Management 
representative). This was negotiated by senior CUK managers and UDM national 
officials (Management representatives and UDM representatives), and like the 
British Coal scheme it replaced, is based on the majority / minority principle. The 
automatic right to independent arbitration has, however, been removed, although 
there is provision for disputes to be referred to an independent body, given the 
agreement ofCUK's Chief Executive and the UDM National President (UDM 
national official). 
The disciplinary and grievance procedure currently in operation at Nottston 
was also inherited by CUK under the TUPE legislation. This structure has, like the 
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conciliation scheme been modified however, and the right to independent arbitration 
has been withdrawn (UDM national representative). The revised disciplinary and 
grievance procedure was similarly negotiated by senior CUK managers and UDM 
national officials (UDM national official). 
The pay structure which is currently operative at Nottston was also inherited 
from British Coal under the provisions of TUPE, although this structure has also 
been amended by CUK. Nottston miners continue to receive a basic weekly wage 
and a production bonus, as was the case when the British Coal pay structure was in 
operation, and similarly continue to receive additional payments for working in heat 
and water. As an NUM representative revealed: "All the bit bob payments are still 
in force at Nottston" (UDM branch official A). The grading structure has been 
modified however, leading to a reduction in differentials (UDM representative). The 
changes to the pay structure were, like the changes to the conciliation scheme, 
negotiated by senior CUK managers and UDM national officials (UDM 
representatives). 
The provisions ofTUPE have then, ensured that formal structures are in 
place to facilitate collective bargaining at Nottston, although the UDM branch at the 
colliery has not, to date negotiated any formal substantive agreements (UDM 
representative). As the amendments to the institutions of collective bargaining 
inherited under TUPE were jointly negotiated by CUK and the UDM, these 
structures represent a collective agreement between the company and the UDM. The 
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NUM was not involved in these negotiations, however, and the new structures were 
been imposed on NUM members at the colliery. 
The institutional bargaining arrangements currently in force at Nottston then, 
have been greatly influenced by managerial prerogative, and furthermore, have been 
designed to consolidate the institutionalisation of dual unionism within the 
company. Because of this, they bear little resemblance to those negotiated structures 
which were operational between 1947 and 1984, and have more in common with the 
procedures introduced unilaterally by British Coal during the final decade of public 
ownership. 
A UDM representative pointed out that, unlike during the years of public 
ownership, the current management team at Nottston discourage informal 
agreements between junior management and members of the workforce which have 
no union involvement: "They [management] are more reluctant to have an off the 
cuff agreement. They'd prefer it in writing, signed by the Branch Secretary and the 
colliery manager" (UDM branch official A). This is significant, since it indicates 
that informal bargaining without union involvement, is no longer a significant 
feature of industrial relations at Nottston. As a UDM representative observed: 
"There isn't any [informal bargaining] really (UDM branch official A). 
The labour process 
Maximising productivity remains a central objective of operations at Nottston, as 
was the case during the final decade of public ownership. Nevertheless, a number of 
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changes have occurred in relation to the labour process at the colliery following 
privatisation. 
Because Nottston was fully automated during the years of public ownership 
(UDM representative), there has been little scope for improving productivity with 
further automation. The current management at the colliery have, however, sought 
to generate productivity improvements with the introduction of new mining 
techniques. Roofbolting has been widely adopted at Nottston, and has contributed 
to improvements in productivity because it is easier to install than conventional steel 
roof supports, and thus speeds up development work at the colliery. The use of roof 
bolting has moreover reduced the labour requirements of the colliery because it is a 
less labour-intensive technique (UDM representative). 
Management at Nottston have also sought to improve productivity by 
introducing flexible working practices, and indeed, functional, numerical, and 
temporal flexibility are all evident at the colliery. 
Functional flexibility has been widely adopted at Nottston following 
privatisation, and many employees have been given training by CUK in order to 
enable them to perform a wider range of duties. For example some underground 
production workers have been trained for FSV or engine driving, and are now able to 
work as part of the underground haulage team if required (UDM representative). 
Functional flexibility at Nottston has also facilitated a reduction in labour 
requirements of the colliery however (UDM representative), and has thus 
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contributed to the intensification of work, since the remaining employees are 
expected to carry out the same amount of work as was formerly performed by a 
larger number of workers. One UDM representative alluded to this when he 
observed: "There's plenty of men doubling up" (UDM branch official A), and 
indeed, another UDM representative expressed the view that functional flexibility 
had not enskilled members of the workforce, but had instead led to the 
intensification of work by reducing the porosity of the working day: "It's multi-
tasking not multi-skilling. Better utilisation of the workforce they [management] 
call it. It's not so much flexible working as one man doing three men's jobs now" 
(UDM national official). 
Numerical flexibility has been adopted at Nottston, if to a limited extent, 
since some specialised tasks on the surface are outsourced (UDM representative). 
All the underground workers at Nottston are directly employed by CUK however 
(UDM representative), and indeed, there is some suggestion that the company is 
seeking to reduce the role played by outside contractors. As a UDM representative 
commented: "They [CUK] seem to be outing all the contractors now" (UDM branch 
official A). 
Temporal flexibility is also a feature of CUK's operations at Nottston, with 
this being primarily manifest in overtime working. A UDM representative 
acknowledged that many Nottston miners volunteered for overtime: "We've never 
had a problem with overtime. it's only when they [management] reduce overtime 
that it's a problem" (UDM branch official A), however he also pointed out that some 
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groups of workers were occasionally pressurised by management into working 
overtime: "There is pressure put on the men. When a face is being prepared, they 
know they'll have to work extra" (UDM branch official A). In addition, there was 
some suggestion that labour reductions at the colliery have necessitated overtime 
working, with the supervisory staff being particularly affected by these 
developments. As a UDM representative remarked: "The officials are doing a large 
amount of overtime to cover for fewer men" (UDM branch official A). 
Although operations at Nottston have focused on increasing productivity 
since privatisation, a UDM representative nevertheless suggested that corporate level 
management have endeavoured to give the same priority to health and safety as was 
the case when the industry was publicly owned: "CUK are throwing a hell of a lot of 
money at safety. There is a big emphasis on re-training" (UDM branch official A). 
The management team at Nottston itself however, do not appear to recognise the 
negative health and safety implications of work intensification, and a UDM 
representative indicated that there was a widespread belief that safety standards at 
the colliery had beenjeopardised by the excessive overtime worked by pit deputies: 
"The men are of the opinion that overworked deputies are compromising safety. 
There is a question as to whether safety monitoring is as effective when deputies are 
tired" (UDM branch official B). This view was echoed by a NACODS 
representative who remarked: "When you talk to senior CUK managers they don't 
want people working excessive hours, but the colliery managers do, and it's there 
where we have problems" (NACODS national official). 
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A UDM representative expressed the view that the insecurity in the industry 
since privatisation had also had negative implications for safety standards at 
Nottston: "The men haven't got their minds on the job because they're whittling 
about what's going to happen. I'm sure it's the uncertainty that's resulting in the 
accidents" (UDM branch official A), and indeed this representative acknowledged 
that the number of minor accidents had increased at the colliery under the current 
regime: "There are more minor accidents now than under BC" (UDM branch official 
A). Another UDM representative moreover, revealed that management at Nottston, 
as at other Nottinghamshire collieries had sought to manipulate the accident 
statistics by discouraging members of the workforce from reporting accidents: "They 
used to have this scheme called points win prizes. The men would win points for 
not reporting accidents, which could be cashed in for gifts, TVs, toasters, that sort of 
thing, but this was stopped by the Health and Safety Executive" (UDM national 
official). 
Mansthorpe colliery 
Management strategies 
As with the other CUK collieries, the style of management which has emerged at 
Mansthorpe following the company's acquisition of the mine, bears a strong 
resemblance to that which was apparent during the final decade of the nationalised 
era. Management at the colliery have continued to pursue the unitary approach to 
labour relations embraced by British Coal during the final decade of public 
ownership, and as a result there has been no return to pluralism at the colliery. 
Continuity with the period 1984-94 is also evident since the maintenance of 
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managerial prerogatives at the colliery continues to receive much emphasis. There 
is, however, some evidence to suggest that CUK has sought not only to introduce the 
patterns of labour relations developed nationally by British Coal during the last 
decade of public ownership, at Mansthorpe, but also to de-collectivise industrial 
relations at the colliery, although there is also some suggestion that this strategy is 
being resisted by management at colliery level. 
Managerial strategies at Mansthorpe reflect industrial relations policies 
developed at corporate level, and as in the final decade of public ownership, 
corporate strategies have focused upon the maintenance of dual unionism, and upon 
the promotion of the moderate UDM. In accordance with corporate policy the UDM 
has been recognised at Mansthorpe, since the majority of employees at the colliery 
have been members of this organisation since its establishment in 1985. The UDM 
has no formal bargaining rights at Mansthorpe, but informal bargaining suggests that 
in practice, the bargaining rights currently enjoyed by the UDM at the colliery do 
not differ significantly from those granted to the union in the final decade of public 
ownership. The NUM, by contrast, is not recognised at the colliery and 
consequently has no bargaining rights, although some 9 per cent of Mansthorpe 
employees continue to belong to the NUM (UDM representative). 
Management at Mansthorpe provide office and telephone facilities for UDM 
branch officials, who are engaged full time on union business (UDM representative). 
The NUM officials at the colliery, receive significantly different treatment from their 
UDM counterparts, since management at the colliery do not provide any facilities for 
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NUM officials, do not pennit NUM representatives to take time offwork in order to 
attend to their union duties and do not allow the distribution ofNUM recruitment 
material on colliery premises (NUM representative). Moreover, NUM officials at 
Mansthorpe, as at other CUK collieries in Nottinghamshire, are only allowed to 
represent their members in disciplinary hearings in an unofficial capacity. As an 
NUM representative stated: "NUM reps representing NUM members on disciplinary 
hearings are only recognised as a friend" (NUM area official). 
The unitary approach in relation to industrial relations adopted by 
management at Mansthorpe is apparent both in relation to the maintenance of dual 
unionism at the colliery, reflected in initiatives to promote the UDM, and in the 
maintenance of managerial prerogatives at the colliery. 
Mansthorpe colliery is not covered by the provisions of TUPE, and 
management at the colliery have, in accordance with corporate policy, unilaterally 
abandoned the fonna1 consultative meetings with the trade unions which used to take 
place on a regular basis when the mine was publicly owned (UDM representative). 
The unions then, are not fonnally consulted in relation to strategic matters affecting 
the long tenn future of the colliery. The UDM is nevertheless able to make infonna1 
representations to management in relation to strategic matters because relationships 
between management and the union at the colliery have customarily been 
conciliatory, and managerial continuity at Mansthorpe has been preserved despite 
the change of ownership. As a UDM representative remarked: "We were lucky that 
we had the same lot [management] here as we had before privatisation. It would 
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probably be different if they'd [CUK] set new management on" (UDM branch 
official B). This is significant, since it suggests that colliery level management at 
Mansthorpe have been flexible in their interpretation of corporate policy in relation 
to the unions. However, as contact between management and UDM branch officials 
is entirely unofficial, and as strategic decisions are made at corporate rather than 
colliery level (Management representatives), the UDM is unable to exert any 
significant influence in relation to strategic issues concerning Mansthorpe. As a 
UDM representative explained: "I wouldn't say we have a say in it [strategic 
decision making]. They'll [management] make the decision yea or nay. All we can 
do is put our ideas forward" (UDM branch official B). The NUM, by contrast, has 
neither formal nor informal contact with management at Mansthorpe, and is 
consequently unable to exert any influence in relation to strategic planning. 
Decisions relating to operational matters at Mansthorpe are also the 
prerogative of management, and because consultative meetings have been 
withdrawn, the unions at the colliery are not formally consulted in relation to such 
issues. UDM officials however, meet informally with management "on a daily 
basis" (UDM branch official B), and the conciliatory relations between management 
and UDM representatives at Mansthorpe facilitate some union influence in relation 
to operational matters, despite this being contrary to corporate policy. As a UDM 
representative observed: "We try to keep all our problems away from Berry Hill 
[UDM national office] and away from CUK headquarters. We try to sort it out 
ourselves, even if we do F and B at each other at times"(UDM branch official B). 
The NUM, by contrast, has no influence in relation to operational decisions at 
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Mansthorpe, since NUM representatives have no contact with management at the 
colliery. 
Management at Mansthorpe have sought to communicate directly with 
Mansthorpe employees, and members of the management team go underground on a 
daily basis in order to facilitate this (UDM representative). Moreover, management 
at the colliery operate an open door policy, and encourage representations from 
members of the workforce independent of the unions. As a UDM representative 
commented: "The manager is accessible to everyone" (UDM branch official B). 
The role of the unions 
Management at Mansthorpe have, as at CUK's other Nottinghamshire collieries, 
offered more favourable treatment to the union most likely to acquiesce to 
managerial objectives at the colliery, having recognised the moderate UDM, but not 
the more militant NUM. In accordance with corporate policy, however, 
management at Mansthorpe have not sought to enter into a single union agreement 
with the UDM. 
There is no evidence to suggest that management at Mansthorpe have sought 
to promote UDM membership amongst employees at the colliery, and indeed a 
UDM representative stated: " Management aren't bothered what union they're in" 
(UDM branch official B). The UDM representative did however reveal that UDM 
national officials endeavoured to persuade CUK to recruit former UDM members 
rather than members of other unions when the colliery was re-opened by the 
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company in January 1994: "There was pressure from Berry Hill [UDM national 
office] to recruit UDM only" (UDM branch official B). 
Non-unionism has similarly not been encouraged by management at 
Mansthorpe (UDM representative). Indeed, a UDM representative pointed out that 
the majority of the workforce recruited by CUK when the colliery was re-opened, 
had previously worked at Mansthorpe, and that many employees were therefore 
former UDM members: "The vast majority of the first men recruited were ex-
Mansthorpe men" (UDM branch official B). Union density at Mansthorpe is 
nevertheless relatively low, and a UDM representative acknowledged that some 27 
per cent of the workforce were not members of any of the mining unions (UDM 
representative) . 
The relatively high level of non-unionism at Mansthorpe was attributed to 
workforce apathy by a UDM representative, who remarked: "1fT were truthful, I'd 
say the men didn't care about the union now" (UDM branch official B). The notion 
that workforce perceptions of trade union weakness may lead to falling union 
density, Winterton and Winterton (1993b: 24), is also supported by evidence from 
Mansthorpe, as a UDM representative stated that some Mansthorpe employees 
without trade union affiliation had applied for union membership when they 
believed the union was able to make effective representations on their behalf: "The 
only time they come and join is when they've had an accident, or when they want 
something sorted" (UDM branch official B). 
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Fonnal collective bargaining has not been restored at Mansthorpe, because 
the provisions ofTUPE do not apply at the colliery, and management have been able 
to abandon the consultative arrangements which existed during the years of public 
ownership. Infonnal contact does take place between management and UDM 
representatives however, and unofficial collective bargaining does occur at the 
colliery (UDM representative). The UDM at Mansthorpe is, therefore, able to exert 
some influence in relation to the tenns and conditions of their members employed at 
the colliery. However, as bargaining at Mansthorpe is infonnal, and is not supported 
by an institutional framework, it is clearly proscribed by managerial prerogatives. 
Moreover, an NUM area representative pointed out that tenns and conditions at 
collieries not subject to the provisions ofTUPE, were "very much inferior" (NUM 
area official), to those at mines where the legislation applied. 
There have been no significant changes in the locus of bargaining in relation 
to Mansthorpe, despite CUK's de-recognition of all the mining unions at national 
and area levels, and the majority of contact between management representatives and 
union officials continues to occur at colliery level, as was the case during the years 
of public ownership (UDM representative). The UDM branch at Mansthorpe, 
moreover, has a tradition of independence, and has sought to avoid the involvement 
of national and area union officials in local matters. As a UDM representative 
explained: "It's hard to describe Mansthorpe. Even under British Coal we wouldn't 
have much truck with the union. It's never been an us and them pit. It's a family pit, 
a bit of a one off' (UDM branch official B). The same UDM representative, 
however, also expressed the view that there was greater opportunity for local 
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bargaining at Mansthorpe, because the colliery was not subject to the provisions of 
TUPE: "The lease / licence provisions mean there is greater scope for local 
settlements" (UDM branch official B). Indeed, there is some suggestion that 
corporate level management within CUK regard the informal local bargaining 
established at lease / licence collieries such as Mansthorpe as something of a model 
for the other collieries owned by the company, and has sought to extend local 
bargaining in order to undermine the existing agreements safeguarded by TUPE. As 
a UDM national representative revealed: "Colliery managers try to engage branch 
officials in negotiations over new terms and conditions" (UDM national official). 
According to a UDM representative, the continued significance of local 
bargaining at Mansthorpe has been accompanied by an increase in the range of 
issues dealt with by the local union branch: "There are more issues now. I think I'm 
told more now than I was before [privatisation]" (UDM branch official B). 
Although management may be making more information available to UDM branch 
officials, the union is taking up fewer issues on behalf of their members. As a UDM 
representative observed: "It's got to be really serious now before you hear anything 
from the men. Before [privatisation], they were in the office all the time. Men 
would come in if they had a sore tooth" (UDM branch official B). This is significant 
since it suggests that the apathy ofUDM members at Mansthorpe has, alongside 
corporate industrial relations strategies, has served to weaken the position of the 
UDM at the colliery. 
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There is then, little evidence of genuine local union renewal at Mansthorpe, 
and the UDM branch at the colliery is largely ineffective despite being party to 
unofficial bargaining. The Mansthorpe NUM branch, which has no contact formal 
or otherwise with management representatives at the colliery is, by contrast, wholly 
ineffective. 
Institutions of collective bargaining 
Following the coal crisis of 1992, Mansthorpe colliery was closed by British Coal 
and the entire workforce was made redundant. CUK's acquisition of the colliery 
therefore did not represented at transfer of undertakings, and because of this, the 
provisions ofTUPE did not apply at the colliery. All the existing agreements 
negotiated by British Coal and the mining unions prior to privatisation, were 
consequently no longer in force at Mansthorpe when the colliery was returned to 
production by the new owners. Some formal institutional structures have 
nevertheless emerged at Mansthorpe to replace the mechanisms which facilitated 
collective bargaining during the years of public ownership. 
Although Mansthorpe is not subject to the provisions ofTUPE, the 
conciliation scheme in operation at the colliery is the same as that which is currently 
operative at collieries where this legislation did apply (UDM representative). When 
CUK purchased the core collieries in 1994, these mines continued to be subject to 
the British Coal conciliation scheme. In 1996, however, CUK amended the scheme 
(Management representative), withdrawing the automatic right to independent 
arbitration, although under the current arrangements, disputes may be referred to an 
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independent body ifCUK's Chief Executive and the UDM National President agree 
to this (UDM national representative). The amended conciliation scheme which was 
introduced at Mansthorpe, is, like its predecessor, based on the majority / minority 
principle, and was similarly negotiated by senior CUK managers and UDM national 
officials (Management representatives and UDM representatives). 
The disciplinary and grievance procedure currently in operation at the 
colliery is also the same as that which exists at those collieries acquired by CUK 
which were subject to the provisions ofTUPE (UDM representative). The British 
Coal disciplinary and grievance procedure was inherited by CUK under the TUPE 
legislation, but this structure was modified, and the right to independent arbitration 
was withdrawn (UDM national representative). The revised disciplinary and 
grievance procedure was, however, like the amended conciliation scheme, negotiated 
by senior CUK managers and UDM national officials (UDM national official). 
The pay structure in operation at Mansthorpe is loosely based on the British 
Coal pay structure, although it differs significantly from the structure in place at 
those collieries subject to the provisions ofTUPE. Wages at Mansthorpe are related 
to the occupational grade of individual employees and the wages received by each 
employee are comprised of a basic rate combined with a productivity bonus, and an 
attendance bonus (UDM representative). Employees at Mansthorpe however, 
receive no additional payments for working in water or heat (UDM representative). 
The pay structure at Mansthorpe, moreover, was not negotiated with the local branch 
of the UDM, but was imposed upon the workforce. As a UDM representative stated: 
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"We were told 'This is the pay structure for Mansthorpe colliery. Do you want it, or 
do you not want it?' " (UDM branch official B). 
Although Mansthorpe is not subject to the provisions ofTUPE, fonnal 
structures to facilitate collective bargaining have emerged at the colliery, because the 
conciliation scheme and the disciplinary and grievance procedure in operation at 
collieries where this legislation applies have been introduced at Mansthorpe. As the 
amendments to the conciliation scheme, and the disciplinary and grievance 
procedure which have been introduced at Mansthorpe were jointly negotiated by 
CUK and the UDM, it might be argued that these structures represent collective 
agreements between the company and the UDM, which were then imposed on NUM 
members at the colliery. The pay structure in operation at Mansthorpe, by contrast, 
was not negotiated with any of the mining unions, and therefore cannot be classed as 
a collective agreement under any circumstances. 
The institutional bargaining arrangements presently in force at Mansthorpe 
then, resemble those procedures introduced by British Coal during the final decade 
of public ownership, rather than the negotiated structures which were operational 
between 1947 and 1984. This is because they have been greatly influenced by 
managerial prerogative, and moreover, have the objective of consolidating the 
institutionalisation of dual unionism within the company, as was the case with the 
British Coal structures they replaced. 
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Infonnal bargaining between members of junior management and groups of 
workers which have no union involvement, are less significant now than was the 
case when the colliery was publicly owned. Corporate policy does not pennit job 
and knock agreements, where miners are allowed to go home early once a specific 
task had been completed, and consequently such agreements are no longer made at 
the colliery. As a UDM representative explained: "There is no job and knock. A 
plan was put forward, but the Director of Mining will not hear of job and knock" 
(UDM branch official B). Infonnal agreements in relation to deployment and shift 
times continue to occur at the colliery however (UDM representative). 
The Labour Process 
The change in ownership at Mansthorpe has not been accompanied by any marked 
changes in relation to the labour process, and as in the years when the colliery was 
publicly owned, the objective of maximising productivity continues to guide 
operations at the colliery. 
Output is limited to some extent at Mansthorpe, since the coal seams being 
worked are small, and the faces at the colliery are, as a result, less than half the 
height than those at other collieries in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. As a UDM 
representative explained: "Production is limited at Mansthorpe due to the height of 
the faces. At Mansthorpe they are metre faces, rather than twelve foot as in the rest 
ofNotts" (UDM branch official B). The colliery was nevertheless fully automated 
during the years of public ownership, and because of this the current management 
team has not sought further technological improvements in order to facilitate 
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productivity improvements. As a UDM representative observed: "There has been no 
real change between BC and CUK in terms of technology" (UDM branch official B). 
CUK has sought to improve productivity at Mansthorpe by reducing labour 
requirements, and indeed in November 1997, the company announced some 80 
redundancies at the colliery (UDM representative). Management have also 
introduced limited flexible working practices at Mansthorpe with a view to 
improving productivity, through functional and temporal flexibility. 
Functional flexibility is a significant feature of operations at Mansthorpe, and 
workers at the colliery are currently expected to perform a wider range of tasks than 
was the case when the mine was publicly owned (UDM representative). A UDM 
representative suggested that the pace of work had increased at the colliery, and that 
members of the workforce were currently working to the limits of their physical 
capabilities: "They [management] can't make them [the workforce] go any harder 
than they're doing at the moment" (UDM branch official B). Although functional 
flexibility has contributed to the intensification of work at Mansthorpe, through 
reducing the porosity of the working day, there is no evidence of workforce 
resistance to these developments. Indeed, a UDM representative indicated that 
members of the workforce had embraced functional flexibility because they viewed 
this as a means of improving the survival prospects of the colliery, and of increasing 
their own employment prospects in the event of Mansthorpe's closure: "There is a 
willingness to be more flexible to keep the pit going. The men are asking to be 
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trained for more jobs. They think they'll have a better chance of finding work if 
Mansthorpe closes if they're multi-skilled" (UDM branch official B). 
Temporal flexibility has also been adopted at Mansthorpe, to a limited 
extent. According to the terms of their contracts, Mansthorpe employees are 
required to work 40 hours a week (UDM representative), but the majority of workers 
at the colliery work overtime on a regular basis: "Most workers do a 48 hour week" 
(UDM branch official B). There is however, no suggestion that Mansthorpe 
employees are under any pressure to work overtime, and indeed a UDM 
representative indicated that many workers volunteered to work additional hours: 
"Most of them want the overtime anyway. It's keeping them out that's the hard part" 
(UDM branch official B). 
Numerical flexibility is not a major feature of operations at Mansthorpe, 
although a UDM representative acknowledged that some work had been outsourced 
in the past (UDM representative). At present however, no contracting companies are 
employed at the colliery. 
Although management at Mansthorpe have continued to seek productivity 
improvements, there is no suggestion that this has had negative implications for 
health and safety at the colliery. A UDM representative suggested that this was 
because management were aware that falling safety standards would be likely to 
meet with employee resistance, and had therefore not imposed changes that would 
compromise safety at the colliery: "They've never tried to push anything on us. We 
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have the same men, and they wouldn't have accepted change" (UDM branch official 
B). 
Conclusions 
The pattern of industrial relations which has begun to emerge within CUK in the 
three years since privatisation, exhibits much continuity with those patterns that 
developed nationally during the final decade of public ownership. This is because 
the unitary approach to labour relations issues which was unilaterally introduced by 
British Coal has been embraced by CUK, and the relationships between corporate 
level management and the mining unions consequently continue to be characterised 
by conflict, rather than co-operation. A unitary approach to industrial relations is 
also evident at colliery level, as evidence from Donborough, Dearnley, Nottston and 
Mansthorpe collieries demonstrates. Significantly, however, the unitary approach is 
most apparent at Dearnley and Mansthorpe, where labour relations have been de-
collectivised. By contrast, management at Donborough and Nottston have adopted a 
less robust approach in relation to the trade unions. 
Corporate policy in relation to the unions at national and area level at first 
appears to be consistent, since all the mining unions have been de-recognised at 
these levels. In practice, however, corporate policy has been primarily designed to 
exclude the NUM, because there is no contact with NUM national officials, whilst 
informal negotiations between senior CUK managers and the national officials of the 
UDM have taken place (Management representatives, UDM representatives, and 
NUM representatives). BACM and NACODS national officials similarly have 
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infonnal dialogue with the company (BACM representative, and NACODS 
representative). CUK's policy of maintaining of dual unionism within its operations 
is also evident at colliery level, since at each colliery, recognition has only been 
granted to the union which represents the majority of employees. This development 
has led to the de-recognition of the NUM at Nottston and Mansthorpe. The UDM, 
however, has not been de-recognised at any of the collieries which were studied. 
At all four collieries, the same emphasis is placed on the maintenance of 
managerial prerogatives as was the case during the last decade of public ownership. 
As a result, the NUM has been unable to exert any meaningful influence in relation 
to either strategic or operational decision making at Donborough or Dearnley, whilst 
the UDM has similarly been unable to influence decision making in relation to these 
matters at Mansthorpe. By contrast, the use of industrial action at Nottston has 
enabled the UDM to have some influence in relation strategic and operational 
decisions at the colliery. 
Developments in management industrial relations strategies at both corporate 
and colliery level then, do not lend weight to the predictions of Ferner and Colling 
(1991), that the new environment engendered by privatisation would result in the 
development of a more conciliatory managerial approach to labour relations issues. 
Privatisation has nevertheless had a major influence in relation to the development 
of management industrial relations strategies within CUK. This is because 
privatisation has led to the emergence of a new fonn of ownership, which has, in 
turn, given rise to a new managerial regime at corporate level. The new regime has 
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sought to maintain, and indeed in some instances intensify, the unitary approach to 
labour relations adopted by British Coal during the final decade of public ownership, 
rather than to abandon this approach. 
Privatisation has however had a more direct bearing on the development of 
management industrial relations strategies within CUK. CUK purchased collieries 
at various points during the privatisation process, and because of this, some mines, 
including Donborough and Nottston were subject to the provisions ofTUPE, whilst 
others like Deamley and Mansthorpe were not. It is significant that management has 
taken the most robust approach towards the trade unions at Deamley and 
Mansthorpe, and indeed it could be argued that the provisions ofTUPE have 
constrained managerial strategies in relation to the unions at Donborough and 
Nottston, where this legislation has applied. 
The structure of CUK has also had a significant influence on the 
development of management strategies however. CUK acquired collieries in both 
Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire, and as a result, the company has been able to focus 
its industrial relations strategies on the maintenance of dual unionism within its 
operations. Furthermore, because CUK acquired twenty collieries during the 
privatisation process, industrial relations strategies are developed at corporate rather 
than colliery level. Management at colliery level are therefore constrained by 
company labour relations policies, although there is evidence which points to 
opposition to corporate level policies at colliery level. This is most apparent at 
Deamley and Mansthorpe collieries, which is particularly significant, since this is 
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where the unitary approach developed at corporate level has been most vigorously 
applied. 
The role of the mining unions which represent CUK employees has 
undergone some change since privatisation, since all the unions have been de-
recognised at national and area levels. It could be argued that this development has, 
with respect of the NUM, merely formalised the de facto situation which existed 
during the final decade of public ownership. It is, however, particularly significant 
that official recognition has also been denied to BACM, NACODS and the UDM, 
which suggests that CUK is unwilling to countenance formal corporate level 
bargaining under any circumstances. Nevertheless, since the company has an 
unofficial dialogue with the national officials of all these organisations (UDM 
representatives, BACM representative and NACODS representative), it is evident 
that corporate policy has been overlooked when this has been deemed to be 
expedient. 
Because formal bargaining is not permitted at corporate level, the 
significance of colliery level bargaining has increased at Donborough and Nottston, 
where formal bargaining is permitted. This has not, however, resulted in a greater 
range of issues coming within the jurisdiction of the recognised trade union branches 
at these collieries, since the extent of bargaining is proscribed by managerial 
prerogative. Branch organisation at both Donborough and Nottston therefore, 
remains largely ineffective. At Deamley, by contrast, formal bargaining has not 
been sanctioned, and local bargaining has not therefore assumed a greater 
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significance. As a consequence of these developments, there has been a significant 
reduction in the range of issues dealt with by the NUM branch at Deamley, and 
indeed branch organisation at the colliery is wholly ineffective. Formal bargaining 
is similarly not permitted at Mansthorpe, but informal bargaining does take place at 
the colliery, and there is evidence to suggest that the UDM branch at the mine 
manage a wider range of issues now than was the case in the final decade of public 
ownership. As bargaining at Mansthorpe is informal however, it is severely 
proscribed by managerial prerogative, and the UDM branch at the colliery therefore 
remains essentially ineffective. Because local recognition has been denied to the 
NUM at Nottston and Mansthorpe, the NUM branches at both collieries are 
completely ineffective. 
The cases of Don borough, Deamley, Nottston and Mansthorpe then, provide 
no evidence to support the view forwarded by Fairbrother (1994) and Edwards and 
Reery (1989), that the increased importance of de-centralised bargaining following 
privatisation would result in the rejuvenation of local trade union branches. The 
current weakness of the trade union branches at these collieries cannot be wholly 
attributed to privatisation however, because the position of capital was strengthened 
relative to that of labour during the final decade of public ownership, when industrial 
relations in the coal industry were extensively restructured. Privatisation has 
nevertheless facilitated the consolidation of these developments. 
Continuity with the patterns of industrial relations developed during the 
period 1984-94 is also apparent, because those institutional structures which are 
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currently in place to support bargaining at collieries owned by CUK, have more in 
common with those structures introduced unilaterally by British Coal following the 
1984-85 strike, than to the mechanisms which were operative during the period 
1947-84. This is because the new structures have served to consolidate the 
institutionalisation of dual unionism within the company. Furthermore, the 
development of these arrangements has been significantly influenced by managerial 
prerogative, and only the UDM was consulted in relation to modifications to the 
structures inherited under the provisions ofTUPE, with the new procedures being 
imposed on the NUM. The existence of an institutional framework to support 
bargaining then, cannot be said to represent the development of a pattern of 
industrial relations based on consensus, and indeed the presence of such structures is 
virtually meaningless given that CUK have denied formal collective bargaining 
rights to the trade unions at corporate level, and at individual collieries including 
Dearnley and Mansthorpe. 
There have been few changes in relation to the labour process at 
Donborough, Dearnley, Nottston or Mansthorpe, other than initiatives to improve 
productivity at the collieries through the intensification of work. Management at 
corporate level are mindful of the negative health and safety implications of work 
intensification, and have continued to accord the same priority to safety matters as 
their predecessors. There is evidence that management at colliery level have 
overlooked these issues, however, and there is some suggestion that management at 
Donborough and Nottston have manipulated the accident statistics, and have 
discouraged members of the workforce from reporting accidents. 
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The emergent patterns of industrial relations within CUK then, exhibit 
considerably continuity with those patterns established during the period 1984-94, 
and there has been no return to the pluralism which characterised labour relations in 
the industry between 1947 and 1984. It could be argued, moreover, that corporate 
level management have sought to take a more robust approach in relation to the trade 
unions than was adopted by their public sector predecessors, at collieries such as 
Dearnley and Mansthorpe, where the legal framework has restricted managerial 
objectives to a lesser degree. It is therefore, possible to conclude that privatisation 
has had negative implications for organised labour in general within CUK, and for 
the NUM in particular. 
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Chapter Nine 
Explaining continuity and change 
Management strategies 
At six of the seven collieries considered within this study, management has adopted 
a unitary approach to industrial relations, although significant variations in the 
vigour with which this approach has been applied are evident (Figure 9.1.). 
Management has taken a particularly robust attitude towards organised labour at 
Workham colliery, where all the mining unions have been de-recognised, and where 
industrial relations have been de-collectivised. At Deamley and Mansthorpe, the 
managerial stance in relation to the trade unions has been only marginally less 
rigorous, since de-recognition has taken place on a selective, rather than general 
basis, but management has nevertheless sought to de-collectivise labour relations at 
these collieries also. Management at Abergoed, Donborough and Nottston 
collieries, whilst continuing to operate within a unitary framework, have adopted a 
less hostile attitude towards organised labour. At these collieries the trade unions 
have again been de-recognised on a selective basis, and the unions have experienced 
varying degree of marginalisation, but management has not attempted to de-
collectivise industrial relations. 
In contrast to the industrial relations strategies adopted by management at 
Workham, Deamley, Mansthorpe, Abergoed, Donborough and Nottston, 
management at Cwmpridd colliery have abandoned the unitary approach to 
industrial relations which held sway during the final decade of public ownership. 
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Although selective de-recognition has taken place at Cwmpridd, this has not had the 
objective of weakening collective organisation at the colliery, unlike at the other 
mines which were studied. Moreover, management at Cwmpridd have not 
introduced policies designed to marginalise those unions which have been 
recognised, and as a consequence industrial relations at the colliery are now based 
on consensus rather than conflict. 
The difference between the industrial relations strategies adopted by 
management at Cwmpridd, and those policies introduced by management at the 
other six collieries within the study, can be accounted for by the form of ownership 
at the mines in question. Cwmpridd, unlike any of the other mines within the study, 
was purchased by an employee buyout team which was formed by a number of 
former NUM and NACODS branch officials, and those same individuals now hold 
many of the senior management posts at the colliery. Management at Cwmpridd 
then, unlike at the other collieries studied, have an ideological commitment to 
organised labour, and have consequently demonstrated their willingness both to seek 
an accommodation with the trade unions at the mine, and to develop a more 
democratic management style than has previously been evident. The emergence of a 
democratic management style has, moreover, received further impetus because some 
80 per cent of the Cwmpridd workforce are equal shareholders in the company 
which was established by the employee buyout team. It is likely, therefore, that any 
managerial attempts to introduce a unitary approach to industrial relations, would 
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have been resisted by the workforce at the colliery, since the worker-shareholders 
are also trade union members. 
The variations in the vigour with which the unitary approach has been 
applied at Workham, Deamley, Mansthorpe, Abergoed, Donborough and Nottston 
cannot be explained by differences in the form of ownership which has emerged at 
the six collieries, however. Deamley, Mansthorpe, Donborough and Nottston are all 
owned by CUK, but the industrial relations strategies pursued by the company at 
colliery level have not been consistent, and a more robust attitude in relation to the 
trade unions has emerged at Deamley and Mansthorpe, than at Donborough and 
Nottston. Similarly, Workham and Abergoed collieries were both acquired by 
management buyout teams, yet managerial attitudes towards collective 
representation at Workham are considerably less compromising than those adopted 
by management at Abergoed. 
Collieries organised by both the NUM and the UDM are represented 
amongst those where managerial strategies in relation to the unions have been most 
uncompromising, and similarly, both NUM and UDM collieries are amongst those 
where management has adopted a more accommodative attitude towards organised 
labour. This is significant, since it indicates that the differences between the 
industrial relations strategies pursued by management at Workham, Deamley, 
Mansthorpe, Abergoed, Donborough and Nottston cannot be explained in terms of a 
managerial response towards the varying nature of trade union representation at 
these collieries. 
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An explanation for the differences identified in management industrial 
relations strategies at Workham, Deamley, Mansthorpe, Abergoed, Donborough and 
Nottston becomes apparent when the legislative framework surrounding 
privatisation is considered. 
Four of these collieries, Donborough, Nottston, Deamley and Mansthorpe 
were acquired by CUK. However of these, only Donborough and Nottston were 
subject to the TUPE regulations. All the agreements which had been negotiated 
between British Coal and the mining unions were therefore still in force at 
Donborough and Nottston after privatisation, unlike at Deamley and Mansthorpe, 
where the provisions ofTUPE did not apply, and where those agreements 
consequently had no legal status. Legislative requirements then, have served to 
constrain managerial industrial relations strategies at Donborough and Nottston, and 
as a result, managerial attitudes towards organised labour have been less antagonistic 
at these mines than at Deamley and Mansthorpe, where management were not 
subject to the same regulatory restrictions. The evidence therefore suggests that 
corporate level management within CUK have adopted a contingency approach to 
industrial relations, and that this accounts for the differing strategies pursued by 
management at individual collieries. 
Like Deamley and Mansthorpe, Workham and Abergoed collieries were not 
subject to the TUPE regulations, and management labour relations strategies at these 
mines have similarly not been constrained by statutory requirements. Although 
management at Workham and Abergoed have adopted differing attitudes towards the 
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trade unions within a unitary framework, it can nevertheless be argued that 
management at both mines have also embraced a contingency approach to industrial 
relations. That different outcomes have followed from this is largely due to different 
personalities within the senior management teams of the companies that acquired 
these collieries. Senior management within EM, the company which acquired 
Workham, are openly hostile to the principle of organised labour, and have 
consequently fully exploited the opportunities presented by the fact that the colliery 
was not covered by the provisions of TUPE. Senior managers within AC by 
contrast, have taken a more pragmatic view in relation to organised labour at 
Abergoed. Unlike their counterparts at Workham, they appear to recognise that 
management can derive some organisational benefits as a result of accommodating 
collective representation, and as a consequence they have not sought to take full 
advantage of the absence of legal restrictions influencing their relations with the 
trade unions at the colliery. 
Because a unitary approach towards industrial relations has been adopted by 
management at Workham, Deamley, Mansthorpe, Abergoed, Donborough and 
Nottston, a high priority is accorded to the maintenance of managerial prerogatives 
at each of these collieries. Some differences are nevertheless visible in the vigour 
with managerial prerogatives have been administered. At Abergoed, Donborough, 
Nottston and Mansthorpe, the local trade union branches are consulted in relation to 
both strategic and operational matters, but have been excluded from the decision 
making process itself. The trade unions at Workham and Deamley, by contrast, 
have no input into either strategic or operational decision making. 
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The legal framework surrounding privatisation has to be given further 
consideration if the variations with which managerial prerogatives have been 
enforced at the collieries owned by CUK are to be accounted for. The TUPE 
regulations have protected the local consultative arrangements which existed during 
the nationalised era, and because of this, the company has been unable to withdraw 
formal consultative meetings at Donborough and Nottston. The unions at these 
collieries then, continue to have an opportunity to express their views in relation to 
strategic and operational matters. Because TUPE did not apply at Deamley and 
Mansthorpe, formal consultative meetings have been withdrawn by the company, 
and as a result, the unions at these collieries have no such formal opportunity to 
express opinions. Within this context, Mansthorpe colliery can be seen as 
something of an anomaly however. Although formal consultative meeting have 
been abolished by CUK, the trade unions are consulted on an informal basis in 
relation to both strategic and operational issues by colliery level management. This 
is because the culture of the mine has resulted in particularly close relations between 
management and the unions, and as a result of this, management at the colliery have 
been prepared to disregard corporate industrial relations policies to some extent. 
The unions at Mansthorpe are nevertheless unable to exert any meaningful influence 
in relation to either strategic or operational decisions, because such consultations are 
unofficial. 
It might be argued that the TUPE regulations have served to restrict 
managerial prerogatives at Donborough and Nottston, because CUK continues to 
have a legal obligation to consult with the trade unions. The existence of 
Chapter 9 
286 
consultation, however, does not give the unions at these collieries access to the 
decision making process itself, and as a consequence managerial prerogatives 
remain intact throughout the company. The apparent variations in the vigour with 
which CUK have enforced managerial prerogatives at Deamley, Mansthorpe, 
Donborough and Nottston, are therefore revealed to be somewhat superficial, since 
similar outcomes have resulted at each of these collieries. 
Similar outcomes with respect to the maintenance of managerial prerogatives 
are also evident at Workham and Abergoed, even though management at Workham 
have placed more emphasis on such matters than their counterparts at Abergoed. 
Neither colliery was subject to the provisions ofTUPE, and therefore there was no 
legal requirement for management to maintain the consultative meetings which were 
established under public ownership at either mine. Formal consultative meetings 
were therefore withdrawn by management at both collieries. As a consequence, the 
trade unions at Workham have no opportunity to influence either strategic or 
operational decisions. At Abergoed, by contrast, although formal consultations have 
been abandoned, management have continued to consult the unions on a regular, if 
informal, basis in relation to strategic and operational issues. The unions at 
Abergoed have nevertheless had no meaningful opportunity to influence managerial 
decisions, firstly, because such consultations occur after, rather than before, such 
decisions have been taken, and secondly, because the commercial environment faced 
by the company has limited the degree to which managerial prerogatives can be 
relaxed. 
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In keeping with the democratic management style which has emerged at 
Cwmpridd following privatisation, considerably less importance is attached to 
managerial prerogatives than was the case during the final years of public 
ownership. As a result, the trade unions at the colliery are consulted by management 
in relation to both strategic development and operational issues, and indeed, the 
unions are also able to influence decision making in these areas. 
At Workham, Deamley, Mansthorpe and Nottston, the unitary approach to 
industrial relations adopted by management has been accompanied by the 
introduction of communications strategies designed to undermine collective 
organisation at colliery level. Furthermore, at Workham, management have also 
implemented various policies with the objective of fostering division amongst the 
workforce. At Donborough, and Abergoed, by contrast, there is no evidence to 
suggest that such strategies have been employed, despite a unitary approach to 
labour relations having been adopted by management at these mines also. 
The most robust management approach towards the trade unions is apparent 
at Mansthorpe, Deamley and Workham, where strategies designed to weaken 
collective organisation are evident. It is however, arguably more significant that 
three of the four collieries where such strategies have been implemented are located 
within the Nottinghamshire coalfield, and are organised by the UDM rather than the 
NUM. 
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Following the end ofthe 1984-85 strike, the industrial relations strategies 
developed by British Coal management centred upon the promotion of the UDM, 
and the maintenance of dual unionism within the industry. As a consequence of this, 
the UDM branches in Nottinghamshire were not subject to the same sustained 
assault that was experienced by NUM branches. Moreover, because the majority of 
the Nottinghamshire workforce did not take part in the 1984-85 strike, they did not 
suffer the same demoralising defeat as that endured by the workforce in other 
coalfields, and as a result, their commitment to solidaristic behaviour remained 
largely intact. Indeed, whilst none of the Yorkshire or Welsh collieries considered 
within this study has been affected by industrial action since privatisation, stoppages 
of work have taken place at both Workham and Nottston. Management at 
Workham, Mansthorpe and Nottston may therefore have embraced policies designed 
to undermine collective organisation, because the position of organised labour at 
these collieries remained relatively strong. By the same token, because organised 
labour had already been significantly weakened at Donborough and Abergoed as a 
result ofthe defeat of the 1984-85 strike and the post-strike restructuring of 
industrial relations, management may not have considered it necessary to adopt 
policies designed to erode collective organisation at these collieries. 
Management at Cwmpridd, as at Donborough and Abergoed, have not 
sought to undermine collective organisation at the colliery, nor have they instigated 
measures designed to foster division within the workforce. At this colliery however, 
the absence of such policies can be attributed to a sympathetic managerial attitude 
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towards the trade unions, rather than to the fact that organised labour had been 
weakened in the aftermath of the 1984-85 dispute. 
The role of the unions 
There is considerable variation in the nature of recognition granted to the unions 
operating at the collieries which have been examined within this study, and 
significant differences are apparent in terms of the locus of recognition, as well as in 
terms of which unions have been recognised. Indeed, the nature of the recognition 
accorded to the unions has had a major influence on the role of these organisations at 
each of the collieries which has been considered. 
Three of the companies owning collieries which were examined within this 
study have introduced major changes in relation to the locus of trade union 
recognition. CUK and AC have recognised the mining unions on a local basis only, 
and have de-recognised the unions at national and area levels, whilst EM has 
withdrawn recognition at national, area and local levels (Table 9.2.). The de-
recognition of the unions at national and area levels by CUK, AC and EM can be 
partially explained by the fragmentation of the industry which accompanied 
privatisation, since this gave rise to single employer bargaining, which undermined 
national level negotiations. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that CUK 
has granted recognition at branch, rather than national level in order to prevent the 
establishment of corporate level bargaining, although the company does have an 
unofficial dialogue with some national union officials. The decision of EM to de-
recognise the unions at local level in addition to national and area levels can, by 
Chapter 9 
290 
contrast, be explained by the priority accorded to managerial prerogatives by the 
company, and by the overt hostility to organised labour amongst senior 
management, who are unwilling to tolerate collective representation at any level. 
Table 9.2: The locus of trade union recognition 
Level of Recognition 
National Level Area Level Branch Level 
Welsh Yes Yes Yes 
Anthracite 
Anthracite No No Yes 
Cymru 
Coal UK No No Yes 
English No No No 
Mining 
The change in the locus of recognition which has been introduced by CUK, 
AC and EM has had significant implications both for the locus of bargaining within 
these companies, and for the role of the unions at the collieries which have been 
considered within this study. 
Within CUK and AC local recognition has increased the potential 
significance of local bargaining, and indeed the national and area levels of the 
unions now have no influence over industrial relations developments at Abergoed, 
Donborough, Deamley, Nottston and Mansthorpe. In practice however, whilst local 
bargaining has assumed a greater importance at Abergoed, Donborough and 
Nottston, at Deamley and Mansthorpe the significance of local bargaining has not 
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increased. This is because of the variations in the collective bargaining rights 
granted to the unions at these collieries which are analysed below. By contrast, 
because EM has withdrawn recognition from the trade unions at all levels, 
bargaining no longer takes place at any level within the company. At Workham 
colliery then, the local union branches are, like the national and area levels of the 
unions, unable to influence the emergent pattern of industrial relations. 
Unlike CUK, AC and EM, W A has not introduced changes to the locus of 
trade union recognition, because management within the company have a 
sympathetic attitude towards organised labour. The mining unions then, continue to 
be recognised at all levels by the company, but in practice, the national and area 
levels of the unions have little influence over industrial relations at Cwmpridd. This 
is partly because the fragmentation of the industry which accompanied privatisation 
undermined national level bargaining, but is also a reflection that the substantive and 
procedural agreements negotiated by the Cwmpridd unions and W A are superior to 
those which exist in other parts of the industry. 
Within this framework, differences are also apparent in terms of which 
unions have been recognised by the companies which own the collieries examined 
within this study, and indeed this factor has also had a significant influence on the 
role performed by the unions at several of the mines which were considered. 
Corporate level industrial relations strategies within CUK, have focused on 
the maintenance of dual unionism within the company, and upon the promotion of 
Chapter 9 
292 
the moderate UDM. At colliery level this strategy has been manifest in recognition 
being granted only to the union representing the majority of the workforce, and as a 
consequence, the NUM has been recognised at Donborough and Dearnley, whilst the 
UDM has been granted recognition at Nottston and Mansthorpe (Table 9.3.). 
Table 9.3: Trade union recognition at colliery level 
Union Recognised 
NUM UDM 
Cwmpridd Yes 
Abergoed Yes 
Donborough Yes 
Dearnley Yes 
Nottston No Yes 
Mansthorpe No Yes 
Workham No No 
This pattern of recognition has had few implications for the role played by 
unions at Donborough and Dearnley, since the NUM is the only union which 
represents mineworker grades at these mines. At Nottston and Mansthorpe, 
however, both the NUM and UDM have members, and CUK's policy in relation to 
trade union recognition has therefore had serious implications for the NUM. 
Because the NUM is not recognised at these collieries, the union is unable to make 
representations on behalf of its members. Moreover because CUK has refused to 
provide office or telephone facilities for the NUM at Nottston and Mansthorpe, and 
has also refused to allow NUM branch officials to take time off in order to attend to 
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trade union business, the organisational ability of the union has been undennined at 
these collieries also. Management strategies at Nottston and Mansthorpe have 
therefore prevented the NUM from providing an adequate service for those it seeks 
to represent, and because of this there is arguably little incentive for mineworkers at 
these collieries to be members of this organisation. 
CUK has not sought to create a non-union workforce at any of the collieries 
which were included in the study, and indeed, union density has remained high at 
Donborough and Nottston, although it is somewhat lower at Deamley and 
Mansthorpe. Leaving aside legal considerations, it is not surprising that CUK has 
failed to promote non-unionism at the collieries it owns, since the company's 
industrial relations strategy is based upon the continuation of dual unionism, and the 
endorsement of the moderate UDM. It is however also possible that management 
within CUK have not considered it necessary to encourage non-unionism since the 
position of organised labour within the company remains weak because the unions 
continue to be divided, and because the strength of the NUM was undennined in the 
aftennath ofthe 1984-85 dispute. 
EM's policy in relation to trade union recognition is somewhat different from 
that adopted by CUK, since this company has sought to de-collectivise industrial 
relations, rather than to support dual unionism. Because of this, neither the NUM 
nor the UDM has been recognised at Workham colliery. Furthennore, neither union 
has been granted office nor telephone facilities, and neither NUM nor UDM branch 
officials are allowed to take time off work for union duties. The role played by both 
Chapter 9 
294 
the NUM and UDM branches at Workham has been significantly influenced by their 
de-recognition, so that neither body is able to represent effectively the interests of its 
members. 
There is some evidence that EM has sought to create a non-union workforce 
at Workham, even though this is illegal under the terms of existing employment 
legislation. This is unsurp, :sing given that the company has endeavoured to de-
collectivise industrial relations at the colliery, and has de-recognised all the mining 
unions to this end. Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that union 
density at Workham, is lower than at any other colliery examined within this study. 
W A and AC have each granted recognition to the NUM, rather than to the 
more moderate UDM, although the rationale behind this pattern of recognition is 
different in the case of each company. Several members of the WA senior 
management team formerl~held positions within the Cwmpridd lodge of the NUM, 
and these individuals consequently have both a personal and ideological 
commitment to the NUM, rather than to its rival organisation. Management within 
AC, by contrast have elected to recognise the NUM because the NUM is the only 
body to organise amongst mineworker grades at Abergoed, and there would be little 
to gain from granting recognition to the UDM at the colliery. Because the NUM is 
the only union to represent mineworker grades at Abergoed and Cwmpridd, the 
pattern of recognition adopted by WA and AC has had few implications for the role 
played by the trade unions at these collieries. 
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Neither W A nor AC have sought to discourage trade union membership at 
their respective collieries, and indeed union density is approaching 100 per cent at 
both Cwmpridd and Abergoed. 
In addition to the differences which are evident in relation to the nature of 
trade union recognition, considerable variations are also apparent with respect to the 
bargaining rights which have been granted to the trade unions at colliery level. This 
factor, moreover, has also had significant implications for the trade union branches 
which operate at the collieries which were examined. 
At the collieries owned by CUK, a complex pattern of bargaining rights is 
evident (Figure 9.4.). This reflects both the company's policy relating to trade union 
recognition, and the differing impact of the provisions ofTUPE at colliery level. 
Both Donborough and Nottston collieries were subject to the TUPE 
regulations, and because of this, CUK has been legally required to maintain the 
existing bargaining arrangements at these mines. The NUM at Donborough and the 
UDM at Nottston, have consequently been accorded some collective bargaining 
rights by the company, in addition to rights of representation. However, since the 
bargaining rights granted to the unions have been restricted by managerial 
prerogative, and do not extend to the issue of pay, neither the NUM nor the UDM 
has increased its influence in relation to terms and conditions at Donborough and 
Nottston respectively, following privatisation (Figure 9.5.), despite the increased 
significance of local bargaining at these collieries. The restoration of some 
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bargaining rights at Donborough and Nottston, similarly has not led to an increase in 
the range of bargaining issues at either colliery. Indeed at Nottston, there has been a 
reduction in the number of bargaining issues, because management have sought to 
exclude UDM branch officials from discussions relating to strategic planning. 
At Deamley and Mansthorpe collieries, by contrast, CUK was not under any 
statutory obligation to maintain the existing bargaining arrangements, as the 
provisions ofTUPE did not apply at these collieries. Collective bargaining rights 
have therefore been denied to the NUM at Deamley and to the UDM at Mansthorpe, 
and as a result there has been no increase in the significance of local bargaining. 
Both the NUM and the UDM, however, have been granted rights of representation at 
Deamley and Mansthorpe respectively. As a consequence of these developments, 
the NUM now has somewhat less influence in relation to the terms and conditions of 
those it represents at Deamley than was the case during the final decade of the 
nationalised era. The denial of bargaining rights has, in addition, also served to 
reduce the number of bargaining issues at Deamley. 
The position of the UDM at Mansthorpe at first appears to be somewhat different, 
because informal bargaining takes place between branch officials and colliery level 
management. The UDM branch is able to express opinions in relation to the terms 
and conditions of its members, therefore, but as such bargaining is both unofficial 
and proscribed by managerial prerogative, it is questionable whether the UDM is 
able to exert any meaningful influence over the terms and conditions of Mans thorpe 
employees. Furthermore, although informal bargaining has led to an increase in the 
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range of bargaining issues at the colliery, such negotiations are not sanctioned by 
corporate level management, and are therefore completely meaningless. The UDM 
branch at Mansthorpe, like its NUM counterpart at Dearnley then, has less influence 
in relation to the developing pattern of labour relations than was the case when the 
mine was publicly owned. 
Because CUK has de-recognised the NUM at colliery level throughout 
Nottinghamshire, both bargaining rights, and rights of representation have been 
denied to the NUM branches at Nottston and Mansthorpe. These branches then, 
have no influence over the terms and conditions of their members, and are unable to 
negotiate with management over any issue. Such developments, however, represent 
continuity rather than change, since collective bargaining rights were also denied to 
the NUM branches at Nottston and Mansthorpe during the final decade of public 
ownership. 
The bargaining arrangements at Workham colliery are considerably less 
complex than those at the collieries owned by CUK which were considered within 
this study, since the NUM and UDM branches have been denied both collective 
bargaining rights, and rights of representation by EM, reflecting the decision of the 
company to refuse recognition to all the trade unions. Because they are not able to 
negotiate on behalf of their members, neither the UDM nor the NUM branches have 
been able to exert any influence in relation to terms and conditions at Workham 
since privatisation. Moreover, because collective bargaining rights have been 
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Figure 9.4: Bargaining rights at colliery level 
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Figure 9.5: Changes in the level oftrade union influence at colliery level since privatisation. 
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denied, there has been a marked reduction in the range of bargaining issues coming 
within the jurisdiction of the UDM branch at the colliery. 
Parry, Waddington and Critcher have argued that trade union marginalisation 
is "most visible" within RJB Mining (Parry Waddington and Critcher, 1997: 192). 
This study however, has demonstrated that the greatest degree of marginalisation has 
been experienced by the trade union branches at Workham colliery, which is not 
owned by this company. The research conducted by Parry Waddington and Critcher 
was, like this research, comprised of a series of case studies. Workham was not one 
the collieries chosen for study by Parry Waddington and Critcher, however, and it is 
therefore unsurprising that their findings differ from those of this research. 
For the UDM, the developments in relation to bargaining rights at Workham 
represent a significant change, and indeed the UDM branch at the colliery has 
significantly less influence than was the case during the final decade of public 
ownership. Because the NUM branch at the colliery had been denied collective 
bargaining rights throughout the final decade of the nationalised era, however, the 
position of the NUM has not changed at Workham, and the branch continues to have 
no influence with respect of industrial relations developments at the colliery. 
AC and W A, unlike CUK and EM, have both granted full collective 
bargaining rights and rights of representation to all the trade unions which have been 
recognised at Abergoed and Cwmpridd respectively, but different outcomes have 
followed from this at each colliery. 
Chapter 9 
301 
At Cwmpridd, the restoration of collective bargaining has resulted in the 
NUM branch having considerably more influence in relation to the terms and 
conditions of those it represents than was the case during the final years of public 
ownership. Furthermore, a wider range of bargaining issues has come within the 
jurisdiction of the branch, because management now consult branch officials in 
relation to strategic planning, commercial issues and investment. The NUM branch 
at Abergoed meanwhile, has not experienced any increase in its ability to influence 
terms and conditions at the colliery despite the restoration of collective bargaining. 
There has moreover, been no significant increase in the range of issues discussed by 
management and NUM branch officials at Abergoed, although management does 
now inform the branch of commercial developments affecting the colliery. 
The different outcomes which have followed the re-establishment of 
collective bargaining at Cwmpridd and Abergoed can be largely explained by the 
differing emphasis placed upon the maintenance of managerial prerogatives by WA 
and AC respectively, since management within AC have accorded greater priority to 
this than their counterparts within W A, and have consequently been less willing to 
concede to trade union demands. The commercial situation faced by each company 
has also had implications for the bargaining power ofthe unions, however, and AC 
management have been prevented from making any significant concessions to the 
unions because the company is operating closer to the margins of profitability than 
WA. 
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It can thus be seen that there is a strong relationship between the 
effectiveness of the trade union branches at the collieries which were considered 
within this study, and the industrial relations strategies which were adopted by 
management at those collieries (Figure 9.6.). 
At Workham colliery, where managerial attitudes towards organised labour 
have been most hostile, and where neither trade union has been granted recognition, 
rights of representation, or collective bargaining rights, the UDM and NUM are both 
wholly ineffective, being unable to represent their members on either a collective or 
individual basis. The NUM is equally ineffective at Nottston and Mansthorpe, 
where management labour relations strategies have similarly been manifest in the 
denial of recognition, rights of representation and bargaining rights. 
At Deamley and Mansthorpe, where managerial attitudes towards the trade 
unions are only marginally less robust than at Workham, the NUM and UDM 
respectively, are only slightly more effective, for whilst they have been recognised 
and accorded rights of representation, and are thus able to represent their members 
on an individual basis, the denial of bargaining rights has prevented these branches 
from representing the collective interests of employees at these collieries. 
The NUM branches at Abergoed and Donborough, and the UDM branch at 
Nottston, are somewhat more effective than those branches considered above, since 
management at these collieries have adopted a less rigorous approach to the trade 
unions. As a consequence, in addition to being recognised and having been granted 
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Figure 9.6: Management industrial relations strategies and 
trade union effectiveness 
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rights of representation, the unions have also been accorded bargaining rights, and 
are consequently able to represent both the individual and collective interests of their 
members. 
The NUM branch at Cwmpridd, where management have adopted a 
sympathetic approach to organised labour, was the most effective of all the branches 
which were considered within this study. Having been recognised, and granted 
rights of representation and bargaining rights, this branch has, like its counterparts at 
Abergoed, Donborough and Nottston, been able to represent both the individual and 
collective interests of Cwmpridd employees. Unlike the recognised trade union 
branches at Abergoed, Donborough, and Nottston, however, the NUM branch at 
Cwmpridd has more influence in relation to the terms and conditions at the colliery 
than was the case during the final decade of public ownership. 
Institutions of collective bargaining 
Following privatisation, new institutions of collective bargaining have been 
established at each of the seven collieries which were considered within this study. 
Variations are nevertheless evident, both in terms of the extent of the institutional 
framework which has emerged at each mine, and in terms of the nature of those 
structures which have been established. 
Formal pay structures are in operation at each of the seven collieries. There 
is, however, significant variation in the character of the structures which have 
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emerged, reflecting both the operational strategies adopted at the different collieries, 
and the differing application of the provisions of TUPE. 
CUK does not operate a single, company wide pay structure, and because of 
this, significant differences are visible in the remunerative packages at the four 
collieries owned by the company which were considered by this research. The pay 
structure in operation at both Donborough and Nottston provides workers at those 
collieries with a basic wage plus a productivity bonus. Donborough and Nottston 
employees however, also continue to receive all those additional payments which 
were negotiated locally by British Coal and the mining unions prior to privatisation. 
Workers at Mansthorpe similarly receive a basic wage and productivity bonus, but 
employees no longer receive any locally agreed additional payments. Employees at 
Deamley colliery, like those at Donborough, Nottston and Mansthorpe, receive a 
basic wage, and a productivity bonus. However, the productivity bonus does not 
vary at the colliery, and wage levels at Deamley consequently do not fluctuate from 
week to week as is the case at Donborough, Nottston and Mansthorpe. Deamley 
employees moreover, like their counterparts at Mansthorpe, receive no locally 
agreed supplementary payments. 
Differences in the pay structures in operation at the collieries owned by CUK 
can be partially explained with reference to the provisions ofTUPE. Donborough 
and Nottston collieries, unlike Deamley and Mansthorpe, were subject to this 
legislation, and as a result, CUK was under a legal obligation to retain the existing 
British Coal pay structure at these collieries, in addition to all local agreements 
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relating to supplementary payments, which had been negotiated locally whilst these 
mines were publicly owned. Although some minor modifications have been made to 
the pay structure at Donborough and Nottston, fundamental change has not been 
introduced, and indeed such amendments have served only to simplify the grading 
system, and to reduce differentials. At Deamley and Mansthorpe, by contrast, CUK 
was under no obligation to retain the British Coal pay structure. The company has 
therefore amended the pay structure at these collieries, and has also withdrawn all 
additional payments. Differences in the production strategies which have been 
adopted at the four collieries have to be considered however, if differences relating 
to bonus payments are to be accounted for. CUK's operations at Donborough, 
Nottston and Mansthorpe have centred on maximising output, and as a consequence, 
bonus payments at these mines are linked to production levels. Deamley colliery, by 
contrast, is required to produce the same quantity of coal each week, and employees 
at this colliery therefore receive a non-variable production bonus. 
New pay structures have been established at Workham, Abergoed and 
Cwmpridd following privatisation, since none of these mines were subject to the 
provisions of TUPE, and EM, AC and W A respectively were therefore under no 
statutory obligation to maintain the arrangements which were established during the 
years of public ownership. 
The pay structure which was instituted at Workham colliery, following its 
acquisition by EM is nonetheless loosely based on the British Coal arrangements. 
Employees at the colliery continue to receive a basic wage and a productivity bonus, 
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as was the case when the mine was publicly owned, however, all additional 
allowances which were paid during the years of public ownership have been 
withdrawn. The pay structure currently in operation at Abergoed, by contrast, 
differs considerably from the arrangements which were in place under public 
ownership. The wages paid to Abergoed workers are influenced by the operation of 
the pool system, and consequently do not fluctuate on a weekly basis, although 
Abergoed employees do receive a monthly productivity bonus if output targets are 
consistently exceeded. The pay structure at Cwmpridd similarly differs somewhat 
from the British Coal arrangements, since the bonus system which was in operation 
during the years of public ownership has been abandoned, and Cwmpridd employees 
are now paid a flat weekly wage. 
An explanation for the new pay structures at Abergoed and Cwmpridd being 
different from the preceding British Coal arrangements, whilst the structure at 
Workham remains broadly the same, can arguably be found when the operational 
strategies of the three collieries are considered. Both AC and WA have abandoned 
the objective of maximising output, and as a result Abergoed is required to produce 
the same quantity of coal each week, whilst Cwmpridd operates on a just in time 
basis, and is therefore expected to produce sufficient coal to meet existing sales 
requirements only. It may therefore be the case that payment systems which do not 
include an incentive scheme, or where incentive payments make up only a small 
proportion of the total wage were considered to be more appropriate given such 
production strategies. At Workham, by contrast, it is possible that incentive 
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payments have been retained, because, as in the nationalised era, the operational 
strategy of this colliery has centred on increasing output. 
Disciplinary and grievance procedures have also been established at each of 
the seven collieries which were considered within this study, however, variations in 
the character of the structures which have emerged are again evident. 
Donborough, Deamley, Nottston and Mansthorpe are subject to the same 
disciplinary and grievance procedure, since CUK has introduced a company wide 
structure which applies at all the mines owned by the company. The disciplinary 
and grievance procedure which is currently operative at CUK collieries is based on 
the British Coal arrangements which were inherited by the company under the 
provisions ofTUPE. Amendments have been made to this mechanism however, and 
the right to appeal against managerial decisions, which existed throughout the years 
of public ownership, has been withdrawn. 
The disciplinary and grievance procedures which have emerged at Workham, 
Abergoed and Cwmpridd, are also based on the existing British Coal arrangements, 
although the owners of these mines were not required by law to retain the existing 
structures. The right to appeal against management decisions has, however, been 
withdrawn at Workham and Abergoed. At Cwmpridd, by contrast, the disciplinary 
and grievance procedure continues to incorporate such a facility. 
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The difference between the disciplinary and grievance procedure which has 
been established at Cwmpridd, and those arrangements which have been introduced 
at the other six collieries, arguably reflect the style of management which has 
emerged at the seven mines. A democratic management style has developed at 
Cwmpridd following privatisation, and because of this the disciplinary and 
grievance procedure at the colliery provides for employees to appeal against 
managerial decisions in relation to these matters. At the other collieries considered 
within this study, however, such procedures do not permit workforce challenges to 
management judgements, this being consistent with the unitary management style 
which has emerged at these mines. 
Whilst formal pay structures, and disciplinary and grievance procedures have 
been established at all seven collieries which were examined by this research, 
conciliation procedures have, to date, only been instituted at some of the mines 
which were studied. 
CUK inherited the existing British Coal conciliation scheme under the 
provisions ofTUPE. The company however, withdrew this scheme in 1996, and 
introduced new arrangements. The new conciliation scheme, is loosely based upon 
the British Coal conciliation scheme, but the current structure does not provide an 
automatic right to independent arbitration. There is, however, provision for disputes 
to be referred to an independent body, given the agreement of CUK's Chief 
Executive and the National President of the UDM. The new conciliation scheme is 
not a company wide procedure, for whilst Donborough, Nottston and Mansthorpe, 
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are subject to the new scheme, this procedure has not been introduced at Deamley, 
and therefore no formal mechanism exists at this mine for the resolution of disputes. 
It could be argued that CUK has declined to extend the conciliation scheme 
to Deamley, because collective bargaining rights have been denied to the trade 
unions at this colliery, but the company has introduced conciliation arrangements at 
Mansthorpe, where bargaining rights have also been refused. This apparent 
inconsistency reflects the contingency approach to industrial relations which has 
been adopted by CUK at corporate level, however, since the absence of a 
conciliation scheme at Deamley further facilitates the marginalisation of the NUM at 
the colliery, whilst the existence of conciliation arrangements at Mansthorpe is 
virtually meaningless given that the unions have no bargaining rights at the mine. 
A conciliation scheme has also been instituted at Cwmpridd colliery. This 
procedure, like the one adopted by CUK, is based on the existing British Coal 
arrangements, although unlike the CUK scheme, the W A procedure provides for 
automatic access to independent arbitration. 
The differences between the conciliation scheme which has been established 
by W A at Cwmpridd, and that introduced at Donborough, Nottston and Mansthorpe 
by CUK can to some extent, be attributed to the style of management which has 
emerged at these collieries following privatisation. The conciliation scheme 
currently in operation at Cwmpridd provides for automatic independent arbitration 
in the event of unresolved disputes, arguably because a democratic management 
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style has developed at this colliery. Access to independent arbitration is, by 
contrast, restricted at Donborough, Nottston and Mansthorpe, this being consistent 
with the unitary style of management which has been adopted at these collieries. 
Conciliation schemes have not been established at Workham or Abergoed, 
but as the disciplinary and grievance procedure at Abergoed applies to both 
collective and individual disputes, a mechanism does exist for the resolution of 
disputes at this mine. At Workham, by contrast, no mechanism exists for the 
resolution of disputes. The absence of a conciliation scheme at Workham arguably 
reflects the fact that bargaining rights have not been granted to the trade unions at 
this colliery, and indeed, all disputes between management and employees are now 
resolved on an ad hoc basis. 
It can thus be seen that the institutional framework to support collective 
bargaining is highly developed at Cwmpridd, Donborough, Nottston and 
Mansthorpe, with formal pay structures, disciplinary and grievance procedures and 
conciliation schemes having been established at each of these mines. The 
framework is less developed at Abergoed, Deamley and Workham, however, 
because no conciliation scheme exists at any of these collieries, although pay 
structures and disciplinary procedures have been instituted. It would appear then, 
that the extent to which the institutional framework to support bargaining has 
developed at individual collieries, to some extent reflects the bargaining rights 
which have been accorded to the unions at those mines, since institutional structures 
are more highly developed at collieries where collective bargaining has been 
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established, than at those where bargaining rights have been denied to the trade 
unions. Two exceptions to this emergent pattern are, however, provided by the cases 
of Abergoed and Mansthorpe. 
In addition to the differences which are evident in relation to the institutional 
frameworks to support collective bargaining which have emerged at the collieries 
considered by this study, the level of trade union involvement in the development of 
those institutional structures has also varied significantly. 
All the trade unions which organise at Cwmpridd were involved in the 
development of the new institutions of collective bargaining which were introduced 
at the colliery following privatisation, and the new structures which have emerged at 
this colliery consequently constitute collective agreements. The institutions which 
have emerged at Abergoed and Workham, were, by contrast, developed without any 
trade union involvement. None of the structures in place at these collieries 
constitute collective agreements therefore, and indeed all were imposed upon the 
workforce at these mines. 
At the collieries owned by CUK, a more complex pattern of trade union 
involvement is apparent. The institutions of collective bargaining which are 
currently in force at the collieries owned by the company were, with the exception of 
the pay structures at Dearnley and Mansthorpe, jointly negotiated by senior CUK 
managers and national officials of the UDM. The NUM, however, was excluded 
from these negotiations, and consequently had no input into the development of the 
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new institutional framework. The new institutions therefore represent collective 
agreements at Nottston and Mansthorpe, since these mines are organised by the 
UDM. At the NUM strongholds of Donborough and Deamley, however, the new 
institutional structures cannot be regarded as collective agreements, and indeed these 
arrangements were imposed upon the workforce at these collieries. 
The pay structures currently in operation at Deamley and Mansthorpe were, 
unlike the other institutional arrangements which have been introduced at CUK 
collieries, developed by CUK management without trade union involvement, and 
were imposed on CUK employees at these collieries. The pay structures at these 
collieries do not therefore constitute collective agreements. 
The involvement of the unions in the development of new institutions of 
collective bargaining has to some extent reflected management industrial relations 
strategies. Thus the trade unions have had more involvement in the development of 
institutional structures at those collieries where management have adopted an 
accommodative approach towards organised labour, than at those mines where 
managerial attitudes towards the trade unions have been more robust. The role of 
the unions in relation to the development of those structures which have been 
introduced at collieries owned by CUK has, moreover, reflected CUK's objective of 
maintaining dual unionism within the company. 
The institutions of collective bargaining which have emerged at each of the 
seven collieries which were considered by this research, apply only to those 
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members of the workforce that are directly employed. The employees of contracting 
companies, are, by contrast, not subject to the new arrangements at any mine, and 
indeed, all the contracting companies which were examined had separate procedural 
arrangements. This is significant, since it is indicative that a dual system of 
industrial relations has begun to emerge at every colliery within this study where 
contractors have been employed. 
Informal bargaining between junior management and members of the 
workforce which has no trade union involvement continues to be a feature of 
industrial relations at Donborough, Mansthorpe, Workham, Abergoed and 
Cwmpridd. At Dearnley, by contrast, informal agreements are rare, whilst at 
Nottston, informal bargaining has been completely phased out. Whilst the 
significance of informal bargaining varies from colliery to colliery, management 
initiatives to restrict the extent of informal bargaining have nevertheless taken place 
at every mine considered within this study, and indeed, at all seven mines, informal 
agreements are less significant than was the case during the years of public 
ownership. 
The labour process 
There has been no significant change in the strategies governing productive 
operations at Donborough, Nottston, Mansthorpe and Workham following 
privatisation, and at each of these collieries, the same emphasis is placed on 
increasing production as was the case during the years of public ownership. At 
Abergoed, Cwmpridd and Dearnley, by contrast, privatisation has been accompanied 
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by marked changes in operational policy. Maximising output is no longer an 
objective of productive operations at these collieries, and instead production levels 
are strictly limited. Different factors have lead to the adoption of operational 
strategies based on restricted output in the case of each colliery however. 
At Cwmpridd, strategic planning since privatisation has focused upon the 
controlled depletion of reserves, and the protection of existing employment levels at 
the colliery. Because of this, marketing and production are closely integrated at the 
mine, which is expected to produce sufficient coal to meet existing sales 
requirements only. Output is restricted at Cwmpridd then, because the colliery 
currently operates on a just in time, rather than just in case basis, as it had during the 
years of public ownership. At Abergoed, however, production levels under the 
current regime have been limited as a consequence of the abandonment of machine 
got long wall mining techniques, and indeed operational policy at the colliery since 
privatisation has centred upon maintaining aggregate production at a stable level. At 
Deamley, by contrast, output levels have been restricted as a result of budgetary 
constraints. 
The adoption of innovative production strategies at some of the collieries 
considered by this study is significant, since it points to the emergence of flexible 
specialisation (discussed in chapter three) within the coal industry, especially since 
Cwmpridd and Abergoed collieries also produce coal for niche, rather than mass 
markets. The majority of the collieries examined by this research, however, 
continue to produce coal for the mass market represented by the electricity supply 
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industry, this being indicative that Fordism remains the dominant mode of 
production within the industry. 
Although differences are evident in the operational strategies which have 
been adopted at the collieries which were considered within this study, initiatives to 
increase productivity have nevertheless been adopted at all seven mines. 
Significantly, less emphasis has been placed upon improving productivity at 
Cwmpridd, than at the other collieries which were examined. This difference can, 
however, be explained with reference to the form of ownership which has emerged 
at Cwmpridd. Management at the colliery, being former trade union officials, 
recognise the negative health and safety implications of raising productivity through 
work intensification. Management at Cwmpridd, moreover, unlike at the other 
mines, acknowledge that work intensification contributed to productivity 
improvements during the final years of public ownership, and that there was 
consequently limited scope for further productivity increases at the colliery. 
Management at Donborough, Deamley, Nottston, Mansthorpe, Workham 
and Cwmpridd have not sought to increase productivity with the introduction of 
advanced technology. This is because all six mines had been the subject oflarge 
scale technological investment when they were publicly owned, and therefore the 
potential for generating productivity improvements through further technological 
investment has been minimal. Management at Abergoed have similarly not 
endeavoured to secure productivity improvements with the application of new 
technology. Indeed, at this colliery, machine got long wall mining techniques have 
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been replaced by hand got short wall methods. At all seven mines then, initiatives to 
improve productivity have centred on the introduction, or extension of, flexible 
working practices. 
Functional flexibility has been adopted to some degree at all the collieries 
considered by this study. Co-operation between workers has been a feature of 
operations within the mining industry for many years, and at Cwmpridd, the 
introduction of multi-skilling has merely served to formalise this tradition. At the 
other six collieries however, job demarcations have been further reduced since 
privatisation, with significant implications for the labour process. 
At Donborough, Nottston, and Workham, functional flexibility has been 
utilised by CUK and EM respectively in order to facilitate labour reductions. 
Productivity improvements have thus been secured through the intensification of 
work, since the remaining employees at these mines have been expected to carry out 
the same amount of work as was previously completed by a larger number of 
employees. The introduction of functional flexibility at Deamley, Mansthorpe and 
Abergoed, has, by contrast, not resulted in reductions in staffing levels. It has 
nevertheless contributed to the intensification of work at these collieries, by 
facilitating reductions in the porosity of the mineworkers' working day. 
Although the introduction of functional flexibility has had negative 
implications for the workforce at Donborough, Deamley, Nottston, Mansthorpe, 
Abergoed and Workham, because it has contributed to the intensification of work, 
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there is no evidence that multi-skilling has been resisted by employees at any of 
these collieries. Indeed, at Donborough and Mansthorpe, functional flexibility has 
been actively embraced by members of the workforce. This is because Donborough 
and Mansthorpe employees believe that the productivity improvements generated by 
flexible working will render the long term future of these mines less uncertain. 
Mineworkers at the two collieries have also arguably adopted functional flexibility 
as a strategic response to the uncertainty within the industry, since they regard the 
acquisition of additional skills as a means to improve their employment prospects in 
the event of future colliery closures. 
Temporal flexibility is a significant feature of operations at Donborough, 
Nottston, Mansthorpe, and Workham, where it is primarily manifest in overtime 
working. At three of these mines, Donborough, Nottston and Workham, a 
relationship between the introduction of temporal flexibility and reductions in labour 
requirements is evident, since members of the workforce at these mines have been 
expected to work additional hours in order to compensate for staff shortages. At 
Workham, moreover, temporal flexibility has also been utilised in order to increase 
machine availability time. At Abergoed, by contrast, temporal flexibility in the form 
of extended shifts, is associated with the operation of the pool system, and has not 
been utilised in order to facilitate reductions in staffing levels. 
Workers at all the collieries considered by this study are contractually 
obliged to work overtime on request, and on some occasions, employees at 
Donborough, Nottston, Workham and Abergoed have been coerced into working 
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excessive hours. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that temporal flexibility 
has been resisted at any of the collieries where it has been introduced, and indeed 
many workers at these mines voluntarily work additional hours. 
The apparent acceptance of temporal flexibility at Donborough, Nottston, 
Mansthorpe, Workham and Abergoed can be explained by a number of factors, 
although many of these are colliery specific. At Donborough and Nottston, where 
the existing redundancy arrangements have been protected under the TUPE 
regulations, overtime working is primarily motivated by the need to maximise 
earnings in order to qualify for the maximum redundancy payment, should these 
collieries close in the future. At Workham, by contrast, overtime working appears to 
be the consequence of low pay. Employees at every colliery where temporal 
flexibility has been introduced have, however, arguably also been influenced by the 
uncertainty which has continued to characterise the industry, and have thus opted to 
work additional hours in order to maximise their earnings in advance of any future 
downsizing. 
Temporal flexibility has not been introduced at either Cwmpridd or 
Dearnley, because this has not been necessitated by operational requirements. 
Cwmpridd and Dearnley both operate on the basis of restricted output, and the 
production targets at both mines can be met within the normal working week. 
Productive operations at the two collieries are therefore not reliant on overtime 
working. 
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Numerical flexibility is an important feature of operations at Donborough, 
Workham and Cwmpridd, where between 20 and 40 per cent of the workforce are 
employed by one of a number of contracting companies. Numerical flexibility has 
also been adopted at Deamley, Nottston and Abergoed to a lesser extent, but at 
Mansthorpe, all the workforce is directly employed. The functions of the 
contracting companies are strictly limited at every colliery where work has been 
outsourced, and there are no plans to extend the use of contractors at any of the 
collieries that were surveyed. 
There is evidence to suggest that RJB Mining is seeking to reduce its 
dependence on outsourcing. This is not because the company has sought to 
incorporate contract workers within it's own contracting company, as Parry, 
Waddington and Cricher (1997: 185) have suggested, but rather, because it is 
considerably cheaper for the company to dispense with contract workers, as Wallis, 
Winterton and Winterton have found, since contract employees, unlike members of 
the directly employed workforce, are not protected by the provisions of TUPE, and 
are consequently not entitled to the relatively generous redundancy payments which 
continue to be available to their directly employed counterparts under the terms of 
this legislation (Wallis, Winterton and Winterton 1998: 44). 
There have been few changes in the labour process at Donborough, Deamley, 
Nottston, Mansthorpe, Workham or Cwmpridd then, other than the introduction of 
measures designed to improve productivity by way of the intensification of work. 
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Corporate level management within CUK, whilst endorsing the introduction of 
flexible working, have nevertheless endeavoured to place the same emphasis on 
health and safety as was the case during the years of public ownership. There is, 
however, evidence to suggest that management at colliery level have failed to 
acknowledge the health and safety implications of work intensification, and that this 
has had a negative effect with respect of safety standards at a number of the 
collieries owned by the company which were considered within this study. 
Management at Workham have similarly overlooked the health and safety issues 
associated with work intensification. Moreover, as management at the colliery have 
also accorded a greater priority to increasing productivity than to health and safety 
since privatisation, safety standards at Workham have been compromised to an even 
greater extent than at those collieries owned by CUK. 
Only at Cwmpridd has the current managerial regime placed more emphasis 
on health and safety than was the case during the years of public ownership. As 
mentioned earlier, management at this colliery have also recognised the negative 
health and safety implications of work intensification, and indeed, largely because of 
these considerations, the adoption of flexible working practices has been limited. 
Safety standards have therefore not been compromised at Cwmpridd as a result of 
changes within the labour process. 
The labour process at Abergoed, has, unlike that at the other six mines which 
were considered, undergone a radical transformation since privatisation, because the 
machine got long wall mining techniques which were employed throughout the 
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years of public ownership, have been replaced by hand got short wall methods. 
Management at the colliery have nonetheless continued to accord the same priority 
to health and safety issues as was the case when the mine was publicly owned, and 
safety standards have largely been maintained. The adoption of unmechanised 
mining has however had a number of negative implications for the health and safety 
of personnel employed at the coalface. 
Although atypical, the changes within the labour process at Abergoed are 
nevertheless more significant than those experienced by the other six collieries 
which were considered within this study, since they challenge existing assumptions 
about the direction of technological change within coal mining (Winterton, 1994). 
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By analysing management industrial relations strategies, and the role played by the 
trade unions, alongside the development of institutional bargaining structures, and 
changes within the labour process at a number of British collieries, this study has 
attempted to describe and account for the patterns of industrial relations which have 
developed within the coal industry following privatisation. 
A consideration of industrial relations during the years of public ownership 
enabled two distinct phases to be identified. Between the years 1947 and 1984, 
industrial relations were both pluralistic and highly regulated. Although the industry 
was relatively strike prone during this period, relationships between management 
and the trade unions at national level were based upon co-operation rather than 
confrontation, and the trade unions operated from a relatively strong bargaining 
position. During the period 1984 to 94 however, industrial relations were 
comprehensively reconstructed in order to facilitate the restructuring of the industry 
which was necessitated both by pressures within the global product market, and the 
objective of privatisation. During these years management within the industry 
adopted a unitary approach to labour relations, and managerial prerogatives were 
vigorously reasserted. The NUM adopted a confrontational response to these 
developments, and labour relations within the industry were characterised by bitter 
conflict as a consequence. This study has therefore attempted to assess whether the 
patterns oflabour relations which have emerged following the privatisation of the 
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industry in 1994 have had more in common with those patterns established during 
the period 1947 to 1984, or with the patterns which were characteristic of the final 
decade of the nationalised era. In so doing, the research has also sought to ascertain 
whether industrial relations developments since privatisation have had positive or 
negative implications for organised labour within the industry. 
The privatisation of the coal industry was part of a wider privatisation 
programme which was undertaken by successive Conservative governments during 
the 1980s and early 1990s in order to facilitate the restructuring of the UK economy. 
An examination of the other concerns which were privatised during these years, 
found that their transition from publicly owned corporations to private sector 
enterprises was marked by continuity and change within the sphere of labour 
relations. It was therefore anticipated that continuity and change would emerge as a 
major theme of industrial relations within the privati sed coal industry also. 
One of the major findings of this study is that privatisation has precipitated 
sweeping changes in the patterns of labour relations at industry level. Because 
privatisation has resulted in the fragmentation of the industry, it has led to the 
collapse of national bargaining. As a consequence of these developments 
considerable variation is now evident between the companies which which now 
operate within the industry in terms of the emergent patterns oflabour relations. 
Furthermore, the legal framework surrounding privatisation has led to the 
development of intra company variations in patterns of industrial relations. 
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The model outlined towards the end of Chapter Three anticipated that 
industrial relations at colliery level would be influenced by two major variables; 
these being firstly, the labour relations strategies adopted by management, and 
secondly, the responses of the various mining unions to those strategies. The model 
also expected that continuity with the patterns of industrial relations established 
during the last decade of public ownership would be most likely to occur at collieries 
where management had continued to favour a unitary approach towards labour 
relations matters, and where the trade unions had adopted a confrontational response 
to such strategies. By contrast, the model anticipated that change would be manifest 
at collieries where management and the trade unions both adopted a conciliatory 
approach to labour relations issues, and that the emergent pattern of labour relations 
at such mines would be more reminiscent of the period 1947 to 1984, than of the 
final decade of public ownership. 
The empirical findings of this study have, however, revealed that this model 
is inadequate as an heuristic device designed to illuminate the dynamics of industrial 
relations within the privatised coal industry. This is because the response of the 
trade unions to management industrial relations strategies did not emerge as a 
significant variable. Although the NUM and UDM have adopted differing responses 
to management industrial relations strategies at national level, this is not the case at 
colliery level, and there is little discernible difference in the responses ofNUM and 
UDM branches to the labour relations policies introduced by management within the 
new coal enterprises. All the trade union branches considered in this study have 
sought to accommodate corporate objectives, and no branch has attempted 
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significantly to challenge the industrial relations policies which have been adopted 
by management. 
The industrial relations strategies adopted by management within the new 
coal companies then, have had a determining effect on the patterns of labour 
relations which have developed at the collieries which were studied. Continuity 
with the patterns of industrial relations which characterised the period 1984 to 1994 
are thus apparent at Donborough, Nottston and Abergoed collieries, because at these 
mines, management has favoured the industrial relations strategies adopted by 
British Coal during the final decade of public ownership. Changes in the prevailing 
patterns o flab our relations are, by contrast, evident at Workham, Dearnley, 
Mansthorpe and Cwmpridd. This is because different industrial relations strategies 
to those favoured by British Coal between 1984 and 1994 have been adopted by 
management at each of these collieries. 
The industrial relations strategies which have been adopted by management 
within the new coal companies have themselves been influenced by the form of 
ownership to have emerged within those companies, by the legal framework within 
which those companies operate, and also by the personalities of key management 
actors (Figure 10.1.). The relative importance of these factors has varied between 
the new coal enterprises however, and differing patterns of industrial relations have 
emerged at the collieries which were studied as a consequence. This variation is 
indicative of the view that management at each of the collieries which were 
considered has adopted a contingency approach to labour relations. 
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Although all the trade union branches considered in this study have been 
prepared to lend support to corporate objectives, the industrial relations policies 
introduced by management within the new coal enterprises have nevertheless had a 
significant influence upon the role of the trade unions at the seven collieries which 
were surveyed. This is because these strategies have had a profound effect upon the 
ability of the trade union branches to influence industrial relations developments at 
these mines. 
At six of the seven collieries considered by this research, the local trade 
union branches have been unable to exert any significant influence over the 
development of industrial relations following privatisation. In the case of the NUM 
branches at Workham, Nottston, Mansthorpe and Deamley, and the UDM branches 
at Workham and Mansthorpe this is because management strategies have resulted in 
bargaining rights being denied to these organisations, and their ability to respond 
effectively to those strategies has therefore been constrained. At Donborough, 
Abergoed, and Nottston by contrast, the responses of the NUM and UDM branches, 
respectively, to management strategies, have not been limited by the denial of 
bargaining rights, but rather by the emphasis placed upon the maintenance of 
managerial prerogatives by management at these collieries. 
At Cwmpridd colliery by contrast, the local trade union branches have had a 
significant influence over the development of industrial relations following 
privatisation. That this has been the case can nevertheless be attributed to the labour 
relations strategies adopted by management. Management at Cwmpridd have 
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adopted an accommodative approach to the trade unions at the mine, have granted 
these organisations full bargaining rights, and have placed considerably less 
emphasis on the maintenance of managerial prerogatives than was the case during 
the final decade of public ownership. In adopting such strategies then, management 
at Cwmpridd have sought to facilitate, rather than constrain, the ability of the trade 
unions to influence labour relations developments at the colliery. 
Because the industrial relations strategies adopted by management have had 
a such a profound effect on the ability of the trade unions to influence developments 
within the sphere of labour relations at the seven collieries that were studied, 
management has had significantly more influence than the trade unions over both the 
nature and extent of the institutions of collective bargaining that have emerged at all 
these but one of these mines. Similarly, management has had more influence than 
the trade unions with respect to developments within the labour process at six of the 
seven the collieries which were considered (Figure 10.1.). 
Parry, Waddington and Critcher (1997), have suggested that RJB Mining is 
more vulnerable to trade union sanctions than the smaller coal companies which 
emerged during the privatisation process. The empirical findings of this research do 
not support their argument however. The workforce within RJB continues to be 
fragmented as a result of the industrial relation strategies adopted by corporate level 
management, and whilst NUM national officials have continued to endorse the use 
of sanctions against RJB, such a strategy has, unsurprisingly, not been adopted by 
their UDM counterparts. A significant proportion of the RJB workforce, 
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moreover, belongs to neither union, and as such would not be involved in any action 
taken by the mining unions. When it is also considered that a significant number of 
workers at RJB collieries are employed by one of a number of contracting 
companies rather than by RJB, it is clear that any trade union sanctions affecting the 
company would involve only a minority of the workforce, and would therefore be 
unlikely to be effective. 
Of equal importance however, given that local bargaining has assumed a 
greater significance within RJB following privatisation, the use of trade union 
sanctions is simply not an issue at colliery level. This is partly because NOM and 
UDM branch officials alike are aware that such sanctions could seriously damage 
the company, and could thus jeopardise many hundreds of jobs. Branch officials 
from both unions are, however, also aware that disputes with the company would 
arise from local rather than national issues, and that localised industrial action could, 
given the continued uncertainty facing the industry, be used by corporate level 
management to justify the closure ofthe effected collieries. 
Although trade union sanctions in the form of a short-lived ban on weekend 
work was endorsed by branch officials at one of the RJB collieries which was 
considered by this study, this was in pursuit of economistic objectives, and did not 
represent a challenge to management industrial relations strategies. Indeed, none of 
the trade union branches at the collieries owned by RJB which were examined in this 
study have initiated any challenge to the labour relations strategies adopted by 
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Figure 10.1: An heuristic model of the dynamics of industrial relations in the privatised coal industry 
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management at those mines. Industrial action has taken place at Workham colliery 
in relation to such issues, but this was manifest in spontaneous unofficial strike 
action rather than in officially sanctioned disputes. The fact that such developments 
have taken place at Workham, however, suggests that it is the smaller companies, 
rather than RJB, that are likely to be the most vulnerable to trade union sanctions, 
since Workham is not owned by RJB. 
The position of capital was strengthened relative to that of labour during the 
final decade of public ownership, and because of this, one of the hypotheses 
advanced towards the end of Chapter Three anticipated that continuity with the 
patterns oflabour relations established during the period 1984 to 1994 would have 
negative implications for the trade unions that operate within the industry. This 
hypothesis has been largely supported by the research findings, since the local trade 
union branches continue to be marginalised at Donborough, Nottston and Abergoed 
collieries, where management have continued to favour the unitary approach to 
industrial relations adopted unilatrally by British Coal during the final decade of 
public ownership. Furthermore, dual unionism continues to be a significant feature 
of labour relations within CUK, the company whose corporate level industrial 
relations strategies exhibit the most continuity with those developed by British Coal 
between 1984 and 1994. 
The alternative hypothesis outlined in Chapter Three, by contrast, suggested 
that change within the sphere of industrial relations at colliery level would bring 
benefits for the trade unions. This is because it was expected that change would 
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result in the abandonment of the unitary approach to industrial relations adopted by 
British Coal between 1984 and 1994, and in the return of pluralism which was 
characteristic of the period 1947 to 1984. The empirical findings have not supported 
this hypothesis, however, and have instead revealed that changes in the patterns of 
industrial relations emerging since privatisation are more complex than was initially 
anticipated. Firstly, change has firstly been multi-directional rather than uni-
directional (Figure 10.2.). Secondly, the context of change has determined whether 
such developments have been beneficial or disadvantageous for the trade unions. 
Thus at Cwmpridd colliery, change has had favourable implications, because this 
has resulted in the emergence of co-determination and in an increase in trade union 
influence. At Dearnley, Mansthorpe and Workham collieries by contrast, change 
has had negative implications for the trade unions, this is because change has been 
manifest both in the de-collectivisation of industrial relations, and in a reduction of 
the influence of the trade unions which operate at these mines, compared with the 
final decade of public ownership. 
It is, then, possible to conclude that privatisation has had negative 
implications for organised labour within the coal industry, except at Cwmpridd 
colliery, since the trade unions continue to be largely ineffective at colliery level, 
and, in the case of CUK and EM, at corporate level also. It must be remembered 
however, that the position of the trade unions was systematically weakened during 
the final decade of public ownership, and for this reason, the industrial relations 
strategies adopted by management within the new coal enterprises can, with the 
exception of those introduced by WA at Cwmpridd colliery, be said to be 
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Figure 10.2: Industrial relations in the privatised coal industry - continuity and change 
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saprophytic upon the strategies implemented by British Coal between 1984 and 
1994. 
Like all research, this study has been the subject of a number of limitations, 
and it would be ambitious to regard this as the definitive study of industrial relations 
within the privati sed coal industry. The twin constraints of time and resources 
necessitated that a relatively small number of collieries were selected for study. As a 
consequence, no collieries were chosen in order to facilitate literal replication, and 
collieries belonging to only 75 per cent of the coal companies currently operating 
within the UK were included in the study. A more complete study might therefore 
have included more collieries, and might have involved all the coal companies with 
operations in the UK. Indeed, given the small size of the privati sed industry, and the 
greater availability of time and resources, future research into labour relations within 
the coal industry might involve a consideration of developments at every UK 
colliery. At the same time, the timing of the research in the early aftermath of 
privatisation, provided a unique window of opportunity to assess the changes taking 
place. 
In addition to the shortcomings described above, it could also be argued that 
this study suffers from a methodological weakness. Problems relating to access 
necessitated the adoption of a methodological approach which was slightly 
unorthodox. This was manifest in the fact that three of the case studies contained 
within this research analysed industrial relations developments at individual 
collieries, whilst the fourth case study examined labour relations developments at an 
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additional four collieries within the wider context of a corporate level analysis. 
Access problems also prevented identical research instruments being utilised at each 
of the collieries which were studied. It is likely that any research into industrial 
relations within the coal industry would encounter problems relating to access. A 
superior study might nevertheless have anticipated the access problems likely to be 
encountered by such research, and a methodological approach might have been 
developed which took such factors into consideration. 
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Appendix A 
Pages 336-342 are a reproduction of the interview schedule used for data collection 
with management representatives. 
Interview Schedule. 
Management Representatives. 
Introduction / Labour process. 
1. How many men does your company employ? 
(How many on this site)? 
2. What sort of employment contracts do your employees have? 
(What proportion of the workforce are employed on each type of contract?) 
3. What proportion of the men on short term contracts usually re-employed? 
(If not, on what basis?) 
4. What proportion of men are finished before their contracts have expired? 
(If yes, on what basis?) 
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5. How many hours a week (excluding overtime) do your employees normally work? 
(And how many days per week?) 
6. How much overtime does the average employee normally work each week? 
7. Is oVeIiime working a contractual obligation? 
8. Has flexible working been introduced by your company? 
(e.g. combining production and maintenence / electrical and mechanical functions?) 
9. What sort of job demarcations exist at this colliery? 
(Has your company sought to reduce job demarcations?) 
10. Can you outline any steps that your company has taken to improve 
productivity? 
11. What are the arrangements for the supervision of your employees? 
12. Can you give me some details about your company's health and safety policies? 
Management strategies. 
13. Does your company recognise all the trade unions which operate in the industry? 
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IF ALL UNIONS RECOGNISED GO TO QUESTION 15 AND OMIT 
QUESTION 26 
IF SELECTIVE DE-RECOGNITION HAS TAKEN PLACE GO TO 
QUESTION 14, AND OMIT QUESTIONS 18 AND 26 
IF NONE OF THE UNIONS ARE RECOGNISED GO TO QUESTION 26. 
14. Why did you recognise the NUM I UDM I NACODS, but not the NUM I UDM 
INACODS? 
15. Do you encourage your employees to join the union or unions that you have 
recognised? (Why I why not?) 
16. Have you considered the possibility of I taken steps towards signing a single 
union agreement with the NUM I UDM I NACODS? 
(How far has this gone?) 
17. What form does recognition take? 
(Bargaining rights, or rights of representation only?) 
18. Omit if selective de- recognition is evident, or if no unions are recognised. 
Does your company prefer to deal with any particular union? 
(Which one, Why?) 
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19. Does your company provide any facilities for the trade unions e.g. offices? 
20. Does your company allow trade union officials time off for union duties? 
21. How are decisions made about the day today running of the pit? 
(Are the unions involved in this?) 
22. How are strategic decisions about the long term future of the pit made? 
(Are the unions involved in this?) 
23. Does your company communicate individually with members of the workforce, 
e.g. with letters sent to their homes / newsheets / teletext messages on the pit top 
etc? 
24. Does your company prefer to recruit labour locally or from further afield? 
25. What role would your company like the trade unions to play at this colliery? 
26. Omit if any unions recognised. 
What factors influenced your company's decision not to recognise the unions? 
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Union responses! roles. 
27. Now that the coal industry has been restructured, is there a greater emphasis on 
local agreements? 
28. Has there been any change in the range of issues discussed with local trade 
union representatives since privatisation? (Examples oflocal agreements! 
changes). 
29. How much influence would you say that local trade union branches have over 
managerial decisions compared with during the years of public ownership? 
30. How often does your company meet with national! area union officials? 
31. Does your company prefer to deal with local trade union representatives or 
national! area officials? (Why one or the other?) 
32. Are there differences between the unions in the way in which they respond to 
managerial decisions! corporate strategy? 
33. Do you, as colliery manager! site manager have the ultimate say on HRM 
policies at this pit or is there an overarching company policy on this issue? 
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34. Do you think that privatisation has affected the environment in which contact 
betweeen management and the unions takes place? 
Institutions of collective bargaining. 
35. Can you tell me how the provisions ofTUPE have applied at this pit? 
36. Can you tell me about the pay structure your company operates at this pit? 
37. How was this established? 
38. Can you tell me about the disputes procedure your company operates at this pit? 
39. How was this established? 
40. Can you tell me about the disciplinary / grievance procedure your company 
operates at this pit? 
41. How was this established? 
If no formal structures exist, how is pay determined, and how are disputes and 
disciplinary / grievance matters resolved? 
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42. Have any company wide / industry wide agreements been negotiated jointly by 
your company and the unions since privatisation? 
43. How important are informal agreements between management and the men 
which have no union involvement? 
44. Has your company introduced performance related pay? (If yes, in what form?) 
45. Are any of your employees engaged on individual contracts? 
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Appendix B 
Pages 343-349 are a reproduction of the interview schedule used for data collection 
with trade union representatives. 
Interview Schedule. 
Trade Union Representatives. 
Introduction / Labour Process. 
1. What sort of employment contracts do your members have? 
(What proportion of the workforce is on each type of contract?) 
2. What proportion of the workforce on short term contracts is usually re-
employed? 
(On what basis does management decide who to re-employ?) 
3. What proportion of the workforce is finished before their contracts expire? 
(On what basis does management decide to finish men?) 
4. Do the different companies on site offer standardised terms and conditions of 
work e.g. pay / hours? 
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5. How many hours a week (excluding overtime) do your members usually work? 
(How many days per week?) 
6. How many hours overtime does the average worker normally complete each 
week? 
7. Is overtime working a contractual obligation? 
8. What job demarcations exist at this colliery? 
(Has there been any erosion injob demarcations since this colliery was 
privati sed?) 
9. What steps have management taken to improve productivity at the mine? 
10. Do you think there has been any change in the pace of work at this pit since 
privatisation ? 
11. Has there been any change in the way that miners are supervised at this pit since 
privatisation? (Examples) 
12. Do you think that there has been any change in health and safety standards at 
this pit since privatisation? (Examples) 
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Management Strategies. 
13. Do all the companies on site recognise the NUM / UDM / NACODS ? 
IF RECOGNITION GRANTED GO TO QUESTION 14, AND OMIT 
QUESTIONS 25 TO 29 
IF RECOGNITION REFUSED OMIT QUESTION 14 
14. Omit if recognition refused. 
What form does this recognition take? 
15. How would you describe the general attitude of management to the NUM / 
UDM / NACODS? 
16. Do any of the companies on site provide facilities for the union e.g. offices? 
17. Are Branch Officials allowed time of for union work? 
18. Is the NUM / UDM / NACODS consulted about the day to day running of the 
pit? 
19. Is the NUM / UDM / NACODS involved in strategic decision making about the 
long term future of this pit? 
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20. Do any of the companies on site prefer to deal with another union other than the 
NUM I UDM I NACODS ? (Which one I Why?) 
21. Do any of the companies on site seek to recruit labour with a particular trade 
union background? 
22. Does management at this pit communicate individually with the men, e.g. with 
letters sent to their homes I colliery I company newsheets etc? 
23. Does the NUM I UDM I NACODS have check off facilities at this colliery? 
24. How many members do you have at this colliery? 
Omit questions 25 to 29 if recognition granted. 
25. Do you still organise in companies where recognition has been refused? 
26. How successful has this been? 
27. Do any of the companies that have refused to recognise the NOM I UDM I 
NACODS recognise any other union (Which one, Why?) 
28. Do the companies which have refused to recognise the NUM I UDM I 
NACODS prefer to employ men with a particular trade union background? 
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29. What attempts have been made by the NUM / UDM / NACODS to gain 
recognition from the companies which have so far refused to recognise them? 
Union Responses / Role. 
30. At which level does contact between management representatives and trade 
union representatives most commonly take place? 
31. Do you think that the companies operating at this pit prefer to deal with local 
trade union officials or with national/area officials? 
32. Has there been any change in the range of issues dealt with by the NUM / UDM 
/ NACODS at this pit since privatisation? 
33. Has there been any change in the amount of influence that the NUM / UDM / 
NACODS has over managerial decisions at this pit since privatisation? (Or 
since 1984, or both?) 
34. Which level of the union would you say is the most influential now? 
35. Does the colliery manager / site managers of contracting firms have a free reign 
in dealing with the unions at this pit, or is industrial relations policy determined 
at a higher level? 
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36. Unlike BC, the company which owns your pit would not have state backing and 
government resources at its disposal in the event of a strike. Do you think this 
has made management more cautious in their dealings with the NUM / UDM / 
NACODS? 
Institutions of collective bargaining. 
40. Can you tell me how the provisions ofTUPE have applied at this pit? 
41. Can you tell me about the pay structure at this pit? 
42. How was this established? 
43. Can you tell me about the disputes procedure at this pit? 
44. How was this established? 
45. Can you tell me about the disciplinary / grievance procedure at this pit? 
46. How was this established? 
If no formal structures exist, how are disputes and disciplinary / grievance 
mattersresolved? 
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47. Are these structure / procedures standardised throughout the pit, or does each 
company have its own arrangements? 
48. Is this pit covered by any company wide / industry wide agreements negotiated 
jointly by management and the unions? 
49. At this pit, how important are informal agreements between management and 
the men which have no union involvement? 
50. Has performance related pay been introduced at this pit? (If yes, in what form?) 
51. Are any of the men at this pit employed on individual contracts? 
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Appendix C 
Pages 350-358 are a reproduction of the questionnaire used for date collection at the 
collieries considered by this study. 
Industrial Relations in the privatised coal industry. 
Workforce questionnaire. 
This questionnaire is part of a larger research proj ect which aims to assess how 
privatisation has affected industrial relations in the coal industry. Information will 
also be gathered from management and the trade unions, but this questionnaire seeks 
the views of the miners themselves. If you could spend 15 to 20 minutes filling in 
this questionnaire, this would be very helpful. All your answers will be treated in the 
strictest confidence. 
Guidance for completing this questionnaire. 
• Most of the questions will relate to your current job. 
• Some questions will ask you to compare what it is like to work for a private 
company with what it was like to work for British Coal. 
• Most of the questions should be answered by placing a tick in the relevent box. 
• Unless otherwise stated please tick one box only. 
Appendix C 
351 
1. Which colliery do you work at? 
2. Who are you employed by? 
o 
o 
The company which owns your pit e.g. RJB. 
A firm of sub contractors e.g. Thyssens. 
3. Which of the following best describes your position at the pit? 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Development / Face worker. 
Outbye worker. 
Surface worker. 
Craftsman. 
Deputy. 
Overman. 
Other. 
Please state 
4. Did you work for British Coal or the NCB before the industry was privati sed? 
o 
o 
Yes. 
No. 
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5. Which union do you belong to? 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
NDM. 
UDM. 
NACODS. 
None. 
Other. 
Please state 
---_. --------------------
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6. Are you more than one month in arrears with your union subscriptions? 
o 
o 
Yes. 
No. 
7. What is the length of your contract? 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o to 12 months. 
13 to 24 months. 
25 to 36 months. 
Over 36 months. 
8. How many hours do you normally work each week (including overtime)? 
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9. Is overtime working at your pit voluntary or compulsory? 
D 
D 
Voluntary. 
Compulsory. 
------------ ---
10. Do you perform a wider or narrower range of tasks in your current job than 
when you were employed by British Coal? 
D 
D 
D 
Wider variety of tasks. 
About the same variety of tasks. 
Narrower variety of tasks. 
11. Do you think the pace of work has increased or decreased since privatisation? 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Increased a great deal. 
Increased a little. 
Neither increased nor decreased. 
Decreased a little. 
Decreased a great deal. 
12. Do you think that safety standards at your pit have improved or worsened since 
privatisation? 
D Improved. 
D No change. 
D Worsened. 
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13. What is the attitude of management at your pit to trade union membership? 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Workers are encouraged to join the union of their choice. 
Workers are encouraged to join a particular union. 
Workers are neither encouraged nor discouraged from joining a 
umon. 
Workers are discouraged from joining a union. 
14. Which of the following best describes the attitude of management to the unions 
themselves at your pit? 
o 
o 
o 
o 
No unions are recognised at this colliery. 
Management only recognise the unions they want. 
Unions only have rights of representation. 
Unions have full bargaining rights. 
15. Which of the following best describes how decisions are made about the day to 
to day running of your pit? 
o 
o 
o 
Management impose their decisions without consulting the unions. 
Management consult the unions but still have the final say. 
Management and the unions come to joint decisions. 
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16. Does management communicate with the workforce using any of the following 
methods? 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Letters sent directly to workers' homes. 
Company / colliery newsheets sent directly to workers' homes. 
Videos / teletext messages on colliery premises. 
Team briefings. 
Please tick all which apply at your pit. 
17. Which of the following best describes the overall attitude of management at 
your pit? 
D Dictatorial. 
D Hard line. 
D Firm but fair. 
D Relaxed. 
D Easy going. 
18. Are all trade unions at your pit treated equally by management? 
D 
D 
Yes, management treats all the unions in the same way. 
No, some unions are treated better than others. 
19. If you ticked the second box in the last question could you say which union or 
unions are favoured by management, and why you think this is? 
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20. Which of the following best describes the range of issues trade unions have to 
deal with at your pit today? 
o 
o 
o 
The unions deal with a wider range of issues now than when British 
Coal owned the pit. 
The unions deal with about the same number of issues as when 
British Coal owned the pit. 
The unions deal with fewer issues now than when British Coal owned 
the pit. 
21. Do you think the unions at your pit have more or less influence now than they 
did when the colliery was owned by British Coal? 
o 
o 
o 
More influence now. 
About the same level of influence now. 
Less influence now. 
22. At which level do you think the unions have most influence? 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
National level. 
Company level. 
Area level. 
Pit level. 
Influential at all levels. 
Ineffective at all levels. 
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23. Since privatisation, have any of the following been introduced at your pit? 
o 
o 
o 
Fonnal pay structure. 
Fonnal disputes procedure. 
Fonnal disciplinary and grievance procedure. 
Please tick all which apply. 
24. How are changes to tenns and conditions of work usually made at your pit? 
o 
o 
o 
By reference to long standing fonnal agreements. 
By infonnal talks between management and the unions representing 
theworkers concerned. 
By infonnal talks between management and the workers themselves. 
25. To what extent are wages at your pit related to the perfonnance of individual 
workers? 
o 
o 
o 
Wages are totally dependent on perfonnance related pay. 
Wages are partially dependent on perfonnance related pay e.g. 
productivity bonuses. 
Wages are not related to perfonnance at all. 
26. Are you employed on an individual contract? 
o 
o 
Yes. 
No. 
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27. Finally, do you think that privatisation has been a good thing or a bad thing for 
miners? Why is this? 
Thank you very much for your help in completing this questionnaire. 
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